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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This report summarizes the main outcomes of a multidisciplinary study carried out from September 2013 to 
March 2015 by a group of forty researchers from different disciplines (7) and countries (10). 
The project Knowledge for Integration Governance (KING) was co-funded by the European Commission DG 
Home Affairs and its activities have been steered by the Ismu Foundation with the aim to feed the debate on 
integration governance and provide knowledge on the state of play of migrant inclusion throughout 
the European Union. 
 
To ensure the study’s comprehensiveness seven disciplines were involved: demography, economics, political 
science, social science, applied social studies, public administration and European policy. This different 
expertise deepened the research through utilizing various perspectives. Notably, the inclusion of public 
administrators in the research team provided insights on the importance of the policy vision. 
 
An analytical and prescriptive combined approach was used. Therefore, moving from the Common Basic 
Principles on migrants’ integration KING’s frame is partly shaped on the heuristic model of R. Penninx. This 
model analyses integration as it occurs in three dimensions (legal-political, socio-economic, cultural-religious) 
taking into account migrants’ and receiving societies’ role and position at institutional, collective and 
individual levels. By looking at these dimensions, KING provides evidence on integration processes and 
policies useful to provide recommendations for a better implementation of the Common Basic Principles of 
migrants' integration. 
 
The outcomes of the project’s analysis have produced more than fifty papers that have been used to inform 
the background papers of both the European Integration Forum of April 2014 and the Ministerial Conference 
under the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (5-6 November 2014).  
 
The methodology used included a comprehensive literature review from the seven disciplines. A crucial 
moment of the project was the subsequent lively brain-storming, that involved all KING researchers, which 
was carried out during the initial stages of the project. Then, each discipline conducted in-depth studies 
informed by the projects’ outcomes disciplinary concerns: statistical elaboration (demography), quantitative 
regressions (economics), case studies (political science, social science1 and public administration), migrants’ 
interviews (applied social studies),and further documents analysis (European policy). 
 
                                                          
1
 The eight case studies are: Amsterdam, Barcelona, Milan, Turin, Turku, Prague, Warsaw, and Stuttgart. They were studied in depth 
by the Social Science Unit of KING project and can be downloaded from www.king.ismu.org 
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Additionally, due to the renewed interest in the Common Basic Principles of Migrants’ Integration, the 
outcomes of the project have also been reorganized to provide policy recommendations supported by 
evidence suggesting concrete application of the principles at different level of governance. 
These materials, together with two summaries produced in two different moments of the project, are 
downloadable from the website: www.king.ismu.org 
 
KING is the acronym of Knowledge for Integration Governance 
 
The importance of producing knowledge for understanding integration processes and different mechanisms 
of governance were the essence of the project since its inception. Indeed, the leading assumption is that 
knowledge is essential for guiding policies and thus the process of integrating migrants. For achieving this 
goal, knowledge should shed light on the existing ways to govern integration at the different authority levels 
and give advice to support sharing activities among diverse contexts. 
 
 
o Knowledge 
 
Knowledge on integration could be considered as the awareness on the phenomenon in terms of migration 
flows, migrants’ presence and population's needs. More deeply, knowing the phenomena changes, by 
considering quantitative data as well as qualitative information, is the crucial aspect for tracking the 
transformation occurring in modern societies, understanding necessities and so identifying targets. 
In this regard, monitoring represents the main strategy for feeding knowledge and hence guiding policies. 
  
At the same time, the first Common Basic Principle defines integration as a mutual accommodation between 
migrants and receiving societies. However, to achieve this, it is pivotal that mutual knowledge, and therefore 
adjustment, between the two actors takes place. On one side, Member States, supported by the European 
Union, ask migrants to learn languages, rules, principles and elements of the receiving country’s culture. On 
the other side, receiving society has been mainly indirectly targeted sponsoring many studies and research 
that have been carried out to provide information and data on migration and integration. In the frame of this 
“educative mission” media have also been asked to play a part. Indeed, the result has not achieved the goal; 
and misleading information is disseminated producing fake myths on the matter. 
 
Much of the public discourse about migrants claims they are simply seeking to access benefits, however small, 
of established welfare states. This undermines the communitarian attitudes towards welfare provision which 
led originally to welfare systems being established. A growing tendency to blame migrants for a range of social 
and economic ills, and minorities for poor levels of achievement and social integration, have often 
exacerbated tensions which are easily manipulated by nationalist and, more recently, even mainstream 
political parties. 
 
As both groups – migrants and receiving society - should be addressed by policy measures, efforts should 
therefore be made in providing education about the reality of migration, introducing majorities to 
minorities, teaching intercultural communication skills and embedding migrants in organisations to try and 
help them adapt to insider perspectives.  
 
 
The perverse effects of misperceptions and discriminatory attitudes strongly hamper both economic and 
social integration. For example, some aspects related to cultural or religious identity are often easily 
stigmatized generating prejudice and discrimination by (individuals, organisations or institutions of) the 
receiving society. 
 
Sharing knowledge and experiences is one important way to decrease the risks linked to misperceptions 
and to shape successful inclusive strategies. Knowledge exchange is a well-established idea among the EC’s 
strategies for fostering integration. In fact, comparative studies and research carried out in different countries 
7 
and/or analysing different groups have generated a great deal of knowledge regarding the mechanisms of 
interaction between migrants and receiving societies as well as of other modalities of policies 
implementation. 
 
This methodology, inspired by the concept of reciprocal teaching, is, however, strongly contextually mediated. 
In other words, sharing knowledge implies becoming familiar with experiences of other contexts but taking 
into account the own environment features. 
 
Last but not least, knowledge also has a crucial role in implementing efficient and effective integration 
policies. In this regard, observatories are practical measures implemented for guaranteeing longitudinal data 
and information that is pivotal for policy makers. The final outcome could be the development of a ‘virtuous 
circle’ consisting of monitoring and evaluation activities functional to policy implementation and 
consequentially to integration. 
 
 
o Integration 
 
Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of 
Member States (CBP 1). This definition sheds light on the necessity to balance responsibilities between 
migrants and natives in order to make the integration process effective. From the moment immigrants arrive 
in a new society, they have basic needs such as finding a home, a job, schools for themselves and their children 
and health facilities. They also need to establish cooperation and interaction with other individuals and 
groups, and get to know and use institutions of the new society. This last element indicates the receiving 
societies’ crucial role in promoting integration. They are called to both provide services addressed to 
migrants, and accept and manage diversity. 
 
The current picture of migrants’ integration processes in Europe puts the concept of acceptance of whom is 
“other by me” as a starting point for supporting efficient integration paths. On the one hand, people need to 
get reciprocally closer and, on the other hand, chances – in terms of resources, opportunities and capitals – 
have to be enjoyed alike by migrants and natives so that integration can be fulfilled. 
Becoming an active part of the receiving society implies the need for safety and reassurance. In this regard, 
it has clearly emerged that acts of racism and harassment, of which migrants and people belonging to 
minorities are often the victim, reduce social confidence and so affect the whole process of integration. 
One of the most neglected aspects regarding integration knowledge concerns the perspective of migrants 
themselves. 
 
 The main questions addressed by the KING report asked (i) do migrants seek to be accepted by receiving 
societies by participating actively and voluntarily in their integration process?; (ii) what kind of aids migrants 
perceive as useful to their integration? 
 
The KING project found that there is a strong necessity to create fruitful relations among the different levels 
of governance, and between governance and the direct target of their policies. 
KING’s results highlighted how often migrants talk about the need to be accepted and the desire to contribute 
to the receiving society: integration is seen as desirable, as a key goal. 
 
Integration supported by different policies is sought and greatly appreciated. In particular, several measures 
seemed to be extremely important: opportunities offered to learn and practice the receiving country’s 
language; providing information about everyday life – particularly regarding systems, rules and regulations 
governing migration and settlement; offering opportunities and places to meet native people and get to know 
them; supporting access to employment suited to professional qualifications; recognition of skills and 
training; training and help to become self-employed; offering volunteering opportunities; help to become 
independent – by supporting organizations to help migrants solve problems for themselves rather than 
resolving problems for them. 
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Acceptance is associated with material security but also with contribution offered to the receiving country, 
such as being able to access the labour market. Therefore, adaptation is accepted and sought, in particular 
concerning language and institutional culture, but also in aspiring to living conditions enabling people to 
succeed. Mixing with a wide range of people is also desired as a form of reciprocal and mutual exchange, 
although it is rarely achieved. 
 
 
o Governance 
 
Migrant integration governance is still a challenge. It involves different actors across different policy areas at 
local, national and supranational levels. Responsibilities are divided between the different administrative 
levels with areas of coordination. 
Governance concerns who has the authorities over what. As far as integration is concerned, Member States 
are in charge. This means that the national level decides how policies have to be implemented and who 
their target is. 
However, at supranational level the EU plays an important role by offering a coherent framework for 
guiding and supporting Member States’ implementation of their policies. 
 
In addition, depending on contextual characteristics, some Member States also benefit from the active 
participation of their subnational levels such as federal states, regions or cities. These actors can also have 
a voice in designing integration-related policies. Indeed, the role of local authorities in delivering integration 
services is a pivotal aspect of integration governance. 
 
Cities, in general, demonstrate the ability to design inventive manners to deal with top-down policies that 
rarely seem to understand the necessities coming from the ground. Indeed, municipalities are called to 
concretize national policies by carrying out practices that are able to match the local integration needs on the 
one hand and the national desires on the other. 
 
At the same time, analysing integration requires consideration of the existing interconnections between the 
two silos of migration and integration governance. As said above, the virtuous circle for implementing 
efficient and effective policies would foresee a specific attention by policy makers to their context of 
reference. This means, as previously highlighted, that monitoring becomes a strategic tool guiding 
policymaking activities. One of the elements to monitoring is the impact and interconnectedness of migration 
policies on integration processes and policies. To illustrate this, one element of the project focused on the 
influence of detention upon arrival and integration. 
 
Integration can be governed following a mainstreaming strategy based on the consideration that migrants’ 
inclusion is a cross-cutting issue. This also highlights the dilemma between policies directly addressed to 
migrants rather than those having the entire population as target. 
 
The report’s structure 
This report has been conceived in order to fulfil two different goals. The first, is to provide a new contribution 
to the scientific debate on integration in Europe, and therefore contribute to existing knowledge; the second, 
is to supply policy makers with evidence and recommendations on how to foster integration processes at 
different levels of governance. Giving the large amount of material produced not all data from the papers 
could be included however they are all downloadable from the website www.king.ismu.org.  
 
Therefore, Chapter 1 describes some aspects of the migration presence in Europe. In particular, the 
demographic and economic dimensions are explored to better understand the previously established claim 
that Member States require inflows of migrants in order to replace shrinking populations and ageing work 
forces. This requires the openness of institutions to the new arrivals together with the open mind-set of 
European citizens. These two aspects are also investigated. 
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Chapter 2 reviews how migrant integration policy has been framed in Europe. In doing this, the two silos of 
integration and migration are considered, in order to understand how policy makers have perceived and 
therefore tackled those issues. The aim is to highlight the inner tension between the asserted pressure of 
immigration and the recognition of benefits which has resulted in a willingness to control migrant flows 
through a process of strict selection. Obviously, this narrow strategy is contrasted by the “shared values” 
Europe claims to pursue. Moreover, the growing importance of the European level is described as well as the 
undeniable shift from integration to securitization. This trend has changed how the integration process is 
perceived in terms of: who is asked to do what. Hence, the KING project has also analysed which groups the 
different policies target. Finally, the project added depth and nuance to these findings by including the voices 
of migrants themselves.  
 
The mechanisms of migrants’ integration governance and the different levels of political action are the 
subjects of Chapter 3. European, national, subnational, and local levels are considered in their own specific 
role, and also in their relation to the other levels. The struggle for competences has clearly appeared as well 
as tensions between desired goals and reasonable needs. Therefore, alliances between levels, primarily 
European and city levels and secondly among cities have been put in place. The second has been largely 
pushed by the European level seeking to face integration needs in the frame of a broader vision of integration, 
rather than the narrow lens usually used by national policy makers. The result of this complex picture is an 
intricate mix of actions where civil society and migrant associations play an increasingly larger role. 
Notwithstanding, despite the urgency of giving direct voice to migrants in order to let them to participate in 
the policy making process, this remain a slow work in progress. 
 
How integration takes place in the three dimensions cited by Penninx’ heuristic model - legal-political, socio-
economic, and cultural-religious - is tackled in Chapter 4. The KING project has broadly examined how cities 
have dealt with those issues. This has been based on the awareness that integration challenges are faced 
primarily by the local level. Therefore, the three dimensions of integration have been analysed, resulting in 
policy recommendations for the different level of governance. 
 
Chapter 5 is focused on the integration strategies of mainstreaming, monitoring and non-discrimination. 
Mainstreaming has been considered as a desirable, coordinated and harmonised process of decision-making, 
which brings together different entities. This should be done at all levels in a frame of both horizontal and 
vertical multilevel governance. Secondly, mainstreaming concerns the way the target population is 
conceptualized. Specifically, mainstreaming follows the logic of “we as a whole” rather than “us and them” 
when possible. Monitoring, is a strategy that should be put in place at each level of governance. Collecting 
information on the characteristics and needs of the population makes policy guidance and processes more 
fruitful. At the same time, monitoring practices provides the data in order to evaluate modalities and results 
and therefore to rectifying interventions that are not achieving their goals. Non-discrimination is also a cross-
cutting strategy. As mentioned above, integration policies and practices help migrants’ inclusion into the 
receiving society but other variables play a crucial role in supporting or hampering the process of becoming 
integrated. Discriminatory behaviours, particularly at institutional level, are a key barrier to integration. 
Therefore, implementing policies that are able to foster and propagate non-discriminatory attitudes is a 
necessity. 
 
 
 
 
In order to make the reading easier, the present report does not have bibliographic references with the 
exception of KING projects’ papers. Bibliography can be found in each of the project’s papers. 
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1. THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT IN BRIEF. POPULATION, LABOUR MARKET 
AND ATTITUDES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Immigration to Europe is by no means a new phenomenon. However, immigration regulation was an inven-
tion of the XXth century. As for integration policies, they emerged on national and European political agendas 
even later, after Western European countries realized that guest workers were not set out to return to their 
country of origin. Accordingly, integration policies were not designed ab nihilo but, on the contrary, were 
inserted in an already pre-existing and complex context. Consequently, even if the aim (i.e. the need to inte-
grate new migrants into receiving societies) was similar from one place to another, the output; the policy 
response, was bound to differ. This section offers an overview, though not exhaustive, of the various factors 
that affect integration policies namely, economics, demography and receiving society’s attitude towards the 
phenomenon. 
 
Migration is a constant aspect of human history, but the scope and features of the phenomenon change 
according to world economy and politics and vary through different geographical regions. Even within Eu-
rope, the story of migration is very different. If immigration started in the Northwest-European countries, 
other countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Norway and Finland, that used to be emigra-
tion countries until the 1980s, started to experience significant immigration in the 1990s and 2000s. In a 
different manner, still other countries, among them most of the new EU-Member States that accessed in 
2004 or after, are experiencing emigration, transit migration and immigration at the same time (Penninx et 
al., 2014). 
 
Due to contemporary globalization, migration to Europe has accelerated in speed and scale and has become 
highly diverse in terms of immigrants’ characteristics and patterns of spatial distribution. The geographical 
position of Europe, not surrounded by oceans, but part of the unstable continent of Eurasia, with Africa and 
the Middle East a few miles away, causes unavoidable propensity to be chosen as destination by migrants. 
Thousands of asylum seekers drown at sea trying to reach Europe each year.  
 
In the last twenty years, more than 26 million people have migrated to the EU (not including the new member 
states’ migrants after 2004 and 2007) and the percentage of non-communitarian citizens living in the EU is 
now close to 7% (quite unevenly distributed in the various member states). The trend is likely to continue in 
the next decades both because of push factors such as high socio-economic inequalities between developed 
and developing countries that foster job seekers, and the many regional conflicts and authoritarian regimes 
that create asylum seekers. Pull factors also encourage migration such as the decline and aging of the EU 
population and the refusal of many native workers to perform low prestige jobs. This fosters the demand for 
workers willing to accept those jobs and who also pay the related taxes and social insurance contributions 
(Martinelli, 2014a). 
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The current anti-migrant, anti-multiculturalism ideology is often created and perpetuated by politicians and 
the media, making some migrants and minorities too fearful to fully engage with the host society. This im-
pacts upon their mental and physical health and hinders their access to social and economic opportunities. 
Such ideology legitimises racism while the move towards welfare chauvinism enhances vulnerability and ex-
clusion. There is a need to base the immigration debate on facts and evidence rather than myths and to 
highlight the important role that migrants play in economies and society and to accept the inevitability of 
population diversity in a globalised world. Understanding that the world (rather than just particular localities) 
is changing and highlighting the reality behind immigration may help to generate a more sensible discussion 
(e.g. surveys have shown that residents think that migration levels are 3 times higher than they are) (Marti-
nelli, 2014a). 
 
 
 
1.1 Europe’s demographic changes2 
 
 
o Migration over the last decade 
 
We now know that the European population is ageing. Total fertility rates in most EU countries fall under two 
children per woman and the old-age dependency ratios are already fairly high. The trend therefore indicates 
a shrinking workforce. The rise of social expenditure for welfare and migration seems the ideal solution, 
provided migrants can contribute to increase the workforce and also act to rejuvenate the host society with 
the support of “young” population.  
 
Over the past ten years, significant numbers of migrants entered the EU area. Inflows however are not 
distributed evenly across Europe. Some countries observe a rising net number of migrants (difference 
between those that arrive and those that leave over a given period) whereas others can still be regarded as 
emigration countries. To be more specific, over the period 2001-2011, three clusters of countries show three 
different trends. 
 
A first cluster is made up of five countries (Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) which 
receive the largest number of migrants compared to the number of departures (a positive net balance, 
annually around 100 thousand people or above). A second group includes 16 EU countries (Belgium, Sweden, 
Ireland, Austria, Portugal, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Greece, Denmark, Hungary, Cyprus, Finland, 
Croatia, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Malta) in which the annual net contribution in 2001-2011, although 
positive, was not as big as in the previous group: no more than 50 thousand people. A third cluster covers 
countries with a negative balance in the decade 2001-2011. They all belong to the Eastern Europe, namely: 
Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and Estonia (Figure 1). Within this latter group Romania 
was the country with the largest negative net balance (minus 161 thousand people annually) while Estonia 
was the country with the smallest negative net migration (minus one thousand people) (Testa, 2014a; 
Blangiardo, 2014a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Contents taken from G.C. Blangiardo, 2014b 
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Figure 1 - Average net contribution (thousands of people added/lost annually) in the 28 EU countries. Years 2001-
2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Testa, 2014a; based on Eurostat data 
 
 
Influxes are mostly made up of people in their working age (15-64) and therefore considerably contribute to 
increasing the European workforce.  
 
The contribution of migration to the EU working age population more than doubled over the period 1991-
2011. Overall, there were almost 13 million people added to the EU-28 working-age population (15-64) in the 
decade 2001-2011 compared to 5.6 million in the previous decade 1991-2001. There were considerable 
differences by age. A peak of additional people in the age group 25-29 can be observed for the EU-28 as a 
whole (Figure 2). At these ages there were around 1,304 thousand women and 1,120 thousand men added 
to the EU population in the decade 2001-2011 (there were slightly more for the male population in the 
subsequent age group 30-34). In the previous ten years the number of EU additional people in the same ages 
(25-29) due to migration was considerably smaller: around 554 thousand women and 337 thousand men; 
moreover in this former period, a second peak of migrants is visible in the 35-39 age group for males (see 
Figure 2). This is larger than that observed at ages 25-29 (364 thousand men). This result seems to suggest 
that the workforce added between 1991 and2001 was not only of a smaller size but also had a different age 
structure, i.e., more mature than that arrived in the most recent years. At each working-age group, the net 
contribution of migration to the EU workforce was larger in the most recent decade, 2001-2011, than in the 
previous one, 1991-2001. The differences are striking at ages 25-29 after which the number of additional 
females and males in 2001-2011 decline steeply and tend to converge with those of 1991-2001. There are 
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also some gender differences: migrants were more often females than males in the central ages 20 to 34 
years in 1991-2001 and in the ages 20 to 29 in 2001-2011, as a consequence, the age profile of female 
migrants is steeper than that of male migrants in 1991-2001 as well as in 2001-2011 (Testa, 2014a.11). 
 
 
Figure 2 - Additional contribution to the EU working-age population - 1991-2011 (thousands of people acquired 
throughout the decade). Age profiles. EU-28 
 
Source: Testa, 2014a; based on Eurostat data 
 
 
Some further consideration should be given to the contrast that positive net migrations would have towards 
the aging of population and the correspondent social spending on welfare. Short-term changes in ageing rates 
and in old-age dependency ratios can be expected to be downwards when immigration prevails, and upwards 
when emigration prevails, as the majority of migrants are quite young. But over longer period changes will 
depend on the cumulated effect of immigrants, as some of them will get older in destination countries. 
 
Taking a long-term perspective, if we consider the aging rates and the old-age dependency ratios referred to 
life-years that the additional (or lost) population will spend in the destination country (or will not spend into 
the country of origin), we can see that the values of the two indicators are much higher than the current ones. 
 
Table 1 - EU-28: ageing indicators for native and acquired population 
Ageing indicators According to: 
 Age distribution of 
residents 2001-2011 
(A) 
Age distribution of 
additional people acquired 
in 2001-2011 
(B) 
Life-years that will be 
spent by people acquired 
in 2001-2011 
(C) 
Ageing rate (*) 16.7 2.4 34.3 
Old age dependency ratio (**) 27.4 3.4 55.5 
    
(*) % of people aged 65 or more (col. A and B) & % of life-years spent in age 65 or more (col. C) 
(**) People aged 65 or more per 100 aged 20-64 (col. A and B) & years spent in age 65 or more per 100 years spent in age 20-64 (col. C) 
Source: Blangiardo’s elaboration on Eurostat data 
 
 
The number of additional life-years to be spent by migrants in retirement ages is quite high for many EU 
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receiving countries: it is more than half the years spent in work. As a consequence, although migration is 
mainly a resource for the EU labour force, we should also consider the relevant costs in terms of welfare 
system that should be paid for migrants in a long term scenario under the assumption of definitive settlement 
in the country of destination.  
 
 
o Migration trends 
 
This trend is likely to be similar in the next 20 to 40 years, despite rather inconclusive and contradictory 
research, as Kaczmarczyk (2014) shows. This is because migration, as a complex phenomenon, is difficult to 
forecast and a lot has to do with the methodology used and/or the stance adopted in undertaking a 
projection. Migration is complex for several reasons. It is a social process that may be driven by different 
elements such as dynamics inherent to the phenomenon (presence of migrant networks and transnational 
social spaces) and the significant impact of migration policies.  
 
Unlike births and deaths, mobility is a multifaceted phenomenon (from circular to settlement migration) 
which is reflected in the poor quality and low reliability of migration data. Difficulties with forecasting 
international migration are clearly visible when analysing the migration projections that are available. In most 
cases the presented outcomes are mainly a product of (sometimes strict) assumptions. On one hand, some 
projections assume that net migration will converge to zero in the long term. On the other, expected labour 
market needs are acknowledged as a factor leading to increase in the scale of the inflow in the future.  
 
Considering our knowledge on mobility and migration, future large-scale immigration to the EU countries is 
inevitable. This is for many reasons including persistent wage and living conditions gaps between North and 
South countries, differences in the economic growth rates, structural demand for foreign labour, as noted in 
most EU countries, and presence of strong migrant networks. These factors can be mitigated by migration 
policies but they cannot change the picture significantly, as shown by most of the empirical evidence. These 
expectations are in line with forecasts discussed in this paper (Kaczmarczyk, 2014). 
 
Moreover, immigration to Europe seems very important for the future of European economies and societies. 
Shrinking populations are expected to challenge the economic situation in many EU countries. There are 
several solutions at hand, including increasing participation rates, changes in retirement age and the 
utilization of labour market reserves but still immigration remains inescapable (and useful). This is shown by 
the data pointing to the importance of immigration for current population balances of well developed 
countries which is likely to gain in importance in the future.  
 
Immigrants are not only expected to influence the age structures of European populations. According to the 
forecasts presented a significant inflow in the labour market is expected – both in quantitative (life-years 
contribution in terms of the labour market activity) as well as qualitative terms (filling labour market gaps, 
providing certain skills). Last but not least, available studies show that even if immigration is not an ultimate 
solution it can become a serious relief for the sustainability of European welfare states (Kaczmarczyk, 2014). 
 
 
o Migration’s effect on receiving societies: long-term demographic scenarios per country 
 
The population usually resident in the EU-28 has been estimated at 507 million on 1st January 2014 (Eurostat, 
October 2014). However, assuming that the annual number of births remains constant - at the average level 
recorded from 2002 to 2011 (roughly within the last two population censuses in state members) - and that 
the current mortality probability by age and gender will be unchanged, the corresponding EU stationary 
population should be only 416 million, 18% less than the current figure3. This means that the 5.2 million 
                                                          
3 A stationary population holds two issues: a) “zero grow”, i.e. inflows (births and immigrations) are fully balanced by outflows (deaths 
and emigrations); b) age and sex distribution not subject to changing. The stationariness is a final condition that can be achieved 
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annual births that occurred in the decade 2002-2011 will be unable to maintain, at the present life expectancy 
levels, the current EU number of residents. 
 
If we take into account the net contribution of 1.3 million people from outside the EU (usually related to 
international migrations) that have been added annually (on average) during this decade the stationary 
population rises to 486 million: i.e. only 4% less than the current residents. 
 
Migration could be considered as fundamental to support the EU population, but it should be remembered 
that even if a high level of net inflows is maintained – i.e. similar to that at the beginning of the new century 
- migration alone will not be able to halt the trend towards a reduction of the total number of residents 
living in EU-28. In particular, whilst there are inadequate births in EU-15 to ensure the stability of the total 
residents, for the newer EU members (EU 13) the reductive effects of insufficient births will be aggravated by 
an overall negative net migration. 
 
A small number of EU member states will increase in population size namely: Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, 
Luxembourg and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, Sweden and The United Kingdom. In contrast, low births 
coupled with persistent negative net migrations suggest substantial reductions of the total of residents (more 
that 50% less) in Lithuania, Romania, Latvia and Bulgaria. Further considerable reductions (over 20%) could 
also be seen in Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Estonia and, the sole exception among EU 15, for Germany. 
 
If we consider the change in the number of residents without taking into account geographical mobility, it is 
easy to see this leads to the demographic decline in virtually all members of the EU 28, with the sole exception 
of Ireland. 
 
 
Table 2 - Actual EU population and its expected changes towards the model of stationariness according to recent 
natural and migratory demographic dynamics  
 EU 28 EU 15 EU 13 
UR- Usually residents on 1st January 2014 (millions) 507 402 105 
Annual births on average 2002-2011 (millions) 5,2 4,1 1,1 
SP1- Corresponding stationary population a (millions) 416 335 81 
Annual Additional/lost population 2002-2011 (millions) 1,3 1,5 -0,2 
SP2- Corresponding stationary population b (millions) 486 417 69 
Change SP1 vs. UR -18% -17% -23% 
Change SP2 v. UR -4% +4% -34% 
a According to a constant annual total of births (average 2002-2011) and no change of 2012 mortality probability by age and gender. 
b According to a constant annual total of births (average 2002-2011 level), no change of 2012 mortality rates by age and gender and a constant annual 
addition (or loss) of population by age and gender equivalent to the average 2002-2011. 
Source: Blangiardo’s elaboration on Eurostat data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
when, for a long number of years, both the frequency of births and the death probabilities are constant (and also constant net 
migrations by sex and age could be considered). The model of stationariness could give a benchmark scenario to assess what will be 
the final effects of the current demographic conditions (as to births, deaths and net migrations) if they will be kept constant over 
time. 
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Figure 3 – EU 28 members: expected % change in the total residents towards the model of stationariness according to 
recent natural and migratory demographic dynamics 
 
 
 
Source: Blangiardo’s elaboration on Eurostat data 
 
 
 
 
o Workforce shortages 
 
The regressive scenario for the whole EU-28 residents is still valid, with even greater severity, when 
considering the active age population dynamics. Indeed according to the stationary model without migration, 
reproducing the current levels of births and mortality rates, the EU-28 population aged 20-64 will fall from 
307 million (as recorded on 1st January 2013) to 178 million (-42%) when stationariness is reached. Only by 
including constant support through migration into the model, is the active age population decline less severe: 
from the current 307 million to the expected 224 million at reaching of the stationariness (-27%). 
 
Again the presence of migration acts differently in EU-15 countries compared to EU-13. While migratory flows 
slow down the fall of the working age population in EU-15, they often increase the fall in the new members 
of EU post enlargements. For some of the latter, the lack of migration would even result in an increase of 
active age population. This is the case of Lithuania, Romania and Latvia, where currently the active age 
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population stock is affected by past losses due to out migration.  
 
Table 3 - Actual EU population aged 20-64 and its expected changes towards the model of stationarity according to 
recent natural and migratory demographic dynamics  
 EU 28 EU 15 EU 13 
R- Residents on 1st January 2013 (millions) 307 240 67 
SP1- Stationary population without migrationsa (millions) 178 126 52 
SP2- Stationary population with migrationsb (millions) 224 179 45 
Change SP1 vs. R -42% -48% -22% 
Change SP2 v. R -27% -25% -33% 
a According to a constant annual total of births (average 2002-2011) and no change of 2012 mortality probability by age and gender. 
b According to a constant annual total of births (average 2002-2011 level), no change of 2012 mortality rates by age and gender and a constant annual 
addition (or loss) of population by age and gender equivalent to the average 2002-2011. 
Source: Blangiardo’s elaboration on Eurostat data 
 
 
Figure 4 - EU 28 members: expected % change in the 20-64 aged residents towards the model of stationariness 
according to recent natural and migratory demographic dynamics 
 
Source: Blangiardo’s elaboration on Eurostat data 
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1.2 The role of the labour market structure4 
 
 
Migrant integration depends on the labour market opportunities that migrants find at arrival and on the 
human capital selection which is achieved by migration policies. We refer, for example, to economic migrants 
from EU countries who may move because of free movement which reduces the migration cost and the 
disparity in wage levels which acts as an incentive, or to refugees who come because they are fleeing 
violence, or irregular migrants who do not comply with national policy. 
 
The construction of a common market and a common monetary structure in Europe, has not been followed 
by the needed harmonisation of the labour market and the employment system. Instead several different 
trends can be traced and a complex picture emerges.  
 
Despite the complexity, some trends can be identified. Despite integration or migration policies, labour mar-
kets follow their own internal rules which strongly impact on the economic assimilation of migrants and, 
therefore, on their chances to be integrated in the host society. Hence, if it is possible to implement anti-
discrimination measures or to introduce changes in the bargaining system, for instance, it is hardly possible 
to act on the job-opportunities offered by the labour market. The demands in the primary sector cannot be 
transformed into opportunities for high skilled migrants or into possibilities for occupational growth in the 
short run. At the same time the domestic service sector continues to adsorb a large part of the female supply 
without offering many chances of upward mobility. 
 
There are systematic differences across advanced economies in their socio-economic regimes that strongly 
impact on the integration process. They distinguish between four types of labour market structures: coor-
dinated market economies (CMEs), which prevail in the Nordic countries as well as in Austria, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and to some extent Germany; the liberal market economies (LMEs) – which include 
United Kingdom and Ireland -; the Southern-statist mixed market economies (MMEs) – Spain, France, Italy, 
Greece and Portugal – and last the emerging market economy (EMEs) of the Central European countries.  
 
Linking the types of socio-economic regimes to migration shows a number of insights in migrants’ outcomes 
in terms of economic integration. In broad terms, the quantitative and qualitative differences in immigra-
tion in the different European countries can be referred to the socio-economic regime variation. Indeed, 
opportunities for low-paid and low-skilled employment attract many migrants, while education and training 
institutions differently shape the domestic supply of labour. 
 
Compared to coordinated market economies (CMEs), in liberal market economies (LMEs) immigrant-native 
gaps in low-skilled employment are attenuated. On the other hand, mixed (MME) and emerging market econ-
omies (EMEs) seem to disadvantage immigrants when it comes to skilled employment, but provide better 
conditions than coordinated market economies with regard to participation, unemployment, and temporary 
employment. 
 
Countries with so-called flexible labour markets, limited regulation, lower minimum wages and lower trade 
union density appear, initially, more favourable destinations for immigrants, enabling them to find their first 
employment.  
 
The role trade unions play in influencing migrant integration in the economic dimension can be pivotal either 
through direct actions such as protecting interests of migrants, by raising migrants’ awareness of their enti-
tled rights and, more interestingly, they act indirectly through several means such as monitoring compliance 
with relevant legal regulation or, more importantly, bargaining for an extended coverage of collective agree-
ments. 
 
                                                          
4
 Contents taken from Kahanec et al., 2014a/2014b/2014c 
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In fact, where higher collective agreement coverage rates exist migrants are more integrated in the labour 
market; obviously the other side of the coin is the preclusion of mass immigration from this system. This is 
the case in Nordic countries where access to the labour market is strongly protected but once accepted, 
migrants face less discrimination or insecurity, equal wages and upward mobility. Moreover, in those coun-
tries migrants are less employed in sectors linked to personal services, restoration or construction.  
 
Higher union density increases the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives. On the other hand, 
collective bargaining coverage seems to have no significant effects. 
 
In line with this argument, in contrast to Ireland or the UK, Sweden, as a country with a very high trade union 
density and a relatively rigid labour market, demonstrates one of the lowest immigrant employment rates in 
Europe. 
 
In contrast, fragmented bargaining systems in liberal market and emerging economies as well as the informal 
system (in MMEs) permit easy access to more precarious work: as it is a flexible system that is therefore 
associated with high migration rates. This system allows employers to take advantage of the migrant labour 
force as it responds easily to the volatile demand of the labour market. In particular, Southern countries have 
a larger number of new migrants who are employed in households and in the construction sector – at least 
up until the crisis started-; whereas the health and community service sectors employ the most migrants in 
the UK and Ireland. In Spain, migrants have been harshly affected. The cost of informality has weighed both 
on migrants, in terms of the impossibility to claim benefits and on the receiving society in terms of omitted 
tax revenue. 
 
Finally, the dual bargaining system present in Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and Germany, 
that clearly divide insiders from outsiders is not effective for natives or migrants and it is combined with of 
informality of the outsiders. This is more evident in Germany, where immigrants are over-represented in 
atypical employment while natives are covered by collective bargaining and enjoy of employment security. 
 
The link between the skill formation system and the industrial relation system clearly impacts on the in-
clusiveness of migrants. Indeed, whereas in CMEs the two systems are strongly interconnected, in the LMEs 
the situation is reversed; as a result employers in coordinated market economies are interested in migrants 
with specific skills whereas in liberal market economies migrants with general and transferable skills are pre-
ferred. 
 
Accordingly, skill acquisition and the production regime is supported by different education and training sys-
tems. Hence, general skills, easily transferable across firms and industries, are supplied by public education. 
The latter also fully participate in the “dual system” that combines public education with training provided 
“on-the-job”. Finally, companies provide firm-specific skills that are the least transferable. Employers are 
mainly involved in the dual-skills formation system through which trust and knowledge are put in place and, 
as a consequence, migrants can be strongly affected by their exclusion from the process from the outset; 
accordingly, they have easy access in general skill regimes, as it is the case in UK. 
 
This aspect should be taken into account not only with regards to newly arrived migrants, who are excluded 
by this recruitment system, but also second and third generation migrants. In this case, the drop-out phe-
nomenon affects different levels. In one case, CMEs, it can prevent migrants from the entering the labour 
market, in the other, in LMEs, it can be the reason for an early start but a consequent lack of upgrading.  
 
Employment protection of regular contracts reduces the gap in the prevalence of low-skilled employment 
between immigrants and natives; however, it pushes immigrants into temporary employment.  
 
Employment protection of temporary contracts has similar effects on immigrant-native gaps in low-skilled as 
well as temporary employment. In addition, it disadvantages immigrants vis-à-vis the natives in terms of 
participation and employment gaps. 
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However, that higher welfare spending may lock immigrants into their existing positions and make them less 
fluid. We conclude that migrants generally grease the wheels of their receiving labour markets, but that this 
potential is not fully realized due to extant barriers to mobility. 
 
Labour market mobility tends to reduce low-skill employment amongst migrants; anti-discrimination 
measures tend to reduce unemployment gap between migrants and natives. 
 
We find that migrants respond to labour shortages more than natives in EU-15 countries, and thus provide 
more efficient labour allocation in the EU-15. We also show that the immigrants' responsiveness depends on 
countries’ economic and institutional contexts. In particular, we find that immigrants are especially respon-
sive in countries with high unemployment rates, in economically more developed countries (with high GDP), 
and in countries that provide immigrants with good access their labour markets, and/or social democratic 
welfare systems.  
 
 
 Temporary and circular migration are possible, but can only be effectively encouraged by the real 
portability of social security and pension benefits together with providing real health care access.  
 
 
Furthermore, working with sending countries’ institutions in order to provide better use of remittances in 
terms of a safety net in the country of origin can have the result of decreasing inequalities there.  
 
 
 Governments should focus on the role of labour market access as a key to successful integration, rather 
than thinking about large-scale social engineering projects. 
 
 Bilateral or multilateral frameworks should be put in place in order to match skills and gaps. 
 
 
 
1.3 Receiving societies: between discrimination, misconceptions and xenophobia 
 
 
Attitudes and behaviour of the majority may impact the discriminated minority group, while this is rarely the 
case for any similar attitudes and behaviour on the part of minority.  
 
In liberal democracies, legislation is the highest form of institutional regulation of inclusion and exclusion. 
The existence and substance of legal discrimination is determining laws. In nation states, the political exclu-
sion of alien immigrants is the major source of exclusion. It is a generally accepted and legitimized form of 
exclusion. The general legislation, regulations, norms and values and structure of receiving society may not 
be geared to the particular needs, characteristics or circumstances of newcomers, even if such arrangements 
stipulate equality in the formal sense.  
 
Societies are regulated by laws and rules that are made by and accepted by majorities of national citizens. 
Immigrants do not influence the creation and implementation of such arrangements. Still more important, 
many of these arrangements legitimize distinction between citizens and non-citizen residents as reflected in 
differential social rights (i.e. access to social assistance or state pension), industrial rights (employment ben-
efits) or political and civil rights (right to vote or to organize). 
 
Within institutions and organizations that indirectly exclude certain groups or categories like women, immi-
grants or disabled persons, the simple application of existing rules, habits and customs can be enough to 
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cause the unintended, unconscious exclusion of these categories. For instance, staff recruitment procedures, 
including culture-biased tests, may have serious exclusionary effect.  
 
The reverse may also be the case. Racist and xenophobic ideas about groups may exist, while institutions, 
organizations and individuals entertaining such ideas may not be in a position to translate the ideas into 
discriminatory acts, or may refrain from such actions because discrimination would harm their own interest. 
 
Institutional social exclusion, through legislation, regulations and conventions - either formulated and im-
plemented explicitly and purposely, or adopted as an unintentional consequence of the practical function-
ing of existing institutions - is the most powerful mechanism of social discrimination. 
 
 
 The institutional setting is often mono-cultural at present: cross-cutting strategies of integration must 
be changed in order to adapt to diversity, so that they can take into account all variables (e.g. age, 
gender, ethnicity) and be sensitive to differences both between and within different diverse groups. 
 
 Institutions should acknowledge and promote the wide ranging benefits of diversity and should make 
wide-ranging efforts to change the negative discourse surrounding migrants, by presenting diversity 
as an opportunity. 
 
 
o The public opinion 
 
Much of the public discourse about migrants claims they are simply seeking to access benefits, however 
small, of established welfare states and thus undermining the solidarity attitudes towards welfare provision 
which led originally to welfare systems being established. A growing tendency to blame migrants for a range 
of social and economic ills, and minorities for poor levels of achievement and social integration, has often 
exacerbated tensions which are easily manipulated by nationalist and, more recently, even mainstreams po-
litical parties.  
 
Political parties and movements deserve special attention; nationalist-populist right-wing parties and move-
ments with strong xenophobic and anti-immigrant positions have recently gained ground in many European 
countries and can feed a vicious circle of more obstacles to integration, more cultural and ethnic tensions, 
more demands for securitisation policies. The perverse effects of misconceptions and discriminatory atti-
tudes strongly hamper both economic and social integration. For example, some aspects related to cultural 
or religious identity are often easily stigmatized generating prejudice and discrimination by (individuals, or-
ganisations or institutions of) the receiving society. That leads – even if access is legally guaranteed - to fewer 
opportunities and lower outcomes for migrants in domains such as employment, education, health and hous-
ing. Evidence shows that national and local media also have an important role in shaping the attitudes of 
natives.  
 
Over the years, and according to Eurobarometer data, the perception of immigration as one of the two 
most important problems facing country has varied over the period 2003-2013. From 0 to 50% of respond-
ents (all countries considered except Spain that is an outlier with a peak up to 65% in 2006) across Europe 
range immigration as one of the two most important problems. The UK and Malta have the two highest 
trends in this regard as they respectively oscillate between 20 and 40% and 15 to 50% over the period. Over-
all, the figures hint at a positive correlation between the size of the migrant population and anti-migrant 
opinion, even if the authors warn against hasty conclusion. Other variables should be considered such as the 
actual level of integration that may weigh against negative opinion or else the immigrant position of the 
political offer (Poletti, Regalia, 2014a). 
 
Immigration is perceived by citizens of EU countries more as a cultural problem than an economic one. 
Policy-scores highlight that anti-immigration attitudes relate more to the perception of a cultural threat than 
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to the perception of an economic threat. Of course exceptions exist. Indeed, much evidence in the UK sug-
gests that, on the contrary, the cultural issue is subsidiary to the economic one: they take “our” jobs is the 
familiar complaint. 
 
The regression carried out confirms that dissatisfaction with the economy, politically conservative, low 
education attainment tend to match negative attitude towards immigration. Political positioning and edu-
cation attainment weigh more than other variables considered, such as satisfaction with the economy; pro-
fessional situation (employed, unemployed, student, inactive); political ideology (self-placement); education 
level; and the control for gender, age, satisfaction with life in general, and political interest (Poletti, Regalia, 
2014a). 
 
 
 Integration policies should encompass measures concerning the attitudes and behaviours of settled 
population (natives and migrants previously arrived) towards newcomers, as i.e. trough national 
education curricula.  
 
 Migrants and receiving society should be addressed by policy measures, efforts should be made in 
providing education about the reality of migration, introducing majorities to minorities, teaching 
intercultural communication skills, myth-busting. 
 
 Media campaigns should increase awareness about the positive effect migrants have on growth, 
national income and innovation. 
 
 There is a great need to focus initiatives on receiving communities as they strongly participate in the 
integration process but are too often neglected in intercultural measures. 
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2. THE FRAMING OF MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When studying integration policies, the first topic to analyse is how different political and social actors per-
ceive and frame immigrant integration. A frame is (a reconstruction of) the problem definition of a policy 
issue, including the underlying assumptions about its causes and the remedies for it. This means looking at 
how the problem is actually defined and explained. In terms of problem definition, the first question is how 
immigration is perceived: is it seen as a problem or as opportunity? Who has the moral and/or legal right to 
be/become an immigrant? Who are the wanted and unwanted immigrants? For immigrants who are actually 
present in the host society, the basic question is whether they are seen as “foreigners”, as “temporary guests” 
or as permanent members of the society for whom the state accepts the same responsibilities as for native 
citizens, guaranteeing the same rights and providing the same facilities. 
 
Frames cannot always be analysed directly but have to be reconstructed from policy documents and political 
discourses. When a policy is defined, there is generally an explicit formulation of a perceived problem and of 
the desired outcome of the specific efforts that are taken by policies. Such verbal, politically debated state-
ments in and about policy documents contain the essential elements of policy frames. The elements analysed 
here and compared are: general assumptions about, and orientations on, causes of the problem and reme-
dies as well as basic concepts used (or explicitly rejected) in some of the main European documents, general 
aims of policies at different levels of governance, policy shifts occurring in the way integration is perceived, 
and definition of the main target groups. 
 
 
 
2.1 General assumptions, orientations and basic concepts used 
 
 
Since integration policies are defined politically by (the majorities within) the receiving society, there is an 
inherent danger of representing the expectations and demands of this society, or dominant parts of it, 
rather than the possibility that these policies be defined on the basis of participation, negotiation and 
agreement with immigrant groups. 
 
The development of the concept of integration in policies (i.e. the specific meaning that is given explicitly or 
implicitly to integration in policy formulation and practice) should be understood against the background of 
how immigration has been framed in Europe. While the United States and Canada define themselves as 
countries built by immigration and immigrants, Northwest-European countries in the post-war period did 
exactly the opposite in their guest worker policies: they started to attract hands for their booming economies 
but on a temporary basis, ideally without their families and with an explicit expectation of return. From such 
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a perspective, in the last century there was no need of integration policies in the legal/political and 
cultural/religious dimensions that later has been recognized as crucial, while integration in the socio-
economic dimension was pursued only as far and as long as required by their (temporary) stay. 
 
 
2.1.1 Immigration: how policy-makers perceive it 
 
At the European level immigration is perceived both as a problem, in term of control, and as an opportunity 
in term of economic growth and partial and inescapable remedy to the aging society and the skills short-
ages in certain sectors of the labour market.  
 
In terms of policy, migration has been essentially framed as a security or a legal issue. Security features 
strongest (60.3 per cent of all measures) in an analysis which included 116 EU policy measures from the 
introduction of the third pillar in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 to 2013 (Heidbreder, 2014a). The strong con-
centration on restrictive measures overall is evident. In contrast, legal measures granting rights account for 
a maximum of three measures a year in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007. Notably, from 2005 there is also an 
increase in measures that deal with both restrictions and rights.  
 
The initial instrument choice in the EU framework had far reaching consequences. Initially framed as a 
security issue, the policy competences are embedded in this particular area of EU competences, under the 
DG Home Affairs portfolio, with specific decision making modes and actors. 
 
The first document provided by the European Commission on migration, the Communication on a Community 
Immigration Policy in 2000 proposed a new approach to immigration. According to the Commission,  
 
“there is a growing recognition that, in this new economic and demographic context, the existing “zero” im-
migration policies which have dominated thinking over the past 30 years are no longer appropriate"5.  
 
The same idea has been reaffirmed specifically in relation to an aging society. Indeed, although it is clear that 
immigration cannot be the solution to the shrinking population, it remains inescapable (Kaczmarczyk, 2014). 
In the Conclusion of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Members States on the 
integration of Third Country Nationals (9905/14), the Council recognizes the central role of migration “given 
the demographic shrinking in Member States and the shortages in certain sectors of the European Labour 
Market” (page 4).  
 
This vision does not seem to match national perspectives and a difference emerged between countries that 
quickly recognized themselves as immigration countries and those which struggled to face this reality. None-
theless the majority of European countries have developed an explicitly anti-immigration rhetoric. Immi-
gration has been perceived in particular ways. After labour migration had stopped in the mid-1970s, there 
was a growing contradiction between the facts of immigration and the denial of defining themselves as im-
migration countries. While some countries like Sweden and the Netherlands started integration policies re-
spectively in 1975 and in the early 1980s, most national governments in Europe maintained the illusion of 
immigrants' temporariness and return till the late 1990s and 2000s. Therefore they confined themselves to 
ad hoc adaptive measures, in practice leaving the integration responsibility to the local level of cities and to 
parties in civil society such as trade unions, churches and welfare organisations (Penninx et al., 2014a). 
 
Since 2001, international political terrorism, brought migrants into focus from a security perspective. Mi-
gration thus became associated first and foremost with problems and threats and as such has risen to the 
top of the political agenda in many EU-countries. Controlling and fighting irregular migration become one of 
the main aims of national governments, particularly in some countries. 
                                                          
5 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “On a Community Immi-
gration Policy”, COM(2000)757final, p. 6. 
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Between 2000 and 2014 the reluctance of Member States to deal with admission rules have had the effect 
of forcing the Commission to lighten its approach on legal admission and to opt for a selected approach 
regarding labour migration. 
 
Lately the emphasis has been put specifically on the economic growth, as in the communication “An open 
and secure Europe: making it happen” (2014), where we read that:  
 
“Demographic changes, in particular the shrinking of the working population in Europe, coupled with significant 
skill shortages in certain sectors (notably engineering, IT and health care) hinder the EU’s productivity and thus 
its economic recovery. Increasing global competition for skills and talents affects labour markets in many Mem-
ber States and will be a decisive factor for Europe's economic prosperity in the decade ahead. During the past 
15 years, the EU has followed a sector-by-sector approach to legal migration. This has resulted in a common 
legal framework, which regulates the admission of certain categories of persons, recognises rights and sanctions 
violations. It has also fostered a shared commitment of Member States on integration and return. It is time now 
to consolidate all this within a more coherent EU common migration policy that also takes into account the short 
and long-term economic needs”.6 
 
At national level each state stresses migration in relation to national labour shortages, outlining how far 
Europe still is from being a single market.  
 
The aspects mentioned above had and still have an impact on the local level. For example, considering im-
migration as a temporary phenomenon useful to the national labour market corresponds, at local level, 
with an integration frame based on early reception policies almost exclusively in order to face primary 
needs. Integration policies of cities have often started as early reception policies for refugees and/ or migrant 
workers. In the cases of Prague, Warsaw and Turku for example, reception of refugees formed the starting 
point for policies. In other cases specific groups of immigrants, such as guest workers in Amsterdam and 
Stuttgart, became target groups of policies because their position in the local society was perceived as prob-
lematic and they faced barriers to accessing public facilities. As a consequence, such early policies started as 
policies in the welfare sector: social benefits, housing, health. The current picture shows cities still focused 
on meeting migrants' needs in a pragmatic way, even if they are more aware of their role and of the strat-
egies they can and desire to put in place (Penninx et al., 2014b).  
 
 
2.1.1.1 Who is the preferred type of migrant?  
 
The most commonly stated aspiration of the European Union and individual Member States is to attract the 
“best and brightest” workers.  
 
The Post Stockholm Strategic Guidelines, adopted in the Conclusion of the European Council of the 27 June 
2014, includes the widely held idea of the need for Europe to remain an attractive destination for talents and 
skills and to maximize opportunities for legal migration in order to mitigate the effects of the recent economic 
crisis. An important innovation in this area, is the invitation to have an informed dialogue with the business 
community. 
 
Again, in the most recent communication from the Commission An open and secure Europe: making it happen 
(COM(2014)154 final), as well as in Juncker’s guidelines A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, 
Fairness and Democratic Change7 and in the Mission letter to the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs 
and Citizenship Avramopoulos8, the need to attract talents encouraging and enhancing the recognition of 
                                                          
6 COM(2014)154 final http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/an_open_and_secure_eu-
rope_-_making_it_happen_en.pdf p. 4 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/pg_en.pdf 
8 http://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/avramopoulos_en.pdf 
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foreign qualifications and professional skills, in particular in putting to good use the skills and qualifications 
of legally resident migrants is clearly expressed. 
 
This idea can be traced through various documents. The Communication on Immigration, Integration and 
Employment of 2003, mentioned the possibility of extending to Third Country Nationals the scope of the 
Directive on recognition of qualifications as the European Economic and Social Committee had suggested 
(ibid, p. 27). 
 
In the Second Annual Report on Migration and Integration of 2007, the Commission alludes again to the 
importance of recognition of academic and professional qualifications and expresses that the procedure is 
often different from that applying to EU/EEA nationals in a number of countries (ibid: 17). 
 
The Integration Agenda of 2011 emphasizes some of the challenges such as the low employment levels of 
migrants, high levels of “over-qualification”, increasing risks of social exclusion or gaps in educational 
achievement. 
 
It should be noted that, the new qualification Directive contains a provision specifically devoted to the recog-
nition of qualification for refugees. Specifically, the recast Directive 2011/95/EU highlights the importance of 
ensuring an equal treatment between beneficiaries of international protection and nationals in the context 
of the existing recognition procedures for foreign diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal quali-
fications. In this regard, Member States are also called to give support to those beneficiaries of international 
protection who are unable to provide documentary evidence of their qualifications. 
 
Although the fact that facilitating the recognition of qualifications could be of a great help in order to reduce 
the existing gap between, for instance employment rates between natives and migrants, we should be aware 
that this would not be sufficient. In the US, the world’s multicultural melting pot, people with a white sound-
ing name have 30% higher chance to obtain a job than a person with a black sounding name, despite the fact 
that may both have the same qualifications. This is therefore a question of non-discrimination. 
 
 Accompanying the need of the qualifications recognition the fight against discrimination remains a 
priority. 
 
 Monitoring labour market systems (supply and demand) is necessary for not wasting the benefit of 
qualification of recognitions. 
 
Finally, at the national level, Member States’ desires should be addressed to attract the best and brightest 
workers related to the specific national/local labour market demands. As pointed out by Kaczmarczyk (2014),  
 
the future labour market needs are to be assessed both in quantitative and qualitative terms. European Migra-
tion Network (2011) looks at the labour shortages on the sectorial level and attempts to answer the question 
to which extent they could be addressed by inflowing foreign workers (the study covers the period 2004-2010 
and is mostly devoted to analysis of migration policies as useful or not in the context of future needs).  
 
Based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data a clearly two-tier structure of the labour market needs has 
been identified. On the one hand, EU member states experienced shortages both in sectors/occupations 
such as engineers, health workers, IT specialists (where the quality of labour does matter) and in construc-
tion, agriculture, basic services and domestic workers (quantity).  
 
Against this background it is not surprising that in most of the EU countries third-country nationals are con-
centrated in the highly skilled and low skilled jobs (Kaczmarczyk, 2014). 
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To sum up, against the declared desire to attract “the best and the brightest” it is quite clear that Europe is 
still not able to fully use the skills already present. Moreover, the limited possibilities to use intra EU-mobility 
rights are a great disincentive to migrants who wish to maximize employment upgrading.  
 
➔ Migrant brain waste should be avoided or at least reduced by monitoring the match and non-
match between supply and demand. 
 
➔ Migrants should, where possible and appropriate, be selected on the basis of their skills, 
thereby reducing skill waste and facilitating their entry into employment. 
 
➔ Intra EU-mobility rights should be extended to certain migrant categories. 
 
 
2.1.2 Integration: how policy makers perceive it 
 
How integration is perceived is a central question in order to understand how policies frame integration. The 
answer to this question is part of the problem definition and of the eventual solutions envisaged. The same 
question could be put in a more explicit manner highlighting the exclusion/inclusion dilemma: for immigrants 
already present in the host society, are they seen as foreigners, as temporary guests or as an established 
members of the society for whom the state accepts the same responsibilities as for native citizens, guaran-
teeing the same rights and providing the same facilities? The following paragraphs aim to provide an answer 
to these questions to draw an idea of how integration policy is framed starting from the European level, and 
then going through the national and the local contexts. 
 
Different models for framing and managing integration have been firstly defined by the national level and 
therefore the local level during the last decades. The British and Dutch multicultural approaches or the 
French tendency to assimilate migrants have been two main approaches taken the XXth century. Other Mem-
ber States have tried to develop their own mechanisms to face the challenges of migration. The well-known 
integration models have been feeding the debate for the last ten years undergoing constant scrutiny partic-
ularly following terrorist attacks or episodes of rebellion in some working-class districts in France and in the 
UK (Penninx et al., 2014b). It could be argued that this has resulted in an acceleration of a process where 
opposite models of assimilation and multiculturalism revised themselves to a point of convergence. 
 
 
2.1.2.1 Old files, same aims 
 
In analysing how integration is and has been perceived at the European level, European institutions’ state-
ments on integration are usually considered as starting from the year 2000 when, after the entry into force 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Commission started to express itself on the matter. Nonetheless, there are a 
number of previous documents published by the Commission of the European Communities from the 1980s 
in which traces of what later become central in the institutional debate about integration policy were already 
outlined. 
 
In a Consultation on Migration Policy in March 1979, the Commission of the European Communities stated 
the “equal treatment as regards living and working conditions, social security provisions, vocational training, 
adult education and especially the education of migrants workers’ children, questions concerning health and 
accommodation” (COM(79)115). 
 
In a European File of 1980, entitled “The European Community and migrant Workers” (COM 9/80), there is a 
clear invitation to guarantee the free movement of Community migrant workers, stimulating the coordina-
tion of national policies on migrants from third countries, promoting the elimination of discrimination over 
living conditions, and specific measures in the social and educational areas.  
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In the Guidelines for a Community policy on migration (COM(85)48final)the importance to promote the full 
participation of migrants in local elections is underlined. In June 1989 the Commission published a report on 
The social integration of third country migrants residing on a permanent and lawful basis in the Member 
States in which there is the first extended commentary on the legal situation of migrants, the importance of 
nationality acquisition, the unemployment situation, education, housing and living conditions (SEC(89)924fi-
nal).  
 
A second report called Policies on immigration and the social integration of migrants in the European Com-
munity (SEC(90)1813final) published in 1990 focused on the Single European Market and the control over 
immigration. In a paragraph entitled “Integration or what else?”, the general meaning of integration is de-
fined as “be one of us socially, economically and, at least in a rudimentary sense, politically” and integration 
policy is considered “inescapable” (ibid. 14). 
 
The next available working documents are significantly entitled Immigration Policies in the Member States: 
between the need for control and the desire for integration (V/1020/92), and Immigration -The situation in 
the EC Member States in 1992. Attitudes towards controls, labour market requirements and the challenge of 
integration (V/166/94). 
 
We conclude this brief overview on old files recalling the Tampere Conclusion, usually taken as a starting 
point, where the section devoted to fair treatment of Third Country Nationals it is something essential to 
understand policy developments.  
 
The main elements of a European approach to integration have a long history. Equal treatment, working 
conditions, employment, education, health and housing have been central elements in the integration de-
bate for decades.  
 
From a semantic point of view it is interesting to compare two different documents by the Commission: one 
of 1990 and the other from 2014. The first is Policies on immigration and the social integration of migrants 
in the European Community (SEC(90)1813final) under the paragraph “Integration or what else”. The second 
is the communication “An open and secure Europe: making it happen” (COM(2014)154final). 
 
The first document from 1990 states: 
 
“In theory at least, countries can choose between leaving the immigrants to themselves and integration or 
assimilating them. Western European countries are densely populated societies crammed into limited living 
spaces where foreigners are perceived not as newcomers who will somehow find their niche but as unwelcome 
additions who will compete for scarce jobs and housing. On the other hand, immigrant workers are part of 
Western economies, to which they make an important contribution. If today’s immigrants were left to fend for 
themselves they would continue to occupy the bottom rungs of society permanently and without the chance 
of leaving them or even being replaced by subsequent waves of immigrants. The larger surroundings society 
turns hostile, develops rejection and stigmatization mechanism and resorts to uncivilized policing, thus rein-
forcing the vicious circle of exclusion breeding marginality.” (SEC(90)1813final: 14) 
 
The second document from 2014 states:  
 
“Europe is a diverse society where integration remains a challenge. To enhance social cohesion and to reap the 
full benefits of migration, commitment to effective integration of migrants in the labour market and receiving 
societies should be strengthened. In these efforts more attention should be paid to gender balance and to ad-
dress the important employment gap for migrant women. Fair treatment and non-discriminatory access to the 
labour market should be ensured. Vulnerable migrants, in particular women, young migrants and unaccompa-
nied minors should receive targeted support and a ‘best interest of the child’ approach should be practically 
applied in accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Building on previous work in the field 
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of integration, successful policies could be identified and best practices disseminated. Further work will be nec-
essary on capacity building and on engaging with local and regional authorities, which are at the forefront of 
integration policies” (COM(2014)154final:4). 
 
Over time European institutions, besides having developed normative and soft steering instruments support-
ing Members States in converging towards a common approach to migration and possibly to integration, 
have evolved in their way of choosing and using words. There are key differences between the first and last 
text. The invitation to seriously take care of the integration issue, expressed in the first text, is replaced by a 
prescriptive approach mentioning principles and conventions in the second. Integration remains a challenge 
but with defined solutions at hand.  
 
Although the language has changed the situation of migrants remains the same. In 1990 migrants are those 
occupying the bottom rungs of society permanently. In 2014 integration of migrants into the labour market 
should be strengthened. Exclusion feeding marginality in 1990 becomes vulnerable migrant in 2014. But the 
impression is that, despite the clear change in the tone used, the situation has not changed significantly.  
 
 
2.1.2.2  EU calls for rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens 
 
Another crucial idea that has been put forward in European documents is the need to provide migrants rights 
and obligations comparable to those to EU citizens. 
 
In 1999 the EU obtained a clear cut competence to legislate on migration with the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, The European Council, as the institution in charge of defining the general political 
directions and priorities of the EU, was the first to express its views on integration.  
 
In Tampere, the European Council provided the basis for any policy on the subject by emphasizing that a 
more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting TNCs "rights and obligations comparable to those of 
EU citizens" (Tampere European Council, 1999: para 18). The European Council also acknowledged “the need 
for approximation of national legislations on the conditions of admission and residence of third country na-
tionals” (ibid, para 20) and that “the legal status of third country nationals should be approximated to that 
of Member States’ nationals” (ibid, para 21).  
  
In the Communication on a Community Immigration Policy of 2000 (COM(2000)757final) the Commission 
proposes several actions which have a clear underlying rationale of rights as a facilitator for integration. For 
example, when presenting its proposal for a Family Reunification Directive, the Commission points out that 
family reunion “is an essential element in the integration of persons already admitted” (ibid: 11). Also, when 
discussing Third Country Nationals’ rights it is argued that “it is clear that a hard-core of rights should be 
available to migrants on their arrival, in order to promote their successful integration into society” (ibid: 17). 
Finally, it is mentioned under the Section entitled integration that the provision of equality with respect to 
conditions of work and access to services, together with the granting of civic and political rights to longer-
term migrant residents brings with it such responsibilities and promotes integration (ibid: 19). 
 
The Long-term Residence Directive 2003/109/EC establishes in Article 5 that, in addition to other conditions, 
Member States may require third-country nationals wishing to obtain long-term residence status, “to comply 
with integration conditions, in accordance with national law” (Acosta, 2014). 
 
Therefore it is clear that granting Third Country Nationals rights and obligations comparable to those of EU 
citizens is considered crucial for supporting integration. It was a formula lunched in Tampere and resumed 
ten years later in Stockholm. The Programme of 2009 argues that comparable treatment should remain an 
objective of a common immigration policy and should be implemented as soon as possible, and no later than 
2014. 
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A claim supporting the idea of rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens emerged from the 
European Parliament in 2003 and 2007. In the European Parliament’s Report on the Commission’s Commu-
nication on Immigration, Integration and Employment - the European Parliament, then being a mere consul-
tative body engaging a proactive role, supported the idea of civic citizenship as it would be important for 
increasing a sense of belonging in Europe, and it even proposed granting Third Country Nationals voting rights 
for the European Parliament elections.9  
 
Also the Commission Staff working paper10 accompanying the Integration Agenda of 2011 goes further and 
mentions the need to ensure proper social protection under Directive 2003/109 for long term residents who 
shall enjoy equal treatment with nationals as regards social security, social assistance and social protection 
as defined by national law (COM(2011)957final). 
 
Despite a constant call to grant migrants comparable rights to those of European citizens are still far from 
being a reality for Third Country Nationals. 
 
 
2.1.2.3  Integration as a two way process 
 
At the European level the conceptualization of the integration as a two ways process is something that is 
commonly recognized and well accepted. Since the Communication on Immigration, Integration and Em-
ployment (European Commission, 2003), the Commission understood integration as something to be ad-
dressed through a holistic approach taking into account “not only the economic and social aspects of inte-
gration but also issues related to cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, participation and political rights” 
(ibid: 18). Integration was defined as a “two way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obliga-
tions of legally resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of 
the immigrant” (ibid: 17). 
 
And this was formally stated in 2004 within the first CBP stating that Integration is a dynamic, two-way 
process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States. 
 
As a result of a previous call by the European Council, the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration 
Policy, proposed in the first Ministerial Conference on Integration, were adopted in November 2004 by the 
Justice and Home Affairs Council. During the last ten years, the CBPs have played a crucial role in defining 
and orienting integration policy and measures all around Europe. The rationale behind the adoption of the 
principles is "to assist Member States in formulating integration policies by offering them a simple non-bind-
ing but thoughtful guide on basic principles" (ibid: 16). CBPs represent a clear and simple summary of all the 
issues involved in integration policy. In doing so, they are a crucial element in the definition of integration as 
a multifaceted task. In the Conclusion of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Members States on the integration of Third Country Nationals (9905/14), the CBPs are reaffirmed with the 
Member State’s commitment towards them. 
 
At the time of their adoption they represented an extremely ambitious framework, clearly defining States’ 
duties in ensuring integration of migrants an affirming that integration is a “dynamic two way process of 
mutual accommodation” which entrusts the responsibility to “accommodate each other” on both natives 
and migrants.  
 
                                                          
9 European Parliament, Report on the Communication from the Commission on Immigration, Integration and Employment, A5-
0445/2003, 1 December 2003, Rapporteur: Claude Moraes. It restated its support in another report in 2006: European Parliament, 
Report on Strategies and Means for the Integration of Immigrants in the European Union, A6-0190/2006, 17 May 2006, Rapporteur: 
Stavros Lambrinidis. 
10 Commission Staff Working Paper - EU initiatives supporting the integration of third-country nationals. Accompanying the document 
European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (COM(2011)455final) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-af-
fairs/doc_centre/immigration/docs/2011_commission_staff_working_paper_on_integration.pdf 
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The key elements in this holistic approach to integration were identified as: access to the labour market 
and recognition of qualifications, education and language skills, housing and urban issues, health and social 
services, social and cultural environment and nationality and civic citizenship.  
 
Beyond the definition of integration in CBP1, the other CBPs recall each element of integration as: the respect 
for the basic European values (CBP2), the access to employment (CBP3), adult (CBP4) and child education 
(CBP5), the access to services (CBP6), the importance of frequent interaction between immigrants and na-
tives (CBP7), the right to profess a religion (CBP8), the political participation (CBP9), the need to mainstream 
policy (CBP10) and the need to measures and evaluate progress made during the times (CBP11). 
 
Until now their potentiality has been mainly expressed through the EIF - European Integration Fund (2007-
2013) which financed countless integration projects conceived and implemented in line with the CBPs frame-
work. The financial resources provided to ensure the concrete application and implementation of the CBPs 
is pivotal. In this regard, the AMIF - Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (2014-2020) commitment to 
financing integration national projects guided by CBPS is of utmost importance for the years to come.  
 
In 2008 in a Communication on a Common Immigration Policy for Europe (COM(2008)359), the Commission 
echoes the necessity of increased participation by Third Country Nationals in order to “reflect the multiple 
and evolving identities of European societies” (ibid: 8). This recognition of Europe as a continent in which 
identity is not static but evolving represents an interesting feature of this Communication which goes beyond 
the usual calls for social inclusion, integration in the labour market or non-discrimination. 
 
In line with previous documents from the last ten years, in the Conclusion of the Council and the Represent-
atives of the Governments of the Member States on the integration of Third Country Nationals (9905/14), 
with an explicit commitment to the CBPs, integration is again defined as a dynamic two-way process (ibid, 4). 
Moreover, diversity is accepted as an enriching and permanent feature of European societies and it is 
acknowledged that integration “is a long-term and multi-faceted process” (ibid, 5).  
 
In practice that means that  
 
 Integration could/should be better enhanced by a strategy involving both adaptation and learning 
of immigrants, but also significant changes in access to and the working of institutional structures 
of society that should be able to cope with more diversity keeping the standard of equality/equity. 
 
 
However, there is little acknowledgement in national political discourses or in government’s policy docu-
ments that integration is a process and an ongoing negotiation between cultures, that can either move for-
ward when the right conditions are provided, or may not proceed if conditions are weak, or else can be 
reversed if conditions or opportunities deteriorate (Phillimore, 2014a). 
 
In this regard, some Member States have begun to develop cooperation between governmental stakeholders 
or have begun to engage the private sector in debates on integration. For example efforts have been made 
to broker connections between migrant groups and employers, employment services and vocational training 
organisations to link demand with supply. One successful project operates in Amsterdam where The Platform 
Arbeidsmarkt en Onderwijs (PAO) brings together key stakeholders and produces a twice yearly labour mar-
ket monitor which provides the local administration with up-to-date data concerning the labour status of 
Amsterdam citizens, including those with a migrant background. However, this information is not shared with 
civil society organisations (Humphris, 2014).  
 
Another element concerning the two ways process is the participation of migrants in the democratic process 
of the receiving society. Even if it is increasingly perceived as a significant aspect of successful integration, 
policies to promote the interaction of immigrants and host society, including the setting up of shared forums, 
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are still limited (Humphris, 2014). It is even more evident if we consider that only a limited number of Mem-
ber States provide third-country nationals with voting rights in local elections. As analysed in more depth in 
the following pages, such evidence is the proof of an unbalanced situation that sees migrants as the main 
characters in the entire process.  
 
Despite calls to envisage integration as a two way process migrants perceive integration, a one-way 
process.  
 
Integration is understood by migrants as a period of adaption and change in order to ‘fit in’ with the majority 
society. This emerged as a one-way process in migrant’s narratives where they believed they had to make 
adjustments and changes to the way they conducted their life. No new migrants discussed their 
understanding of integration as a two way process or in terms of natives people learning and adapting or 
changes in receiving society culture.  
 
‘I think it means that you are able to incorporate yourself into something new. It means being part of something. 
Being welcoming’.  
 
‘It means involvement in the new community. You know in our country we are born and bred in Pakistan. We 
are grown in old Pakistani styles. In this country, it is totally different, how we adapt the new systems and 
challenges I think… I am thinking that’s integration. Adaptation of new society, new culture, how you adapt.’  
 
This emerged in migrant’s narratives as describing how they perceived receiving society and culture as a 
closed container. As such migrant’s descriptions of successful integration were linked to ‘getting inside’ and 
learning the system. This also emerged in descriptions of trying to ‘mix up’ with people.  
 
‘It means learning a way of life of your host community. Getting to know how things are done. The way of life. 
Getting to know people. The activities. Taking part in those activities. Getting involved and ‘owning’ what goes 
on in there and contributing in there’.  
 
A key feature of integration was repeatedly described as a disposition to take part in activities of the country 
and the ability and confidence to change and adapt. This took the form of a positive frame of mind and having 
an ‘open’ disposition. 
 
 ‘You just have to try to be social. To talk to others.’ 
 
However, for those who had suffered prolonged loneliness and trauma in the migration and integration 
process, as we will refer later in the case of detention upon arrival, this was described as a barrier to meeting 
people and forming friendships: 
 
‘Being new is difficult. It is not something that is easy. You find difficulties but you get used to it. You just need 
to relax. That’s all.’ 
 
 
2.1.3 The policy shift: integration is a challenge to whom? 
 
As mentioned above, when integration policy began to be discussed it was clear that institutions, both at 
national and European level, had the main responsibility in regard to migrants’ integration into receiving 
society. 
 
However, framing integration policy at European level changed direction after a few years. Towards the end 
of the so called first period (from Tampere 1999 to The Hague 2004) some Members States started to shift 
the burden on who should facilitate access to language civic knowledge from State to Third Country Nationals 
themselves. 
 
35 
In the First Annual report of Migration and Integration, it was mentioned for the first time how language 
tuition and the provision of civic education to newly arrived migrants was growing and how the focus had 
moved towards an increased responsibility on the newcomers to pay for these courses and to pass exams, 
as in the case of the Netherlands (ibid: 19). Thus, the Commission acknowledged for the first time this new 
trend which has been subsequently replicated in various countries (Acosta 2012; Pascouau 2012).  
 
The new conceptualisation of integration is notable since it represents a paradigm shift from an under-
standing of integration policies as something positive, given their role in promoting social inclusion, non-
discrimination and access to rights, towards a condition in the form of a test, programme or contract within 
immigration law in order for Third Country Nationals to become socially included, to acquire a regular 
residence status and to have access to family reunion. The legality of this conceptualisation of integration 
from the perspective of the current EU migration law framework will be something specifically developed 
during the second period form The Hague to the Stockholm program (2004-2009) (Acosta, 2014). 
 
When the Commission published its Second Annual Report on Migration and Integration on 30 June 2006 
(European Commission, 2006) it highlights the “new emphasis on obligatory integration courses, containing 
both language instruction and civic orientation” (ibid: 5). It also stresses how “in several countries, there is 
an emphasis on possible sanctions in cases of non-compliance with obligations arising from compulsory inte-
gration measures, rather than on incentives in case of compliance” (ibid). Significantly, the Commission refers 
for the first time to the legal validity of these requirements under the Family and Long-term Residences Di-
rectives and states that integration conditions and measures “should not undermine the efficiency (‘effet 
utile’) of the Directive” (ibid). In addition, the Commission acknowledges that “careful examination of na-
tional transposition measures and concrete practices will be necessary” (ibid: 6) in order to ensure that long-
term residents are guaranteed equal treatment in a number of areas such as access to education or housing. 
 
The European Council adopted in 2008,11 and under French Presidency, the European Pact on Immigration 
and Asylum (European Pact Immigration and Asylum, 2008). Whereas the Pact also focuses on migrants’ 
rights “(in particular to education, work, security, and public and social services” as well as the “need to 
combat any forms of discrimination to which migrants may be exposed”) (ibid: 6) it shifts its attention to-
wards migrant’s obligations, in particular the need to “promote language learning” and the stress for the 
respect needed “for the identities of the Member States and the European Union and for their fundamental 
values, such as human rights, freedom of opinion, democracy, tolerance, equality between men and women, 
and the compulsory schooling of children” (ibid). 
 
This was the result of the spirit with which the French government of former President Sarkozy approached 
migration and thus integration, since the idea of imposing integration requirements to limit unwanted (fam-
ily) migration was derived from the Netherlands’ example. This is even clearer if the negotiations before the 
Pact was adopted are considered. The original idea in the Pact was to include a reference to the compulsory 
imposition of integration contracts for Third Country Nationals and only the opposition of the Spanish Gov-
ernment to this measure caused its elimination in the final text adopted. To put it differently, the two-way 
process called for by the CBPs is endangered by the willingness of some States to link the migrant's residence 
status to his/her capacity to prove language or civic knowledge. However, the importance of the Pact cannot 
be overstated. The Pact is a non-legally binding, political document and its principal interest was to try to 
influence the Stockholm programme. The main political document which guided the EU’s action in the area 
is the Stockholm programme until the adoption of a new multi-annual programme (Acosta, 2014). However, 
the Pact did not disappear after the adoption of the Stockholm programme. The pact was continuously 
quoted over the years until Sarkozy’s defeat in 2012. 
 
At the national level, in many Member States, relatively liberal “multicultural” regimes have been under at-
tack, with critics arguing that they allowed people from other cultures to enjoy the rights but ignore the 
responsibilities that living in another country might bring, and effectively to live separate lives. The political 
                                                          
11 Brussels European Council, 15-16 October, Presidency Conclusions, 14368/08, p. 8. 
36 
and thus policy direction of travel in many countries has been to imply that minorities need to do more to 
integrate, as in the UK, Germany and France, blaming the disturbances in many cities during the late 2000s 
on the unwillingness of minorities to integrate. The particular form this policy trend has taken, and the 
language used to describe it, obviously differs between countries to some degree.  
 
In the UK the policy framework has been called social or community cohesion and a very substantial, if at 
times confusing, literature has developed around this official framework, much of which has challenged the 
Government’s approach and/or argued that it ignores the impacts of discrimination and racism on minorities 
and migrants which undermines attempts at cohesion. In an increasing number of countries (including France 
and the Netherlands), the framework for integration has moved more strongly towards compulsion with 
migrants required to participate in programmes – which may or may not be free - and to pass certain tests 
and before they become eligible for citizenship and residence (Craig, 2014). 
 
In the last document produced at European level on the migrant integration policy, the European Council 
Conclusions from the 27 June 2014, the last sentence of the paragraph is representative of the vague formu-
lation used in these types of documents. It refers to the need to “support Member State’s efforts to pursue 
active integration policies which foster social cohesion and economic dynamism”. It is unclear whether this 
means more emphasis on compulsory civic and language knowledge integration courses or, whether in line 
with the reference to economic dynamism, this rather relates to the possibility of facilitating mobility within 
the internal market for third-country nationals in order to maximize talents and skills matching and to con-
tribute to economic growth. This second interpretation is possibly the correct one and also the only one in 
line with the current legislative framework on EU Migration Law. 
 
Finally, in this regard, there is a reference to a possible “voluntary cooperation between receiving countries 
and countries of origin in a pre-departure phase” which could facilitate reception and integration in the des-
tination Member State. The reference to “voluntary” is important in this regard since it seems to slowly be-
come clearer for all actors, even for those Member States who had introduced integration requirements 
abroad, that compulsory integration abroad impeding family reunification is not in line with EU law (Acosta, 
2014). 
 
The number of Member States engaged in such a process must not be underestimated, for several reasons. 
Firstly, these Member States are established countries of immigration and therefore have considerable 
weight in the debate on migration policy. Secondly, they are very active in the field and may act as 'pioneers' 
on aspects of migration policy. They have taken advantage of the Directive to establish schemes under which 
family members are requested to fulfil integration measures in the country of origin i.e. before access to the 
European Union. In addition, rules related to integration have not always been adopted in order to boost the 
integration capacity of migrants, but rather to control or limit family migration. The Dutch example is one of 
the most significant in this regard. 
 
 The EU Commission should issue clear implementation guidelines of EU Directives concerning the 
integration requirements that Third Country Nationals must fulfil (long-term residence and family 
reunification Directives) and should explore the use of infringement procedures. 
 
Two notions stem from the idea of co-operation between receiving and sending countries. Firstly, that inte-
gration abroad remains an idea to develop. The second is that it should be voluntary. In the latter case, there 
is an increasing number of Member State using pre departure information schemes. Mandatory schemes are 
not all contrary to EU law. The French integration abroad scheme is one example. Secondly, these schemes 
are extremely costly and this is perhaps the reason why they are progressively abandoned.  
 
At national and local level, these assumptions have been translated in very different ways. Indeed, during 
the increasingly politicised climate of the late 1990s and early 2000s which pushed for the implementation 
of integration policies, at national level the term integration started to get a different meaning.  
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Where early policy conceptions such as those used in Sweden and the Netherlands had been rights-based, 
aimed at structural integration in the socio-economic domains and framed in a liberal cultural atmosphere 
(later called multicultural), the new approach focused increasingly on the cultural dimension of integration 
as an obligation for immigrants: cultural and value-based commonalities were thought to be essential for 
social cohesion. Acquisition of national citizenship - that was promoted in early Swedish and Dutch policies 
as an instrument that would facilitate structural integration - was increasingly redefined as the crown on a 
finalised process of cultural adaptation.  
 
This new cultural conception of integration policies went hand in hand with redefining the identity of North-
west European countries. The claims and outcomes of such discussions on the ‘identity’ of receiving societies 
(as modern, liberal, democratic, secular, equal, enlightened, etc.) were translated into civic integration re-
quirements for immigrants and civic integration courses of an assimilative nature. The latest development - 
compulsory pre-immigration courses such as developed in the Netherlands - extends this logic even further: 
under the label of integration, such courses actually function as instruments to make immigration more re-
strictive and selective. Notwithstanding these pressures, quite different immigration and integration policies 
developed in practice in the ‘second generation immigration countries’, particularly in Southern Europe.  
 
Most immigration in those countries is legalised ex-post by regularisations. Integration measures and policies 
have been initiated since the mid-1990s, predominantly on the local and regional levels, based on rights of 
access to important domains irrespective of immigrant status. Such local policies aimed primarily at insertion 
in the labour market were embedded in a liberal cultural atmosphere that tends to use interculturality as a 
strategy (Penninx et al. ,2014a). 
 
Likewise, the integration agreement could be monitored for highlighting whether its use overflows from in-
tegration policies to migration policies. Integration agreements are the main instruments used by receiving 
societies for answering the principle of mutual accommodation. Through language tuition and introductory 
courses, migrants are supposed to receive the necessary support to integrate themselves, while the receiving 
societies guarantee the correct modalities to achieve the aim. Integration agreements should represent the 
tool for enabling contact between migrants and natives during the first phase of the integration path. How-
ever, there is also a danger that the migrant can be refused residency due to the punitive nature of the policy 
for those who fail. In Italy for example, the permission to stay in the territory cannot be renewed if the mi-
grant doesn’t achieve the score (30 points) predicated by the agreement. As in the case of the family reuni-
fication, the integration principle is obfuscated by the main objective of controlling migrants’ residency and 
movement.  
 
Member States are not legally entitled to include wide ranging integration requirements. Nonetheless, de-
spite existing limits imposed by general principles of EU law and by the Directives themselves, Member States 
have a wide leeway in some situations. National Courts have an important role to play in this regard by cor-
rectly interpreting the conditions to the general rule under these Directives. The increasingly harsh debate 
with regard to migrant ́s integration in Europe, coupled with the fast emergence of a model based on com-
pulsory integration in order to access rights directly granted by European Law and which has been quickly 
replicated in various Member States, demands a clear response by the Commission in the form of guidelines 
or infringement procedures.  
 
Since 2005, the concern regarding the correct enforcement of legislation in this area has repetitively been 
acknowledged by the Commission, as well as the Parliament, in numerous documents, including the Stock-
holm programme. Where integration is clearly endangered by impeding de facto Third Country Nationals 
assessing rights deriving form EU law with the risk to lead people to social exclusion, on a legal basis there is 
the possibility to launch infringement procedures. The Commission already advanced this eventuality in its 
Report on the implementation of Family Reunification Directive in 2008 and repeated it in its last annual Re-
port on EU immigration and asylum where it was mentioned that the Commission should ensure the full 
implementation of existing rules, open infringement procedure where necessary (COM(2013)422final:16). 
Despite this intentions, there is no news of any infringement procedure on the Family Reunification Directive 
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in any Commission’s annual reports and only one infringement procedure has reached the Court of Justice 
of the European Union on the long-term Residence Directive.  
 
The official rhetoric has usually referred to the need to promote integration and make Third Country Nation-
als self-sufficient while at the same time arguing that these tests would help in the emancipation of women 
and the prevention and fight against arranged marriages. Hence, there needs to be empirical evaluation on 
whether these official aims are being attained by these tests and integration contracts. Two studies have 
evaluated the effects on integration of these tests in several Member States: PROSINT12 and INTEC13. They 
have both reached similar conclusions that several aspects of these tests and requirements may lead to social 
exclusion rather than to enhance integration. This makes it even more urgent to have a clear response by the 
Commission (Acosta, 2014). 
 
 
2.2 Target groups: Who has the right to be/become an immigrant and to be inte-
grated? 
 
 
Another question to be addressed is: integration for whom? Migrant integration policies that formulate spe-
cific groups of immigrants as target groups are different from policies that focus on all immigrants. And these 
are substantially different from policies that target all individuals regardless of their origin or that target 
natives. Policies may also target collectives (organisations, civil society) rather than individuals. They may 
even target general institutions of society. In practice, these different approaches result in very different 
policies with regard to the three dimensions of integration:  
 
- political rights can be granted to immigrants as individuals, for instance by granting voting rights, 
or as members of a group, which often means the creation of representative bodies;  
- policies may seek to promote equal opportunities for all citizens, meaning equal access to hous-
ing, education, health care and the labour market, or equal share in their actual access to these 
goods and services;  
- finally, cultural diversity can be promoted as an individual or as a group right, the latter often 
implying the state support to immigrants' organisations and own institutions. 
 
Dealing more specifically with immigration issues, Article 79 of the TFEU indicates “the Union shall develop 
a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, 
fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and en-
hanced measures to, combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings”. 
 
As a matter of principle, at the European level there is a fundamental disjunction between policies applicable 
to migrants in an irregular situation, who should theoretically be excluded from the territory, and migrants 
legally residing in the Member States, who should theoretically be included into the receiving society. Begin-
ning in 1999 with the Tampere European Council conclusions, and adopted immediately after the entry into 
force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the common approach to immigration and asylum polices should “ensure 
the integration into our societies of those third country nationals who are lawfully resident in the Union”. 
 
Also the Common Basic Principles on Integration, endorsed by the November 2004 Justice and Home Affairs 
Council emphasised that “a critical aspect of managing migration is the successful integration of legally re-
siding immigrants and their descendants”14. 
 
                                                          
12 http://research.icmpd.org/1429.html 
13 http://www.ru.nl/law/cmr/projects/intec/ 
14 The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, OJ C 53, 03.03.2005.  
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Ten years after the adoption of the Common Basic Principles, the June 2014 Justice and Home Affairs Council 
agreed to adopt conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States on the integration. The mere title of the document is self-sufficient to portray the limited scope of the 
conclusions which address the integration “of third-country nationals legally residing in the EU”15. 
 
As a matter of fact, policy orientations at EU level are locked into a logic whereby integration policies and 
measures should only accompany legally residing third country nationals and are never linked with the po-
tential fact that third country nationals in an a priori irregular situation could be granted a right to reside and 
therefore fall within the ambit of inclusion policies. 
 
The distinction “legal/inclusion” vs. “irregular/exclusion” deeply affects the way policy makers perceive 
and develop migration policies. The basic idea that migrants in an irregular situation should not remain on 
the territory, or be expelled, is accompanied with the development of detention practices. Hence, once ar-
rived on the territory or once discovered in the territory migrants in an irregular situation are often, and 
sometimes systematically16, subject to detention17. This derives from the widely shared principle that mi-
grants in an irregular situation should be removed and that detention is an efficient practice to ensure re-
moval. 
 
The situation of migrants apprehended at the border is quasi-systematically managed under “security-
driven” procedures. In such circumstances, the necessity to identify people or the belief that migrants would 
abscond lead national authorities to detain people. The use of detention in such circumstances is a well-
established policy which plays as a deterrent measures towards migrants who may be willing to access the 
territory without authorisation18. But these practices, whether developed due to time constraints or imple-
mented for political purposes, do not take into account the effects detention may have on individuals in the 
immediate, medium or long run and in particular regarding integration. 
 
The distinction “legal migration = inclusion” and “irregular migration = exclusion” is firmly rooted in EU and 
Member States policies. It has had the consequence of creating an artificial disconnection between policy 
fields of migration and integration, with the effect to exclude integration policies from an entire side of im-
migration and also asylum policy. Hence, the fight against irregular migration has validated the use of de-
tention as a tool to hamper people to enter as well as to deter people to migrate. In this context, a large 
number of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees have been detained and released, bearing the physical and 
psychological scars of detention sometimes a long time after. 
 
The above mentioned distinction “legal migration = inclusion” and “irregular migration = exclusion” effects 
the national and the local level in a particular way. Indeed, while this definition matches completely the na-
tional philosophy, at local level, regions and cities which are at the forefront of integration policies, have to 
face also the very concrete problem of irregular migrants’ needs in particular in education and health. 
 
There are cities which adopt the so-called human right frame which regards undocumented in general, does 
no matter the reason of their stay (e.g., for work reasons, to seek asylum etc.), as particularly vulnerable 
individuals, who have to face more threats to their safety and security than ordinary residents and are at 
                                                          
15 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/143109.pdf  
16 “Invisible Suffering. Prolonged and systematic detention of migrants and asylum seekers in substandard conditions in Greece”, 
Médecins sans Frontières, 2014, Report available at the following address: http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/invisible_suffer-
ing.pdf  
17 The number of detention centers has increased over time in the EU, see for instance work undertaken by several NGO’s in this 
regard like Migreurop http://en.closethecamps.org/2014/03/03/europe-of-camps-deploys-its-web/ and the Atlas http://www.mi-
greurop.org/IMG/pdf/Carte_Atlas_Migreurop_19122012_Version_francaise_version_web.pdf  
18 As pointed out by the UNHCR “Putting people in detention has become a routine – rather than exceptional – response to the 
irregular entry or stay of asylum-seekers and migrants in a number of countries. Some governments view detention as a means to 
dissuade irregular migration to or applying for asylum in their territories”, in “Beyond Detention. A Global Strategy to support gov-
ernments to end the detention of asylum-seekers and refugees”, UNHCR 2014. Available online: http://www.un-
hcr.org/53aa929f6.pdf.  
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greater risk of marginalisation because of their lack of a residence permit. Cities that adopt such an approach 
show a particularly open stance towards undocumented immigrants’ access to fundamental rights, from legal 
status to health, education, housing etc. and to legal status in particular. 
 
A case in point is the Communist city of Pierre-Bénite, in the Lyon area in France, which in the 2000s set up, 
together with the NGO Cimade, particularly active support for immigrants, an “alert system” aimed at mon-
itoring the difficult situations faced by some illegal immigrants in the city and at finding favourable solutions 
in collaboration with the Prefecture. A second example is the city of Ghent in Belgium, the municipality offers 
legal advice to all immigrants, irrespectively of their juridical conditions, in order to favour their access to 
other services and rights. Public officials together with NGOs are crucial in undertaking and carrying out this 
kind of legal service (Caponio, 2014b). 
 
On the other side, there are local levels which are in line with the national level by following the security 
frame that targets primarily national residents, with the aim of reassuring them about the respect of legality 
in the city and about the enactment of controls on unwanted immigration. Usually, the political discourse in 
these cities is openly anti-immigrants and the concrete actions carried out are aimed at sending the message 
that undocumented migrants are not welcomed. The main strategy is introducing restrictive measures as 
public order ordinances that make life for them extremely difficult and therefore impede access to legal sta-
tus (Caponio, 2014b). 
 
Third country nationals are the target defined by the European Union for integration and migration policy. 
Quite surprisingly, although not having the competence to rule on this policy field, the EU took the chance 
to define the specific target for the existing policy or those to be implemented. Against the European back-
drop, the right to be or become a migrant is granted to those people who respond to conditions stated in the 
European Directives and in the national laws. Asylum seekers are those having the moral rights to be or 
become immigrants. 
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3. THE GOVERNANCE OF MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Governance can be defined as a method, a set of mechanisms and formal and informal processes for dealing 
with a broad range of problems and conflicts. Governance operates through groups of actors who arrive at 
mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiation and cooperation aimed at managing and regulating 
a given domain of human activity. Governance includes the definition and implementation of rules as well as 
the establishment of formal and informal institutions and regimes for regulating collective activities and 
exercising power within a given territorial domain (Martinelli, 2014b).  
 
Here we consider governance from a descriptive point of view, taking a wider range of actors into account 
(institutional, collective and individual). First, institutions at different administrative levels, such as national, 
regional and local governments; agencies and practitioners within the state apparatus; second, relevant ac-
tors at collective level such as NGOs, migrant organizations and networks; and finally individual actors, such 
as politicians and migrants themselves. The vertical dimension of integration policymaking, namely, the rela-
tionship between the national, regional and local levels, is of particular relevance since both municipalities 
and the EU level have become increasingly involved in making immigrant policies. We conducted analysis to 
consider this multiplicity of levels in order to understand how new tensions have come to the fore and also 
how new alliances and forms of cooperation (e.g. between the local and the EU level) have developed. Key 
questions are: who has the authority over what? Who is in charge of integration policies? How are the dif-
ferent levels coordinated? Do they respond to different political and social imperatives? Do they complement 
or contradict each other?  
 
The multilevel governance of immigrant integration has been the result of the historical process of immigra-
tion in Europe and the evolution of related migration policies. In the XX century, Europe has become a con-
tinent of immigration, but European countries are not nations of immigrants in the sense of the US, Canada 
or Australia and do not perceive themselves as such. A first wave of immigrants came to North-western Eu-
rope including refugees after the Second World War, people from former colonies, and workers from less 
developed European states. In the 1980s a second wave of immigrants reached other European countries, 
which previously had been labour-exporting, like Italy and Spain. After the implosion of the Soviet Union in 
1991, a third wave of immigration took place in the new EU member states, which experienced emigration 
and transit migration at the same time (Martinelli, 2014b). 
 
The governance of such a process started with regulating policies at the national level, which were followed 
- sometimes with significant delays - by integration policies. Local policies have been mostly integration pol-
icies and have been developed either as a reaction to the lack, or the sheer absence, of such policies at the 
national level, or as a complement to them. Except for a few advanced countries like the Netherlands and 
Sweden, where, as early as the 1980s, national governments encouraged integration policies at the local 
level, municipalities usually substituted for the lack of action of national executives and regularly conflicted 
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with them. The role of cities in integration policy was enhanced by the exchange of knowledge and experi-
ence in networks of cities, like Cities for Local Integration Policies, Integrating Cities, Intercultural Cities, the 
European Coalition of Cities Against Racism, with strong connections with the European Commission after 
2003 (Penninx et al., 2014a). 
 
EU governance has been the late comer to the integration debate, with integration measures following the 
same pattern of regulation and other immigration policies. The sequence of treaties that gave birth first to 
the European Communities and then to the European Union (1993) have created EU citizenship, guaranteed 
a complete freedom of movement and removed physical, technical and fiscal barriers (Single European Act, 
1992). However, the opening of internal borders implied the preservation of their common external border 
and the coordination of Member States’ policies concerning the admission of third-country nationals. Also, 
as a consequence of the rapid growth of asylum-seekers in the early 1990s, the governance of immigration 
at the EU level has been predominantly concerned with increasingly restrictive admission rules and securisa-
tion policies aiming at fighting illegal immigration. 
 
 
3.1 Actors 
 
 
The horizontal dimension of integration policymaking considers whether and how integration policies are 
implemented by institutional actors as well as other relevant ones such as private institutions, NGOs, immi-
grant organisations and professionals, and migrants themselves. The central question here is: who is sup-
posed to be a relevant actor in policies? Are individual immigrants seen as primary actors? Are their organi-
sations and other collective and institutional resources regarded as relevant? With regard to the receiving 
society, the question emerges: who are the main actors involved (again at the individual, organisational and 
institutional level)? 
 
 
3.1.1 Who has the authority over what? 
 
When examining the set of actions developed at EU level, it is evident that integration policies are subject to 
a specific “treatment”. More precisely, they are not addressed in the same way as immigration or asylum 
policies. This difference in treatment is crucial in trying to understand the dynamics taking place at EU level 
regarding integration policies and their relationships with immigration policies. Notably, the development of 
a common EU immigration policy has not been accompanied with the corresponding competences in the 
field of integration. Where the EU has full competence to harmonise national immigration policies, it does 
not have the same competence in the field of integration. While this could be explained by several legal 
factors, this situation leads to a complex and intricate mix between hard and soft law. 
 
For almost 10 years, from 1999 to 2009, the competence of the EU to harmonise national integration policies 
was all but clear. Whereas the Treaty of Lisbon finally clarified the issue, a significant set of rules and 
measures have been adopted in this policy area using either hard law or soft instruments.  
 
Within migration multilevel policymaking, the authority is divided between different actors and territorial 
units that together make up the EU. In the EU there are exclusive competences, shared competences and 
supporting competences19. These competences vary considerably when considering migration or integration, 
as the division of authority and thus of competences differs depending on the policy field considered.  
                                                          
19 As stated in the TFEU in art. 2: “1) When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union 
may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union 
or for the implementation of Union acts. 2) When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in 
a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member States shall 
exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise 
their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence. […] 5) In certain areas and under the 
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Most issues that address migration policy fall under the category of shared competences, especially in the 
areas in which Treaty reforms have established a formal community competence as in visa and border con-
trol, asylum, immigration, and labour migration. In the share competence regime, where EU legislation exists, 
Member States have to submit to it. Where no legislation has been established, the Member States can in-
dependently legislate as long as EU legislation is adopted. This is the process of harmonisation of national 
legislations lead by European institutions. 
 
The EU plays the strongest role in the visa and border control regime. As it concerns immigration and asylum, 
formal EU competences exist but legislation is not yet always fully developed and implemented. 
 
As regards integration policy, the EU is only able to adopt measures which aim to coordinate national poli-
cies, as foreseen in the area of the supporting competences. Integration policies remain within the remit of 
States' competence. The EU is competent to develop a series of actions which aim at helping MS to coordi-
nate their policies and with the support of EU institutions, mainly the European Commission. This is precisely 
what Article 79.4 TFEU says and it has been carried out through policy orientation and exchange of infor-
mation between relevant stakeholders as better detailed below (Heidbreder, 2014a).  
 
Indeed, art. 79.4 TFEU states that 
 
“The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may 
establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting 
the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of 
the laws and regulations of the Member States”. 
 
In this provision the distribution of competences shows clear limitations in EU integration policy. While the 
EU is entrusted with the power to develop migration policy, on integration it can only provide support in 
orientating national policy and promoting the exchange of information among stakeholders. In the field of 
integration, the EU is able to intervene insofar as it does not lead to the harmonisation of the laws and reg-
ulations of the MS. The EU is thus entrusted with the lowest level of competence as it only has the compe-
tence to coordinate national policies, the latter remaining into the competence of the Member States. 
 
The logic underlying this limited authority relates mainly to two specific aspects of integration: first, the fact 
that integration involves a complex variety of policy fields and second, that a comprehensive integration 
policy requires a wide range of administrations and actors, many of whom are located at the local level. The 
first element is due to the multidimensional aspect of integration process. Indeed, integrating people into 
the receiving societies implies that the persons concerned should be granted access to a large set of crucial 
services like health care, housing, education, the labour market, vocational training, culture, etc. In all these 
policy fields, the EU's competence is minimal, where it exists at all. Second, alongside the significant number 
of policy fields involved, integration policies also involve an impressive set of players. Indeed, while national 
policies are defined mainly at governmental level, they are implemented at regional, sub-regional, local, dis-
trict and even sometimes street level. In this context, and according to the principle of subsidiarity, the EU 
does not seem to be the most appropriate level of intervention (Pascouau, 2014a). 
 
In addition, the structural imbalance of competences between migration and integration policies have 
meant that they have been developed separately, despite constant claims towards a holistic approach. For 
that reason, a main consequence of the present division of competences is the silos approach while the ho-
listic approach remains mainly desirable. 
 
                                                          
conditions laid down in the Treaties, the Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the 
actions of the Member States, without thereby superseding their competence in these areas. Legally binding acts of the Union 
adopted on the basis of the provisions of the Treaties relating to these areas shall not entail harmonisation of Member States' laws 
or regulations”. 
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The EU level is therefore characterised by a particular situation where the EU has shared competences in the 
field of immigration and supporting competences regarding integration issues. Such a situation goes against 
the assumption that immigration and integration policies should be developed together and with the same 
level of commitment. This discrepancy in terms of competences is no coincidence.  
 
As underlined earlier, the clarification regarding EU’s competences in the field of integration only occurred 
with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. However, the previous 10 years have 
shown that, EU action in this field has not always been in a coordination capacity. Far from it, the EU has 
adopted a series of rules and tools, some of which have enabled the coordination of national policies and 
some of which have harmonised national rules. The decade running from 1999 has seen an intricate mix of 
actions between coordination and harmonisation.  
 
 
3.1.2 National and local competences 
 
The national level has the authority over migration and integration. National experiences of immigration in-
fluence how integration is framed. How countries are administratively organized is also relevant. Particularly, 
the Central states in the European Union have asymmetrical competence on immigration, asylum and natu-
ralisation The regional level, in these States, deals only with matters of integration and with specific tasks on 
education, housing and other social affairs. On the contrary, countries of symmetrical federalism (and old 
traditions of federalism) involve the Länder and cantons in immigration matters. In other words, all levels of 
government work together in a defined way, and particularly in German speaking countries the Länder and 
cantons administer the laws of the federal level. The underlying idea is that there should be basic equality 
through federal law, but the administration should be connected to the realities and needs of the individual 
cantons or Länder, and controlled by elected regional and local representatives.  
 
Another example is given by the Italian and Spanish administration. These two countries are characterized 
by a tradition of centralised government. However they have followed in the footsteps of cooperative feder-
alism. The Italian constitution foresees the autonomy of regions but also the idea of a nation that is “one and 
indivisible”. To sum up, both countries have taken up the division between central legislation and regional 
implementation (Thränhardt, 2014a). 
 
Local integration policies have always existed in the shadow of national integration policies or developed 
independently in the case that no policies exist at national level. However, if immigration policy is followed 
by a national integration policy then local integration policies are stimulated and facilitated by these preced-
ing national frameworks. Sweden and the Netherlands are cases in point and this explains why Dutch and 
Swedish cities have a longer history of local integration policies. In the absence of national policies, many 
cities have developed integration policies as is testified by Birmingham and Bradford, Berlin and Frankfurt, 
Vienna or the cities of Zurich, Bern and Basel, to give just a few examples.  
 
In the last decade, local integration policies have become much more visible: cities have organised them-
selves internationally in networks20. These networks are strongly supported and funded by the European 
Commission and their activities have been studied extensively often on their own request.  
 
Systematic comparison of local policies reveals a significant variation in the framing of policies and the 
meaning of integration behind these local policies. Some initiatives, such as the Intercultural Cities Network, 
focus very strongly on the cultural dimension of integration, using diversity as a strength and diversity man-
agement as a strategy. Other cities frame integration policies primarily as a socio-economic issue using anti-
discrimination and equality as strategies and mainstreaming as governance principle. Still other cities stress 
the participation dimension of integration, looking at accessibility and opportunity structures, on the one 
                                                          
20 Cities for Local Integration Policies Network (CLIP), Intercultural Cities Network, EUROCITIES.  
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hand, and ` active citizenship’ of immigrants, on the other. Some cities have even developed a local citizenship 
concept as opposed to national citizenship (Penninx et al., 2014a). 
 
A particularity can be linked to the City of Barcelona where the City Council has played a crucial role in im-
plementing several processes related to different aspects of immigration. Although the Spanish Constitution 
gives the State exclusive competence over matters of “nationality, immigration, emigration, status of aliens, 
and right of asylum”, management of registration in the municipal census and the writing of reports on social 
integration and housing give the municipal councils a leading role in immigration procedures related with 
arrival and reception, regularisation and family reunification (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014b). 
 
 
3.1.3 Tension between levels of governance 
 
Tensions between the European and the national levels have been studied in depth by Dietrich Thränhardt 
in his analysis (Thränhardt, 2014a) which focused on the governance, at national level, of the two policy silos: 
migration and integration. He identified elements that cause these strains.  
 
First of all the creation of the single market and concomitant liberalisation implication that States can no 
longer control the movement and influx of people as they did previously. However, the idea that shifting 
power to the EU-level would re-establish some different form of authority is, challenged openly by politicians 
who see the loss of national sovereignty due to EU-harmonisation as not only too high a price to pay but also 
as an additional element in undermining national action sovereignty.  
 
Following this logic, the UK and Ireland have opted out of the whole area of freedom security and justice 
(justice and home affairs) and the Schengen area.  
 
Second, the EU has no all-encompassing blueprint that would provide a fully-fledged programme for a com-
prehensive migration policy. The type of competence the EU has in certain policies linked to migration have 
emerged in an incremental and ad hoc fashion. Third, the constant struggle between the functional pressure 
for harmonisation and the attempt to retain national powers leads to the de facto result that policies remain 
highly incomplete in practice. Even where more comprehensive solutions – such as a common asylum policy 
– have been formally added to the treaties, the actual EU-law creation has been hampered by lack of agree-
ment among the Member States. Interestingly enough, these tensions have not led the national governments 
to engage in the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) to coordinate national immigration policies and pre-
empt EU harmonisation.  
 
The specific division of authority is the outcome of competing interests on two dimensions:  
 
“The EU’s involvement in this field of law must not only address these diverse aspects of migration in a coherent 
way, but also has to manage two distinct but related conflicts: the balance between EU competence in this 
field and national sovereignty, and the tension between immigration control and the protection of human 
rights. Indeed, as the growing corpus of legislation indicates, the EU has been gradually harmonizing national 
law as regards control of irregular migration, and moreover it has continually been increasing the degree of 
control of irregular entry” (Heidbreder, 2014b). 
 
Tensions between national and local levels have been analysed through eight local case-studies which allow 
some conclusions to be made regarding the potential role performed by local integration policies in promot-
ing migrants inclusion. Indeed, even if decisions have been taken at national level it is at local level that the 
processes of becoming an accepted part of the society are developed. For this reason the biggest difference 
between the local and national frameworks of integration is that the local contexts are asked to meet the 
first needs linked to the settlement of migrants within the territory. 
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3.1.4 The role of civil society in filling gaps 
 
It has been a recurring theme in the literature on integration: NGOs, Trade-Unions, or more generally non-
profit organisations may be important actors for integration policies. In the absence of national policies, they 
may even have compensated the state’s shortcoming in guiding migrants in the maze of receiving societies.  
 
Legal advice and guidance is an area where receiving society organisations may offer pivotal support to mi-
grants. This may take many forms, for example, preparation of documents or providing information on the 
legal system. In this regard, Prague is a case in point. 
 
“Social and legal counselling is the cornerstone of integration projects organized in Prague. […]Legal counselling 
is organized to provide knowledge about the legal system, and other legal problems that were encountered by 
the counselled migrants. The counselling includes preparation of necessary documents and also legal repre-
sentation in procedural dealing with courts and public administration such as procedure of granting a state 
citizenship. Moreover, the legal consultations include general issues of life, ranging from Family Law (newly 
born children, under-age children, weddings or divorces), Civil Law (real estate purchases), Labour Law (extor-
tion) salary, wage refunds, labour contracts consultations, improper severance of the labour relations) to Com-
mercial Law (commercial register) and Criminal Law” (Matusz- Protasiewicz, 2014b). 
 
Another example of free legal advice that can help newly arrived immigrants is Barcelona, where social enti-
ties support immigrants with the procedures for obtaining legal status (via arraigo or “rootedness”), renewal 
of residence permits, family reunification, deportation, information regarding marriage with Spanish nation-
als, help with housing and other services. Garcés-Mascareñas found that: 
 
“Legal advice is one the mainstays of reception policies for the newly arrived population. […] this service is 
offered by a set of social entities (55 in 2011) and funded by the Barcelona City Council through projects. At the 
end of 2007 the Council’s Department for the Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue Programme launched the 
Xarxa d’Entitats Socials d’Assessorament Jurídic per Estrangers (XESAJE – Legal Advice for Foreigners Social 
Entities Network) with the aim of fostering shared knowledge among people providing legal advice in the city. 
The publication and circulation of information concerning changes in laws and regulations affecting foreigners 
is encouraged by this network, and periodical meetings are held with the institutions working in the field to 
obtain up-to-date information on the most pressing issues for both administration and users” (Garcés-Masca-
reñas, 2014b). 
 
Until 2002, non-governmental organisations in Germany, particularly trade unions and churches, were crucial 
for integration processes of guest-workers and their families. 
In Turin, during the amnesty of 1995, a mobilisation from below took place in order to facilitate the regular-
isation of immigrant undocumented workers, which lead to the emerging of a network between trade unions, 
NGOs, the municipality and the Police Headquarters (Caponio,2014a). 
 
A third case in point is Prague where the lack of a robust political-bureaucratic body has been compensated 
by a relatively well-developed network of NGOs dealing with integration governance. Prague-based NGOs 
have taken part in the realization of national integration strategies and they are also involved in the formation 
of legislative acts concerning the integration of migrants which then create a broader framework for the 
evolution of local strategies for integration governance. On the local level, they have constituted the back-
bone of Prague's integration governance and performed multiple tasks. Firstly, they have helped migrants to 
access public goods through social/legal counselling and also organized courses in the Czech language. Sec-
ondly, they have substituted the weak or even non-existent migrant organizations, in lobbying for migrants' 
interests and articulating their needs. Thirdly, they represented the main contact places for migrants and 
functioned as crucial intermediaries between individual migrants and the public administration. Moreover, 
thanks to their first-hand experience, the NGOs have had the ability to reflect on everyday needs when 
providing policy advice and through taking part in the evolution of Prague's integration governance (Matusz- 
Protasiewicz, 2014b).  
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NGOs may provide migrants temporary accommodation and act as mediators between private owners and 
tenants. It is worth noting that often, these initiatives receive funding from local authorities (Garcés-Masca-
renas, 2014). More generally, civil society may spearhead integration endeavours through practices and ini-
tiatives carried out at local level. Due to their experience at the grass roots level these organisations are often 
able to respond to specific issues faced by particular communities. As Humphris (2014) states,  
 
“reasons for this include flexible action plans, lower administrative costs and the embedded nature of organi-
sations within local areas. They have an important role in creating the right conditions for third-country nation-
als to access information and services relating to employment, education, healthcare, housing and culture”.  
 
As interventions take place at the local level there is a wide range of approaches, practices and outcomes. 
Humphris (2014) has identified some emerging trends in civil society’s practices that are aimed to ease the 
process of integration for new migrants.  
 
First, the use of mediators has had a multiplier effect on integration. Generally based on volunteering from 
the general public including retired people, students, members of the majority population or long-estab-
lished migrants, intercultural mediation aims at overcoming language and cultural barriers, mentoring stu-
dents and pupils, improving employability or language skills on a one-to-one basis (Phillimore, 2014). 
 
 Cultural mediators should work alongside personnel such as doctors, teachers, etc. 
 
Second, effective integration projects are based on effective and relevant partnerships, associating actors 
from the non-profit sector, local authorities and migrants themselves). Pasini and Coletti (2014a) reach sim-
ilar conclusions through a network analysis of integration practices throughout the EU. In essence, they find 
that a practice is more likely to be successful if: it places migrants at the centre; it is design implies a dense 
network of interaction between the different actors involved; the actors involved.  
 
 Following the example of the European Migration Forum, dialogue between civil society and policy 
makers should be increased at other levels of governance. 
 
Third, the establishment of forums gathering non-governmental organisations, migrant communities and lo-
cal government officials proved to be an effective way to organise the communication of issues regarding 
integration and find remedies to address them (this reflects the user-centric approach to practices as ex-
pounded in Pasini and Coletti, 2014a). This is similar in inter-faith forums: they gather different religious 
representatives, local authority officials and so forth. Such forums provide the opportunity for multiple actors 
from migrant communities to connect with agencies and institutions and discuss key issues of concern to 
migrant communities. The success of this approach depends on having the right political environment within 
which to operate so that institutions are open to the information they receive and are prepared to act 
(Phillimore, 2014a).  
 
Of particular importance is the capacity of trade unions in some cases to weigh on migrant’s labour market 
outcomes. Depending on their strength, unions may play on institutional arrangements for bargaining for an 
extended coverage of collective agreements, monitoring compliance with relevant legal regulation, negoti-
ating particular collective agreement provisions for migrant workers, or protecting the interests of migrants 
and raising their awareness on entitlements related to work and welfare system provisions in the receiving 
countries (Kahanec et al.,2014c). 
 
As several studies on Southern Europe have shown, in the absence of governmental integration policies, civil 
society actors (such as trade unions, NGOs, charities and civil movement associations) have become key in 
providing various services and offering political support for immigrants' rights claims. At the same time, their 
mobilisation may produce a “crowding out” effect wherein native associations mobilising on behalf of immi-
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grants actually become the main recipients of municipal funding and partners in policymaking, thus prevent-
ing immigrants from forming their own organizations (Penninx et al., 2014b). 
 
This statement is of particular importance since it points out that in some cases there can be tensions be-
tween the organization of immigrants and those for immigrants.  
 
It is worthwhile to refer to a tension that arises regularly between (representatives of) immigrant organisa-
tions and NGOs (of natives) that defend the interests of immigrants and provide services to them. In the first 
phase of immigrants’ settlement, such as in the Prague and Warsaw cases, interests of immigrants are – in 
the absence of strong immigrant organisations - defended by such native NGO’s: the ones that nowadays 
build up the service provisions for immigrants and pressure for national and local policies and – as in the 
Prague case – are strongly represented in the Regional Advisory Platform. As immigrant organisations de-
velop in the course of time, these may (re-)claim such representing tasks and the resources that governments 
may make available for both representation and service provision. The outcome of such a struggle is to a 
great extent dependent on choices that local governments make. For example, in the city of Milan, as re-
ported by Caponio, representation (and to a lesser extent also service provision) was moved away from im-
migrant organisations to Catholic NGOs (Penninx et al., 2014b). 
 
Also in Turin (Italy) the situation is quite similar, where there is an established practice of distributing grants 
every year to NGOs working in the social policy field, as well as Catholic organisations dealing with undocu-
mented migrants (Caponio,2014c). This is a way to reach a category of migrants (undocumented) who are 
not targeted by official policies due to their legal status. 
 
 Investments should be made to build excellent community and civil society leaders, who should 
come from a wide range of men and women, nationalities, statuses, and ages.  
 
 
3.1.5 Migrant organisations and networks 
 
The role, the power and the nature of migrant associations vary greatly both within a country and among 
different countries. Associations differ widely amongst themselves firstly with regard to their purposes and 
nature: some of them pursue sociability amongst their members; others promote cultural ethnic activities; 
still others are more active in the political field (e.g. claiming rights for migrants). 
 
Also the level of organisation and strength of an association may vary greatly and an example may clarify this 
point. In Italy migrant associations are largely unstructured, characterised by organisational weakness and 
do not have the power to influence the country’s social and political life. In other countries, such as Sweden, 
large institutional support and economic incentives, targeted at ethnic associations have given them more 
resources and power. 
 
In specific cases migrant associations may play a crucial role in migrant integration. As Kindler states: 
 
 “The important role of migrant organisations is presented in the study of refugee community organisations 
(RCOs) providing pre-arrival assistance , initial reception in the form of translation, interpretation, and support; 
assistance with building of skills and the provision of cultural knowledge; facilitating access to volunteering 
opportunities, as well as providing opportunities of social space and social contact” (Kindler, 2014). 
 
Kindler seeks to shed light on the role social networks and social capital play in fostering integration into local 
neighbourhoods across the EU. Over the past decade, the debate has revolved around whether bonding so-
cial capital (i.e. community-based social capital) prevents or hinders the construction of bridging social capital 
(i.e. transcending community cleavages). Alongside this debate, another major subject of research has been 
the role of ethnic networks in migrants’ economic activity and social integration at local level. Migrants may 
rely on their community to find a job but, in so doing, they may also restrain their opportunities and be 
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confined to low paid jobs. Since the majority of the studies reviewed are qualitative and conducted at the 
micro-level, results given are place-based and vary a great deal. Some trends are however discernible.  
 
A series of findings from a long list of studies leads to a nuanced and sometimes contradictory picture: not 
all networks are conducive of better integration. The capacity of a network to aid integration differs widely 
according to collective but also individual characteristics. 
 
There is an important differentiation between the various national/ethnic migrant groups, but also within 
the same national/ethnic group (among others along the lines of legal status, education and gender)” (p.12). 
Migrant networks do play a significant role in the initial phases of the settlement process, supporting in find-
ing job and accommodation, which can then become a source of bridging social capital. That said, increase 
in size and establishment of a given community may cause the networks to be more exclusive than inclusive. 
Characterised by distrust towards other groups, it would create increasing inner group cohesion and a nega-
tive form of bonding capital (Kindler, 2014).  
 
Considering the influence of inter-ethnic contact in mixed-neighbourhoods, the picture once again appears 
rather complex. Kindler argues: 
 
 “studies show that although diversity leads to a decline in mutual contact and trust, under certain circum-
stances it actually leads to an increase of these aspects of social cohesion” (ibid, 2014) 
 
More importantly, studies seem to pinpoint that this diversity does not undermine cohesion but rather that 
there is less cohesion in deprived areas. Diversity and deprivation appears to be concomitant. Again, Kindler 
argues: 
 
“Structural deprivation in neighbourhoods – as poor quality of housing, education and employment possibilities 
etc. - is the main reason behind the perception of areas as having little social cohesion” (ibid, 2014). 
 
 
 Social cohesion and inter-ethnic relations would improve locally if the broader framework of eco-
nomic policy took into account the needs of marginalized communities as they can be further dis-
advantaged when high levels of immigration are concentrated in deprived areas. 
 
 
As sketched in the previous section, networks on one hand, do play a significant role among migrants in the 
initial settlement process, helping to find a job or accommodation and giving support – especially buffering 
the negative effects of weak cultural and economic capital, as well as lack of a stable legal status. At this stage 
ethnic networks do constitute a source of bonding social capital. With time, these can lead to the develop-
ment of ethnic places, such as shops, business and restaurants, where migrants and native inhabitants meet, 
and which then can become a source of bridging social capital. The extension of ethnic networks, based on 
strong ties and mutual trust (which thus constitute bonding capital), via weak ties to wider social networks, 
seems to lead to place attachment and social integration. 
 
However, on the other hand, establishment of the group (both for migrants and non-migrants) in the country 
of migration and increase in size of the community can cause networks to be more exclusive rather than 
inclusive, and divided along lines of residence status and education. Membership in such networks is charac-
terised by distrust towards and stigmatisation of others while increasing inner group cohesion. Such networks 
may also be characterised by distrust towards one’s own national/ethnic group, thus are neither a source of 
bridging nor of bonding social capital. Ethnic networks, especially when it comes to economic participation 
of migrants, may become exploitative rather than a source of social and economic improvement. More es-
tablished migrants may disassociate themselves from newcomers with unstable legal and weak social sta-
tuses. Also younger generations may be unwilling to participate in the networks of older generations. 
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 Migrant networks need to be supported but monitored to make them really play a crucial role in 
fostering integration. 
 
 Support migrants to develop wide-range network. 
 
 
 
3.2 Organisation of policy making and implementation 
 
 
Once we have identified the main policy frames, the policy targets, and the actors involved, the next question 
we pose is how integration policies are organised and implemented. In terms of organisation, we examine 
the location of the initiating and coordinating force for migrant integration within the governmental admin-
istration: is it centrally located and coordinated, at the national level within a specific ministry (i.e. Home 
Affairs, Social Affairs or Employment), or is it organised between all areas that are relevant for integration 
policies? Such questions also apply to regional and local policies. 
 
 
3.2.1 Europe driving integration: an intricate mix of actions21 
 
The division of competences detailed above in Par. 3.1. was clarified with the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon in December 2009. However, in the last decade, EU action in the field of integration was not always 
been limited to a coordination role. Far from it, the EU adopted a series of rules and tools some of which 
have enabled the coordination of national policies and have harmonised national rules. Although the Treaty 
of Amsterdam was silent about the possibility of the EU to act in the integration field, in 1999 the Tampere 
European Council's conclusion opened the way for a EU action covering racism, xenophobia and non-discrim-
ination and also aimed to grant rights and obligations to third country nationals.  
 
This mix of actions has been well demonstrated by Acosta in a contribution to this project. Rather than rep-
licating what has already been developed, this part of the report will synthesise the EU actions in the field of 
integration. In doing this, we particularly focus on the dynamics which have taken place in this particular 
field. Hence, it will address which rules have been adopted with the aim of harmonising national laws and 
regulations and which tools and mechanisms have been adopted to enable and improve the coordination of 
Member States integration policies.  
 
 
3.2.1.1 Harmonisation of national rules 
 
Within the framework set in Tampere, the EU adopted two different types of legislations: rules aimed at 
integration, such as the Family Reunification Directive and the Long Term Residence Permit Directive, and 
rules opening access to certain rights, for example the wide range of EU rules in the field of immigration and 
asylum which define rights of third country nationals. 
 
 
o Rules pursuing an integration purpose 
 
The Family Reunification Directive and the Long Term Residence Permit Directive both aim to promote inte-
gration. Both Directives also include provisions enabling MS to implement integration requirements vis-à-vis 
                                                          
21
 Content taken from Pascouau, 2014a 
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third country nationals. It is thus relevant to note that, even if migrants’ integration is still under the full 
control of the MS only, the EU adopted rules which, in their aim and content, deal with integration issues and 
lead to the harmonisation of national rules in the field of integration. In addition, the procedural standards 
established under the Common Asylum Policy might offer an entry point for EU-level intervention.  
 
With regard to family reunification, the Directive is clear: “Family reunification is a necessary way of making 
family life possible. It helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third country nation-
als in the Member State, which also serves to promote economic and social cohesion, a fundamental Com-
munity objective stated in the Treaty” (Preamble point 4). 
 
The Long Term Resident Directive follows a similar line of reasoning. The Preamble states that: 
 
“the integration of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the Member States is a key element 
in promoting economic and social cohesion, a fundamental objective of the Community stated in the Treaty” 
(point 4). It adds further on “in order to constitute a genuine instrument for the integration of long-term resi-
dents into society in which they live, long-term residents should enjoy equality of treatment with citizens of 
the Member State in a wide range of economic and social matters, under the relevant conditions defined by 
this Directive” (point 12). 
 
More precisely, Member States may require applicants to demonstrate a certain level of integration before 
granting the right to family reunification or the long term resident status22. 
 
However, it is important to highlight that the EU has adopted rules which, in their aim and content, deal with 
integration issues and lead to the harmonisation of national rules in the field of integration.  
 
 
o Rules opening access to rights enhancing integration 
 
The second type of EU legislation is less direct and concerns rules which frame Member States’ room for 
maneuver regarding integration. This relates more precisely to a wide range of EU rules in the field of immi-
gration and asylum which define conditions under which Member States shall or may grant access to a series 
of rights which have a positive impact on the integration of third country nationals. These rights concern: 
- access to the labour market; 
- access to education; 
- access the vocational training; 
- access to health care; 
- access to housing; 
- equal treatment regarding working conditions;  
- recognition of diplomas and qualifications; 
- branches of social security and tax benefits; 
- access to goods and services and the supply of goods and services made available to the       
public.  
 
It should be underlined that these rights are not awarded in the same manner. The possibility for third coun-
try nationals to gain access to these rights is not the same across all of the instruments and is conditioned by 
the field covered. For example, variations occur depending on whether the instrument deals with interna-
tional protection or admission of migrants, the status of third country nationals, temporary or permanent, 
and the conditions to be fulfilled. In particular it is dependent on whether they are exhaustive or indicative,  
 
                                                          
22 The conditions under which these provisions can be implemented by Member States have been clearly explained by Diego Acosta, 
2014.  
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While there is a wide heterogeneity in this particular field, it is nevertheless worth noticing that the EU inter-
venes in areas which are closely linked to integration. As already indicated, having access to the labour mar-
ket, benefiting from equal treatment or being able to receive health care are all elements which promote 
integration of third country nationals in the receiving society. In including provisions related to these rights 
in its legislation, the EU creates the conditions that approximate national rules and policies.  
 
Over the last 15 years, the EU has developed rules which have directly or indirectly addressed integration 
related domains. These rules have, on certain occasions, and contrary to the letter of the Treaty, framed and 
consequently initiated the harmonisation of Member States rules in this policy field. While existing, it should 
nevertheless be pointed out that this harmonisation process is not direct. It stems from a process which 
primarily aims at defining rules regarding admission and sojourn of legally residing third country nationals in 
the EU. 
 
Alongside harmonisation which remains an exception in EU’s policy, institutions have developed and estab-
lished a wide range of tools and bodies aimed at coordinating national integration policies.  
 
The EU has carried out different actions in order to enhance the coordination of national integration policies 
over the last 15 years, which can be divided into two main types of action: policy orientation and exchange 
of information between relevant stakeholders.  
 
 
o Policy orientation 
 
Policy orientations have been defined in the Common Basic Principles of Integration, adopted by the Justice 
and Home affairs Council in November 200423; during the Ministerial conferences held in 2004, 2007, 2008, 
2010 and 201424; and, notably, in the five year programmes in the area of freedom, security and justice 
adopted by the European Council in 1999, 2004, and 2009.  
 
The Common Basic Principles, informal ministerial conferences and European Council conclusions enable 
Member States to discuss integration issues and to set future priorities in this domain.  
 
The European Commission has also been quite active. While it has helped Member States to define the ori-
entation of their policies, its main task was to put this into practice. It did this in two different ways. It firstly 
defined the concrete steps to take following Member States orientations. This mainly took the form of the 
adoption of Communications and so called “Integration Agendas”. The Commission has published two Agen-
das; one in 2005 to put the Common Basic Principles into concrete action, and the other in 2011, identifying 
new and further challenges in the field of integration.  
 
Secondly, the European Commission has been tasked to manage the European Integration Fund created by 
the Council in 2007 which ran from 2007 to 2013. The Fund aims to assist Member States in their effort to 
support third country nationals’ integration and set priorities. In managing the Fund, the European Commis-
sion is at the centre of EU policies and is able to attribute the money to Member States, to influence national 
developments and therefore European convergence. 
 
 
o EU’s support to exchange of information  
 
Given the limited competence attributed to the EU in the field of integration, the exchange of information 
between national stakeholders is a key element of the coordination of national policies. In this regard, the 
                                                          
23 Council Justice and Home Affairs, 19 November 2004, Doc. 14615/04. 
24 The last one was in November 2014 under the Italian presidency in Milan. The background note to the last ministerial conference 
on integration was developed from KING’s results by Ismu Foundation. See more at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Fifth-
Ministerial-Conference-on-Integration-Background-Note.pdf 
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EU has developed several types of actions which aim to gather and share experiences and practices among 
Member States representatives and civil society. Notably, this occurs during the meetings of the National 
Contact Points Integration and the European Integration Forum, and through the European Web Site on In-
tegration which aims to become an EU-wide platform for networking on integration through exchange about 
policy and practices.  
 
 
3.2.2 National and local level: an erratic organisation of migration and integration governance  
 
Integration is a challenge and, as such, it is a difficult matter to manage. At national level, governance is made 
more complex by the multiplicity of institutions in charge of the matter. 
 
Analysing the governance of integration at national (but also local) level means taking account of the different 
political parties and priorities at any one time. Indeed, whilst some countries show consolidated institutional 
tradition, other Member States have experimented with changing the responsibility for integration after 
every election. At the same time, many countries modified portfolios deliberately, looking at the objectives 
and the nexus with related policy fields. In addition, others followed tactical paths, e.g. coalition arrange-
ments.  
 
The causes of these changes are also linked to how integration is framed. Indeed, how policy makers per-
ceived the problem (integration in our case) influences governance. In earlier decades, immigration was 
largely considered an economic and social fact and so it became a matter of the ministries of the economy, 
labour, social affairs and education. The events caused by the end of the Cold War, the Gulf Wars, and ter-
rorist attacks in Europe and America brought the issue of immigration into the purview of security ministers 
 
In this regard, the reassignment of migration and integration to the ministry of the interior in France has led 
to strong links between immigration control and integration programmes. Therefore, integration is 
increasingly seen as a security issue, and integration programmes are aimed increasingly at the selection 
of immigrants rather than their empowerment. In France, integration activities have also been overtaken by 
the security agenda under President Sarkozy, e. g. with quantified deportation targets (Thränhardt, 2014a). 
France , at one stage, indicated a desire to implement the Dutch scheme of pre-departure integration but has 
not been able to do so due to legal reasons. 
 
At local level, as a consequence of the consolidation of migrants’ presence in various areas more policy fields 
become involved and the need for more coordination of policies comes to the surface. Particularly, when a 
more comprehensive, mainstreamed and future oriented approach replaced the welfare character of poli-
cies, then an additional need is felt to place the coordination of policies at a (hierarchically) higher level within 
the administration of the city. This process often goes together with higher visibility of these policies in local 
politics.  
 
Cities, in general, have shown that they adopt inventive manners to deal with top-down policies that rarely 
seem to understand the necessities coming from the ground. The strategy adopted by cities is not to imple-
ment the national policies as a final rule, but use them as a delineating framework that must be further 
modified, accommodated or renegotiated in everyday governance practice with the other local stakehold-
ers (Matusz-Protasiewicz, 2014a). 
 
Cities in Europe seems to follow one of the three different models: i) the interventionist model, visible in 
Vienna or Bologna, which attempts to encompass all sectors of cultural, social, economic, religious, ethnic 
integration; ii) the regulatory model, visible in Copenhagen or Turku, which is selective and based on the 
active intervention in the social and economic sectors of integration, but indifferent or neutral in the cultural, 
ethnic, and religious ones. In this sense, this model promotes the principle of having ‘no policy is also policy’; 
iii) the passive model, visible in Porto and Dublin, which lacks a proper infrastructure, and is characterised 
by a general reluctance in investing in social cohesion measures. It presumes that immigrants already speak 
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local language, do not suffer language barriers and can thus integrate without any additional help (Matusz-
Protasiewicz, 2014a). In these three models, the outcomes in terms of integration are different, as cities 
create their own frame of governance in which their role as mediator or negotiator among different players 
clearly emerges 
 
With regard to the implementation of migration and integration policies, local authorities can enjoy differ-
ent margins of responsibility and autonomy/discretion. A distinction can be made between countries that 
assign cities explicit and formal prerogatives on matters of immigrants’ regularisation and countries where 
these procedures are highly centralised.  
 
Finally, in all levels of governance, evidence shows an increase of the policy/practice’s success if i) migrants 
(i.e. end users) are placed at the centre of a policy/practice, so that it can better fulfil their needs; ii) the 
design implies a dense network of interaction between the different actors involved (density); iii) the actors 
involved in the network belong to different policy-making levels and non-profit/civil society (complexity)25 
(Pasini, Coletti, 2014a).  
                                                          
25 In addition, the three features, if combined, guarantee that the output addresses its initial target and that the outcome favours 
integration. All this leads to the activation of social mechanism, such as reciprocity, control, acceptance, certification of actors’ claims 
by public authorities, material and non-material rewards, and positive effect of past experience, that can trigger the two-way process 
between migrants and the receiving society (Pasini, Coletti, 2014a). 
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4.  LOCAL INTEGRATION POLICIES IN THREE DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter will focus on what has been done at different levels of governance to integrate migrants into 
the receiving society. 
 
In some cases, a state or a city may choose to ignore migrants' presence and therefore avoid any special 
responsibility for them. This non-policy response constitutes a choice, and as such should be understood as 
a policy in itself. In other cases, new policies may be formulated to cater for certain immigrants' needs but 
under specific conditions due to the alleged temporary nature of their stay. Under this “guest-worker ap-
proach”, immigrants’ otherness may be “tolerated” and even encouraged though their (residence) rights may 
be curtailed in the long run. Finally, if migrants are perceived as permanent residents, inclusion may be the 
main response.  
 
In order to have a comprehensive picture of how integration is supported it would be important to go beyond 
the mere integration policy and also consider other policies such as those in the field of education, housing, 
health and employment. Although we acknowledge this here we limit our analysis to integration policies 
implemented at European, national and local level. Specifically, we analysed these policies by dividing them 
into the three dimensions proposed by Penninx in his heuristic model: legal and political, socio-economic and 
cultural and religious (Penninx et al., 2014a). 
 
As shown in Figure 5 below, there are two main actors who interact with one another: migrants and the 
receiving societies. Then, as depicted in the middle, integration can be divided into three dimensions that are 
constantly influencing each other: the legal-political dimension, the socio-economic dimension and the cul-
tural and religious dimension. Finally there are three levels of analysis: the individual level, which refers di-
rectly to migrants and natives, the collective level, which refers to organisations of migrants (e.g. migrant 
associations), organizations of the receiving society (e.g. trade unions, churches) and organizations of both 
of them; and finally the institutional level. 
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Fig. 5 -Penninx’s heuristic model for the study of integration processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The nature of the interaction between the two constituent populations (receiving societies and migrants) 
determines the direction and the temporal outcomes of the integration process. However, these two 
‘partners’ are fundamentally unequal in terms of power and resources. Since integration policies are 
defined politically by (the majorities within) the receiving society, there is an inherent danger of representing 
the expectations and demands of this society, or dominant parts of it, rather than the possibility that these 
policies are defined on the basis of participation, negotiation and agreement with immigrant groups. 
 
The study of the legal-political dimension of integration has been developed extensively, both the part that 
focuses on the legal status attributed by admission policies and its consequences for integration (including 
the absence of an official legal status) and the part on (non) participation of immigrants in politics in the 
broadest sense, a branch of studies that often goes under the name of citizenship studies. 
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The analysis of the socio-economic dimension regards the (development of the) position of immigrants in 
key fields of societal stratification: work and income, education, housing and health. If the benchmark is the 
native/non-immigrant, such studies often go under equality studies; if they are longitudinal within the group, 
they go under the label of (intergenerational) social mobility studies. 
 
Concerning the cultural-religious dimension: while the study of the cultural and religious adaptation of indi-
vidual newcomers has been central, nowadays the perception and acceptance of newcomers by natives has 
become increasingly important. Furthermore, immigrants' culture and religion are studied as collective phe-
nomena, as is often dictated by the political and societal organization of cultural and religious diversity and 
its recognition in the society of settlement (equity studies). 
 
Using these three dimensions to analyse integration is a valuable way for understanding the process and, 
therefore, for providing recommendations on how to govern the phenomenon. Meanwhile, recognising the 
interconnections among the dimensions is crucial in order to implement strategies supporting integration. 
These three dimensions are different as far as their direct objectives are concerned, but they are intercon-
nected and should always be considered as such. As a matter of fact, evidence sheds light on the negative, 
if inadvertent, impacts of one domain on the others due to misplaced policies or attitudes. On the other 
hand, evidence highlights good practices in promoting efficient migration and integration policies that can 
have results in more than one dimension at the same time.  
 
The socio-economic dimension of integration may be strongly influenced by the legal-political one, particu-
larly if access to and rights in these critical fields are limited or even denied. Potentially, the outcomes of 
immigrant integration in the socio-economic dimension may also be influenced by the ethnic/cultural/reli-
gious one, for example, where negative perceptions relating to certain groups of migrants lead to prejudice 
and discrimination by the receiving society (individuals, organisations or institutions). That brings – even if 
access is legally guaranteed – fewer opportunities and lower scores for immigrants in the so-called hard do-
mains of employment, education, housing and health care.  
 
 
4.1 Integration policy in the legal-political dimension 
 
 
The legal-political dimension refers to residence and political rights and statuses of immigrants. The basic 
question here is whether, and to what degree, immigrants are regarded as fully-fledged members of the 
political community. The position of an immigrant or the `degree of integration’ has two extreme poles: on 
the one hand there is the position of the illegal foreign resident who is not a part of society in the legal-
political sense (but is part of it in the other two dimensions, i.e. socio-economic and cultural-religious dimen-
sion). At the other extreme there is the position of an immigrant who is (or has become) a national citizen. 
In between there is an enormous variation, which has increased in recent decades due to attempts of Euro-
pean states to `regulate’ international migration and integration, and as a consequence of new statuses and 
rights of the European Union migration regimes (among others EU-nationals versus Third Country Nationals). 
 
The competence over the legal and political dimension of integration lies predominantly at the national 
level, particularly when it comes to the legal status and formal political participation through voting. This 
means that in these respects conditions are set for local policies. Local authorities have to deal with these 
conditions, by using their discretionary power in implementing national policies and/or by promoting specific 
initiatives to facilitate immigrants’ access to secure a legal status.  
 
Although main competence over the legal and political dimension of integration lies at the national level, 
local authorities enjoy a considerable margin of manoeuvre in implementing national policies and/or can 
promote specific initiatives to facilitate migrants’ access to secure legal status (e.g., a dedicated office 
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providing information on the naturalisation procedure) or programmes that promote migrants’ political par-
ticipation (e.g., consultative committees). The analysis also shows how cities can play a relevant role in mat-
ters which are primarily of a national competence, i.e. access to legal status and citizenship on the one hand 
and immigrants’ political inclusion on the other. The literature review shows a highly varied picture, with 
different kinds of policies unfolding within different frames of immigrants’ legal and political integration (Ca-
ponio, 2014a). 
 
 
4.1.1 Access to legal status and citizenship: the role of cities 
 
Migration policies are implemented at national level. Governments decide who can enjoy the right to enter 
the territory and permission to stay. However, the irregular presence of immigrants is a crucial issue for 
each level of governance. Although irregular migrants are not considered a target of policies because they 
are not supposed to exist, their presence is a fact. Cities cannot pretend that they do not have this category 
of migrants but their response varies widely depending on existing national laws and local rules.  
 
For instance, on the one hand, in Spain, through the institution of the padron municipal, which is an admin-
istrative register where immigrants who live in a city can register with their foreign passport and therefore 
without necessarily having a regular residence permit, the local administration can play an active role in fa-
vouring (or discouraging) undocumented immigrants’ access to legal status. In fact, since 2003, Spanish im-
migration law assigns municipalities the task of producing the so called “social rooting” (arraigo social) report, 
which is a fundamental requirement for seeking regularisation. On the other hand, in France the municipali-
ties have no formal competence on matters of immigrants’ legal status. At a local level the Prefect (Préfet), 
as representative of the Ministry of the Interior and therefore of the national government, enjoys a consid-
erable amount of discretion in establishing who cannot be expelled and has to be regularised on the basis of 
humanitarian considerations (Caponio, 2014a). 
 
 
 Irregular migration should be considered as a reality which should not only be dealt with by the 
local level, specifically with regard to integration policies. 
 
 
Legislative amendments and proposals in several EU Member States have made citizenship harder to ob-
tain. A general shift to more demanding integration conditions has taken place, resulting in the exclusion 
of large numbers of migrants from obtaining citizenship, notably in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Again cities can play a relevant role by promoting different kind of actions aimed at fostering access to citi-
zenship such as language courses, information to would-be citizens and/or specific preparation to pass citi-
zenship tests or examinations. The naturalisation campaigns carried out in some German cities, such as Berlin 
or Hamburg are a case in point. In Hamburg, volunteer facilitators from various different communities have 
been trained to provide advice about citizenship procedures to those who are hesitant or need guidance 
because of linguistic barriers, fear of bureaucratic processes or lack of knowledge of the benefits of natural-
isation. 
 
To address this: 
 
 Citizenship should be regarded as an important integration tool and should therefore be facilitated 
at the national level.  
 States should provide more transparency and clarity in administrative procedures for accessing 
citizenship. 
 Governments should promote actions aimed at fostering access to citizenship at the local level 
(e.g. advice on citizenship procedures, naturalization campaigns).  
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4.1.2 Political participation of migrants: direct or indirect participation 
 
The extent to which migrants participate politically relies upon both the political opportunity structure and 
several individual variables such as political ideas and values; individual characteristics – level of education, 
linguistic skills, gender; previous involvement in politics in the country of origin; level of social capital; reasons 
for presence in the territory (permanent or temporary migration); and sense of belonging to the destination 
country. 
 
The political participation of migrants may be considered as a collective or as an individual prerogative. The 
experience of Turin highlights that, after the failure of the Consultative committee in the mid-2000s, immi-
grants political participation was redefined as an individual right, implying the inclusion of immigrants and 
their participation in general elections at the district level, rather than special rights and groups’ representa-
tion. Such an approach appears to be consistent with the support of the Deputy Mayor on Integration Affairs 
to the initiatives aimed at leading to a revision of the nationality law and, more generally, with the discourse 
on second generations as “citizens of tomorrow” (Caponio, 2014c). 
 
Migrant participation in the political arena can be classified as direct or indirect political participation. In 
order to analyse these two forms of participation, it is important to consider whether or not some rights, i.e. 
voting rights, and opportunities, i.e. consultative bodies, are offered by national or local administration. 
 
 
 4.1.2.1 The right to vote 
 
With regard to direct political participation, in some countries migrants have the right to vote in local elec-
tions after three years of residence (Sweden) while in others, such as Italy, they enjoy very limited political 
opportunities and non-EU residents cannot vote in local elections. The right to vote in national elections is 
strictly linked to the naturalisation process: this poses some problems for long-term residents who are 
excluded from representation despite their role in the society and being subject to the laws of the land. 
 
 
 The political participation of immigrants through the right to vote deserves specific attention in 
each context in order to understand its meaning for immigrants themselves and its potentialities. 
 
From the case studies of cities analysed within KING Project, only two cities, Turku and Amsterdam grant full 
active and passive voting rights to immigrants. But interestingly, “respondents in Turku and Amsterdam seem 
to take this participation for granted”. It looks as if such individual participation is not seen as representing 
the immigrant community and thus as less relevant than other forms of collective representation, such as 
immigrant organisations. The Turku case, however, has recently shown that a significant representation of 
Councillors with immigrant background may lead to specific policy initiatives. In the Amsterdam case, this 
also happened in the past (Penninx, 2014). 
 
The right to vote in local elections does not mean that political participation of migrants will automatically 
follow. Some cities, recognizing this limitation, promote a series of initiatives in order to foster an actual 
engagement of migrants in the receiving country, for example through training courses in voting education, 
information sessions on local politics, and information campaigns on electoral rights. A case in point is Dublin.  
Caponio states that: 
 
 “in Ireland, legally resident non-EU citizens can vote in local elections, yet participation had historically been very 
low: in the 2007 election, only 8,400 out of a potential of 75,000 migrants registered to vote. Barriers identified 
included the very young profile age of foreign potential voters and a lack of targeted information on how to register 
and why they should vote. In view of the 2009 local elections in Dublin, the Migrant Voters Campaign Project was 
launched with the aim of raising awareness of migrants’ voting right. In particular, the city organised one day voting 
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education training for 74 community leaders who were then involved in delivering voters’ information sessions 
within their respective communities and in other communities across the city. Posters advertising the project were 
translated into 25 languages as part of the registration campaign. To carry out the project, immigrant communities 
and their associations were involved since the very beginning: a steering committee of 16 immigrants from 12 
countries representing ethnic, religious, cultural groups and business interests was established” (Caponio, 2014a). 
 
 
 States should encourage the political participation of migrants with voting rights by providing 
information in appropriate forms and through many platforms on local politics and on voting 
systems.  
 
 The positive effect of allowing voting rights for third country nationals should be further explored 
by Member States.  
 
 
 4.1.2.2 Consultative committees: role and limits 
 
With regard to indirect political inclusion, the eight case studies of the King Project found a common tendency 
among all cities: all of them have invested in consultative committees, platforms or councils that bring to-
gether stakeholders in integration policies. Still there is a great variety in their composition and to a certain 
extent in their function. Indeed, while the access to the right to vote is generally restricted, the access to less 
formal spheres is more open.  
 
First of all, there are platforms that bring together immigrants (mostly coming from immigrant organisations) 
when they are the target group of a particular policy. They are asked to function as a communication, mobi-
lisation and evaluation agency between target groups and policymakers. Milan once had its Migrants’ Coor-
dination (Coordinamento Migranti) (1985) and Turin had its Municipal Consultative Committee (1995). 
Stuttgart used to have an International Council whose members were chosen by Stuttgarters with an immi-
grant background, but in the present Council, members are appointed on the basis of their expertise in mi-
gration and integration issues. Amsterdam still has an Advisory Council, although its status has declined in 
the course of recent years. The case studies suggest that overall such forms of representation – as a kind of 
alternative political representation – is rather vulnerable and does not have a long life. 
 
Secondly, there are platforms that primarily gather direct stakeholders in integration policies and have a 
primary focus on mobilisation, policy instrumentation and implementation. Immigrant organisations may 
constitute an important part of the members, but then as stakeholders and participants in policies rather 
than as representatives of a group. The broad 58-member Immigration Council of Barcelona and the current 
International Council in Stuttgart, are good examples. Membership is based on the expectation that mem-
bers will contribute to policy making or implementation; or the expectation that members scrutinise the 
administration’s policies and practices” (Penninx et al., 2014b). 
 
Another example of an initiative that may favour an active engagement of migrants in issues of public interest 
is participatory planning, an approach aimed at including migrants in the decision making process. Nonethe-
less, the relation between participation and empowerment of citizens is not univocal: in some cases partici-
pation has a rhetorical meaning or even has a conservative function in the maintenance of the status quo. 
Sometimes it is simply an instrumental tool of legitimising decisions previously taken. The following cases 
show effective and non-effective examples of the participatory planning approach. 
 
In the participatory planning initiative for the Station Area in Reggio Emilia, the vast majority of citizens who 
got involved turned out to be natives, in an area where the majority of residents are of foreign origin. But 
there are also successful examples of participatory planning. However, when given time participatory plan-
ning has been a success in Berlin. The Quartiermanagement (QM) programme was set up by the Senate in 
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1999 in 15 neighbourhoods, most of them with a high migrant population. A dedicated ‘resident fund’, a form 
of participative budgeting, led to previously unseen levels of local citizen involvement. With a particular focus 
on people with a migrant background, this participative policy enabled the city to have a better understand-
ing of the needs and priorities of migrant communities. By involving migrant residents’ decisions to shape 
the use of ‘resident funds’ the feeling of shared ownership of local policies increased. Also, developing effec-
tive structures which allow migrants to input their views on common community activities such as festivals 
and events encourages wide ranging participation as was the case with the Peoples of the World Festival in 
Bilbao (Humphris, 2014). 
 
Consultative bodies are established by cities in order to give migrants or migrant communities a venue for 
their representation and to represent them in the political sphere. Nonetheless, their efficacy varies greatly 
and in some cases, they are merely an attempt to compensate for the lack of access to political rights (Matusz-
Protasiewicz, 2014a).  
 
Most of existing studies on immigrant consultative committees do not point to a conclusion that these insti-
tutions can effectively compensate for the absence of local voting rights. In other terms, their involvement 
in policymaking processes should be further investigated.  
 
In general, these committees seem to have a quite limited role in the definition of local policy. In the case 
of Lyon for instance, the Conseil des Rdes Rl d Etrangers Lyonnais (CREL) is regarded as a place of reflection 
and proposal. It must gather at least four times a year in plenary assembly, and has a formal right of infor-
mation about local policies; furthermore it can make proposals, spontaneously or when consulted by the City 
Council. Yet, the City Council has neither the obligation to consult the CREL each time it examines a special 
issue related to immigrants’ integration, nor to follow its advice.  
 
Similarly the Consell Municipal d’Immigració established in 2001 by the City of Barcelona is a consultative 
body aimed at favouring immigrants’ participation and at creating the necessary conditions for their access 
to full citizenship, regardless of their administrative situation. To this end, different actors are taking part in 
the Consell, not only immigrant associations, but also pro-immigrant autochthonous organisations and 
‘mixed’ organisations, as well as representatives of the local authorities and of employers’ associations. Yet, 
its concrete functioning reveals how the Consell played a limited role in local policymaking, since it met rarely, 
only once or twice per year, and only on the initiative of the city council, while requests for extraordinary 
meetings coming from the associations were systematically disregarded (Caponio, 2014a). 
 
Other examples on the role of consultative bodies may clarify this point: 
 
The city of Amsterdam established advisory councils for minorities in the early 1980s, mirroring the national Minorities 
Policy. The goal was to provide venues for the representation of immigrant communities living in the city and promote 
their involvement in processes of policy formulation. In more concrete terms, five advisory councils were established, 
i.e. Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese/Antilleans, South Europeans and refugees, Chinese and Pakistanis, each one consti-
tuted of representatives of individual minority organisations and were financially and administratively supported by the 
city administration. In 2003, the advisory councils were discontinued, and a new Diversity Council was set up in 2005. 
This includes representatives of different immigrant associations and acts as a public inquiry institution, i.e. it airs criti-
cisms and gives voice to the concerns of the ethnic communities. It meets about four times a year with the Advisory 
Board on Diversity and Integration, which also includes experts (Caponio, 2014). 
 
In Copenhagen since 1998, an Integration Council has been established “to ‘attend to the interests of ethnic minorities 
and act as their mouthpiece’, as well as to ‘guide the politicians, the standing committees and the administration of the 
city on how to secure an efficient and coherent integration policy’”. It used to be composed of nominated representa-
tives of ethnic organisations, in addition to experts and representatives of the social partners, housing corporations and 
educational institutions. Since 2006 the representatives of immigrant groups are directly elected from the population 
of residents with (non-western) immigrant origin, and immigrant organisations as such are not involved anymore. A 
shift from group representation towards individual participation seems to have taken place (Caponio, 2014a). 
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 Encourage migrants to use participation opportunities through targeted distribution of infor-
mation; awareness of rights; exchange best practices and experience; follow-up policy implemen-
tation. 
 
 Create opportunities to participate:  
- ensure participation and inclusion in policy decision-making processes of all (migrant) groups 
affected by a certain decision; 
- create specialized migrant consultative bodies which have a concrete say in policy-making 
processes (rather than committees with just symbolic functions); 
- institutionalize the participation of migrant representation in local consultative bodies/councils 
- strive for intercultural openness in all administrative levels, e.g. by increasing the proportion of 
employees with a migrant background. 
 
 
4.1.3  Migrant associations and integration in the legal-political dimension 
 
Migrant organisations, both in terms of membership and services provided by them, play an important role 
in the settlement process and in integration. Notably, the study of Refugee Community Organisations (RCOs) 
highlight the role of migrant organizations in providing pre-arrival assistance, initial reception in the form of 
translation, interpretation, and support; assistance with skills development and the provision of cultural 
knowledge; facilitating access to volunteering opportunities, as well as providing opportunities in social 
spaces to promote social contact (Kindler, 2014). 
 
On the whole, migrant associations often face several limitations. While in certain cases they do represent 
an important actor in receiving countries and do favour migrants’ mobilisation, in others cases they suffer 
from a lack of representativeness, and a low capacity to deal with institutions that do not consider them as 
interlocutors.  
 
Often migrant associations are internally divided. Numerous ethnic organisations in Flanders (Belgium), were 
fragmented along ethnic lines and often divided politically and religiously. In addition, the electoral impact 
of ethnic minorities remained limited for demographic reasons (Kindler, 2014). 
 
Two examples make clear how and to what extent migrant associations are limited through lack of organiza-
tion or resources.  
 
With respect to immigrants’ political participation, Turin has undergone two main phases: the mid-1990s, 
which was characterised by the representative frame and the 2000s, when an approach based on mediation 
started to take place. In the first period immigrants’ political participation featured as a particularly promi-
nent issue in the local political agenda, as pointed out by the decision of establishing in 1995 the Municipal 
Consultative Committee. This was directly elected by immigrants who had been living in the city for more 
than three years on the basis of a complex electoral system aimed at ensuring the representation of the main 
geographical areas of origin of the immigrants living in the city, i.e. Europe, Eastern Europe, North Africa, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. However, the Municipal Consultative Committee was abandoned in 1997, given 
the scarce participation of immigrant associations in the meetings. It was revealed to be structurally weak, 
and often lacked the resources to organize on a permanent basis (Caponio, 2014a). 
 
Nonetheless, in some cases the marginalization of migrant organisations is due to other factors, as the case 
of Milan shows. 
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In Milan, migrant organisations played a relevant role in the mid-1980s, when the Consultative Committee 
was put in place with the goal of promoting their participation in policymaking processes. This was aban-
doned in the early 1990s, after the electoral victory of the Northern League Mayor, Marco Formentini. Since 
then, immigrant associations have been marginalised vis-à-vis the more reliable and experienced Italian 
NGOs, which have been running most of the municipality services for immigrants’ reception and assistance. 
[…] However, a change of approach started to take place with Mayor Letizia Moratti, who, while being a 
prominent figure of centre-right Berlusconi movement, still showed a certain interest in immigrant associa-
tions as a resource for the city, in particular with regard to the EXPO 2015 event. In more concrete terms, the 
Mayor held three meetings with immigrant organisations operating in the city area. However, no consultative 
institution was established, and relations with immigrant associations appear today to be primarily of an 
informal kind (Caponio,2014b). 
 
 Support migrant organisations (however informal) as they have an important role in fostering in-
tegration processes. 
 
 
4.1.4  The attitude of the receiving society on migrant integration in the legal-political dimension 
 
The attitude of the receiving society is crucial for the integration of migrants, and also in the legal-political 
dimension: if migrants are perceived as outsiders or as a menace it is less likely they will be granted rights, 
such as voting rights in the local election. If the perception of migrants is more favourable it is more probable 
that they will be accepted as full members of the society, with rights and obligations comparable to those of 
other citizens. Over the last decade, and especially after the terrorist attack in 2001, migration has become 
an increasingly politicised issue with the widespread diffusion of xenophobic attitudes among natives. This 
hinders any process of migrant inclusion in the receiving society and specifically in the legal and political 
dimension of integration. 
 
In some countries, such as Italy, the debate of migrants’ political rights is highly politicized and the adverse 
attitude of a part of the public opinion hinders the effective participation of migrants in the political arena. 
An interesting example is the city of Milan where after the electoral victory of the Northern League Mayor, 
Marco Formentini […] the issue of immigrants’ political participation was side-lined and became a sort of 
taboo for the centre-right majorities governing the cities since the 1990 (Caponio,2014b). 
 
Nonetheless, the political discourse on migrant participation does not always correspond to practices and 
the case of Milan is again a case in point. Indeed today, under the current centre-left city government, the 
official discourse appears far more open to cultural accommodation and participation, yet policy practices 
are rather contradictory. The City World Forum has been established, which however is not an institution 
allowing for the political participation of immigrant associations, and no resources have been allocated to 
them to develop their projects (Caponio, 2014b). 
 
Another interesting example of initiatives put in place to influence the attitude of the national level toward 
a specific issue, namely the citizenship of the second generations, comes from Turin where the Deputy Mayor 
on Immigrant Integration has always supported initiatives aimed at putting pressure on the national govern-
ment for the revision of the current restrictive national law. A case in point was the petition “L’Italia sono 
anch’io” (I’m also part of Italy), undertaken in 2013 by various NGOs and associations of second generations, 
which aimed at collecting the 50,000 signatures needed in order to register a new bill in Parliament that 
revised the 1992 nationality law. The initiative was explicitly endorsed by the Deputy Mayor in various public 
events held in the city (Caponio, 2014c). This initiative is an example of a mobilization from the local level in 
order to influence the attitude of the receiving society as a whole.  
 
 
 Policymakers should put migrants at the centre of the action, engaging as many levels of govern-
ance and as many stakeholders as possible. 
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4.2 Integration policy and migrants’ integration in the socio-economic dimension 
 
Integration in what may alternatively be called hard domains, structural domains or socio-economic domains 
is fundamental. A migrant needs to find a job to meet her/his and her/his family needs, a home, schools for 
the children, healthcare facilities. But integration in these spheres is not necessarily more important than in 
the other spheres. Finding a place in society in the social or cultural sense is equally important, as is being 
protected by the law or politically participating in the receiving society. But socio-economic aspects are both 
means and markers of integration: means because they generate integration; and markers because they al-
low to see whether there is equal access or not (Phillimore, 2014). 
 
Exclusion and deprivation have enormous impacts upon the ability of new migrants and existing minorities 
to integrate, and reach their potential, to develop social connections and social capital. Furthermore, given 
the economic emphasis associated with migration, down-skilling and, in migrant children, poor education 
outcomes and economic activity levels, have an economic (as well as social) opportunity cost. Thus 
introducing national mechanisms for recognising or converting qualifications, enhancing employability, 
providing work experience and supporting migrant children in school are likely to impact on their integration 
in other domains (Phillimore, 2014). 
 
The challenges migrants face in their integration process in these domains call for responses on the part of 
public authorities. These responses come from national, regional and/or local authorities. They lean against 
a backdrop made up of distribution of competence, immigration history, labour market features and so forth 
(see Chapter 1). It remains that these challenges are mostly felt at local level since practical difficulties are 
first encountered there and local institutions are first interlocutors.  
As Phillimore states: 
 
“Migrants essentially settle into their country of migration at local level. It is at this level they find housing and 
employment, their children enter education, they build social connections (in addition to those elsewhere) and 
utilise services” (Phillimore, 2014). 
 
For some fields, namely healthcare, education and labour market, a national regulatory framework exists in 
most cases. For housing however, local authorities have greater margin of manoeuver. Notwithstanding, the 
capacity of local authorities or political will to act in one way or another in these four fields leads to differ-
ences from municipality to municipality throughout the EU (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014a).  
 
It is important to bear in mind the tension between access to socio-economic facilities and migrants’ legal 
statuses. Legal migrants have, in principle, the right to access facilities that irregular migrants, being undoc-
umented or refused asylum seekers, have not. This is problematic because legal statuses may change over 
the life-course but the impact of not profiting from integration policies will, most likely, endure. One may 
become irregular if one fails to satisfy residence permit renewal conditions. One may also be regularized. 
Deprivation of access to one field of structural integration or another may have dire consequences on the 
process of integration. For that reason, the following section deals with both regular and irregular migrants. 
Education is the most relevant example. A child that cannot attend school due to restrictions stemming from 
legal status may suffer from unequal opportunities if and when his or her stay is regularized.  
 
 
4.2.1 Labour market 
 
Access to the labour market and employment are fundamental features of the process of integration. Both 
scholarly literature and governments’ attention to the matter underscore the place labour integration takes 
in the process of integration. Employment is regarded as the best way to foster integration in other domains 
as it avoids poverty. That is, poor economic conditions may lead to concentration in poor housing areas and 
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isolation from work and education opportunities, to poor health and problems of disaffection (Craig, 2014). 
Likewise, empirical studies show that having a job is also perceived as fundamental by migrants themselves. 
Beyond economic security and professional development, work gives migrants a routine, a sense of worth 
and the opportunity to meet other people (Phillimore et al., 2014a). 
 
Literature on market integration altogether points to migrant labour market outcomes generally below those 
of the receiving country. 
 
To conclude, for successful market integration, migrants must have overcome three barriers: participation; 
unemployment; and employment quality (Kahanec et al., 2014a). These barriers are mediated by discrimi-
nation.  
 
o Migrants participation to the labour market 
 
Studies show that migrants’ participation rate in the labour market remains lower than nationals’ participa-
tion rate overall, but this gap decreases with the passage of time after migration (Craig, 2014; Kahanec et al., 
2014). This statement seems to hold less when we look at migrants’ residence purpose: economic migrants 
display higher participation rates than natives whereas humanitarian and family reunion migrants are less 
likely to participate. More open economies, i.e. those with a higher export-to-GDP ratio, provide favourable 
conditions for labour force participation and perhaps also employment of immigrants (Kahanec et al., 2014b).  
 
Nonetheless, barriers to participation in the labour market are often set in national legislation, as a part of 
the mechanism of exclusion mentioned in chapter 1. 
 
In France, labour market access and integration are complicated by existing barriers, which often explicitly 
exclude non-citizens from a number of positions, such as civil servants, lawyers, doctors, dentists, midwives, 
surgeons, pharmacists, brokers, chartered accountants, bailiffs, notaries, etc.  
 
In the Netherlands the native-immigrant gaps remain, aggravated by limited language knowledge and, as a 
consequence, negative perceptions by natives. The Netherlands decided to leave aside cultural integration 
and boost economic aspects of integration (Blom, 2014). That said, access to the labour market is not granted 
without condition. At the same time, at national level, participation in the labour market follows a twofold 
logic that discriminates undocumented migrants and rejected asylum seekers. With the exception of those 
migrating through family reunification or asylum seekers with an on-going procedure, regular residence is 
the condition to access labour market. In addition, employment has increasingly become a condition for 
gaining a residence permit (regularization and renewal) (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014a). 
 
Until recently, Germany did not focus on integration of guest workers and paid insufficient attention to 
language skills or other skills necessary for successful economic and social integration. This helps to explain 
the low qualification of migrants, insufficient linguistic skills and limited education, especially of second-
generation migrants living in Germany, which have created barriers for successful employment. 
Consequently, there are significant employment participation and earning gaps between natives and second-
generation migrants due to low educational levels and insufficient vocational training of the latter group.  
 
 The set of rights laid down in EU directives providing access to the labour market requires proper 
implementation and monitoring, with the aim of ensuring equity and equality. 
 
 Legal access to temporary jobs or occasional employment could be facilitated by reducing legal and 
administrative barriers (e.g. through easier bureaucratic procedures for hiring people temporarily or 
occasionally, such as the Italian “voucher system”), subject to regulation conditions.  
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 Information on European labour market opportunities and needs (skills shortages) and requirements 
(bureaucracy, procedures, etc.) should be more efficiently communicated to both migrants already 
living in the receiving society and potential migrants. 
 
 
o Employment insecurity and unemployment 
 
Migrants are over-represented amongst the unemployed throughout Europe (Kahanec et al., 2014a), but 
here again, the gap decreases with time after migration. Indeed, significant differences within and between 
immigrant groups remain, with women doing generally less well than men (Craig, 2014).  
 
It is interesting to note that migrants from Eastern Partnership countries fare better than other migrants, 
mostly due to the nature of the agreement between the EU and these countries (Kahanec et al., 2014a). 
Disadvantage in this respect is accentuated for those coming from poor countries and/or have poor com-
mand of the receiving country language, in spite of their young age and education level. Migrants also tend 
to be distributed in industrial sectors with low professional prospects (Craig, 2014). 
 
Employment policies have mostly been adopted at national level. Cities have provided complementary pro-
grammes to promote employment, ethnic entrepreneurship and diversity in the composition of the munici-
pality’s workforce, to name a few examples. Cities’ ability to act in this direction also depends on exogenous 
structural factors. The organization of job centres is a good example. Where these fall under local admin-
istration (e.g. Sweden and Ireland), the city may orient their activities towards specific groups. Where these 
fall outside the scope of municipalities (e.g. in the UK or Belgium), they do not enjoy of this lever for local 
employment policies. More generally, it seems that cities somewhat act at the margins, using their own im-
agination to favour employment and diversity: some (but few) cities seek to promote ethnic entrepreneur-
ship; some others buy private goods and services to providers employing immigrants or promoting diversity 
amongst their employees (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014a). 
 
The transformation of industrial relations pertains to all sectors at almost all levels (e.g. flexible contracts 
and atypical forms of employment, often resulting in extreme exploitation). Although that presents potential 
concerns for the entire economically active population in ‘developed’ economies, it is important to focus 
particularly on the consequences that such transformations can have on the integration process of migrant 
populations across European countries (Kahanec et al., 2014a). 
 
The fragmented bargaining systems in the UK and the lack of collective agreements in most enterprises 
allows management to take advantage of immigrant labour forces and use them, for example, as a buffer 
against fluctuations in demand.   
 
The German economy, whilst formally classified as a coordinated market economy, has developed strong 
signs of a serious insider-outsider cleavage within the labour market. While insiders are still covered by 
collective agreements and enjoy a great degree of employment security, those outsiders not covered have 
to put up with much more flexible and individualized contracts, more wage dispersion and unstable working 
conditions. Immigrants in Germany are disproportionately concentrated in atypical employment forms, 
including short-term contracts, mini-jobs and temporary agency work. The changes in the bargaining system 
were not deliberately aimed at segregating migrants; in effect, however, they impinged mostly on non-
nationals. 
 
The collective bargaining system of Spain unites certain elements of the dual and the fragmented labour 
market models, but its distinctive features are informality and state intervention. From the perspective of 
migrants, the benefits of this system are apparent in the relative ease with which construction, agriculture 
and personal service jobs could be taken up in the booming Spanish economy during the early 2000s. 
Similarly, to the UK, migrants provided the buffer to meet increased demand in good times, and there was 
no collective bargaining in the affected sectors that could have prevented massive inflow of foreign-born 
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labour. Nevertheless, significant social and individual costs stemmed from informality: these included 
forgone tax revenues on the receiving society’s side, and no possibility for claiming benefits on the side of 
the new inhabitants. 
 
 National governments should ensure implementation of existing laws against exploitation, impose a 
minimum set of standards in those sectors not regulated by collective bargaining, increase controls, 
make sure that trade unions represent all workers (both natives and migrants), promote laws and 
regulations for the conciliation of work and family life.  
 
 Local levels of governance and local contact points of national agencies (environmental and health 
agencies) should increase regulation and inspectorial regimes in sectors where vulnerable migrants 
concentrate; and introduce stronger transparency measures in supply chains. 
 
 Relevant stakeholders (trade unions, employers’ associations, migrant workers’ representatives, 
employment agencies, NGOs) should more widely promote existing regulations and protection for 
migrant workers, educating migrant workers about their rights on arrival. 
 
 Legally employed migrants should be able to accumulate social benefits (pension, healthcare, etc.) in 
temporary/occasional jobs. 
 
 
o Employment quality and recognition of qualifications 
 
Beyond obtaining a job, the role of the labour market is also about employment quality, about “the appro-
priateness of that job and the role of the workplace itself in promoting integration” (Craig, 2014). Throughout 
Europe, labour migrants have ended up in the worst labour market conditions, filling the gaps left by nation-
als. Migrants tend to be employed in jobs for which they have more skills or qualification than appropriate. 
Besides discrimination and lack of qualification recognition, barriers to fit employment are also lack of lan-
guage fluency and of social networks. 
 
It is worth noting here that this situation is not encountered by all migrants. Highly skilled migrants, to the 
contrary, are the object of a competition for talents between states: more rights and more extensive rights 
are granted to them (Kahanec et al., 2014a). 
 
 
 The huge achievement of a European-wide system of recognition of qualifications, extended to third 
country nationals, should be put in place. 
 
 The scope of Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications should be 
extended to all third country nationals. 
 
 In certain high-skilled sectors, regulations that require national language proficiency should be 
eliminated. 
 
 Priority checks (giving precedence to European citizens) could be eliminated. 
 
Integration policies in Turku go through promoting participation through work and reduce dependency on 
welfare. In order to favour labour market integration, migrants are given the opportunity to equip themselves 
with knowledge and skills (including language) to adapt to the market’s needs. Structural integration seems 
to prevail over the two other dimensions: legal-political and cultural-religious. Despite these efforts, there 
still is a gap between labour market outcomes for migrants and natives. According to most policy-makers, 
this is due to lack of skills, including language skills. Consequently, the city deploys much of its energy on 
training and skills provision (Penninx, 2014). 
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As of today, integration in Turku is guided by a programme for integration for the period 2014-2017. Clinging 
to the national legal framework, the programme accords special emphasis to labour market integration. 
Integration is defined as an: 
 
“interactive process of immigrants and the society that aims to provide them with the knowledge and skill to 
function in the workplace and in society ‘while contributing to the possibility of immigrants to maintain their 
own language and culture’” (Penninx, 2014). 
 
Education is also a key element. In the Finnish system education and vocational training is free, and is a 
responsibility borne by the municipalities. Some national funding is transferred to municipalities for special 
expenses cities may bear for immigrant children. Adult education, particularly Finnish language courses, is 
also important for migrants and for the city. If national funding is available, 43% of these courses are financed 
by the city itself (Penninx, 2014). 
 
 
4.2.2 Education and training 
 
Education is a fundamental stepping stone towards integration, not only for children, but also for adults (see 
4.3.1). As touched upon above, migrants tend to down skill into positions requiring skills below their level of 
formal education. For children, education is a way to break the circle and ensure they enjoy better 
opportunities. For adults, it is a way to recognise or validate their skills in the receiving society. 
 
o Access to education 
 
Education policy is decided at national or regional level. Localities may also intervene to complement or re-
pair (or worsen in some cases) policies adopted above. Education is regarded as a right of all children, at least 
formally. In practice, some impediments arise when it comes to children of irregular migrants: even though 
they are guaranteed the right to education by law, they are most often victims of disincentives (fear of par-
ents to be detected if their children go to school; request of proof of residence by schools in some countries; 
no economic aid for books, transportation etc., due to their legal status). Here again, it is up to local bodies 
to respond to shortages which may lead to disparities from one municipality to another. Some localities may 
be supportive (coverage of expenses such as school books or transportation), whilst others may try to dis-
criminate against particular groups (exclusion of irregular children in nursery schools in Milan, discrimination 
against Roma people in some French municipalities) (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014a). 
 
With regard to children of regular migrants, the trend is to bridge the gap in school achievements between 
minority and majority pupil populations. However this gap is not to be found everywhere. If migrant children 
perform worse in some countries, they perform the same or even better in some others. At national level, 
policies aimed at reducing the gap in school achievements consist of increases in resources allocated (finan-
cial or in terms of staff) or specific support when a target group is clearly identified (language support classes 
or setting up of particular reception classes for newly arrived migrants). At local level, policies are generally 
extra-curricular support, establishment of additional neighbourhood schools or vocational schools (as in Rot-
terdam), programmes to reduce the share of migrants in underperforming schools (Garcés-Mascareñas, 
2014a). 
 
In some Member States, Third Country Nationals with a long term residence permit are charged higher fees 
to access education, which goes against the provisions made by the Long Term Residence directive.  
 
One example of practical barriers can be cited: even if national law prohibit schools from asking for 
documentation from migrant children, many schools actually do so, in order to avoid having undocumented 
migrant children amongst pupils. In countries such as the Netherlands, Poland and Hungary, schools also 
justify identification document requests by arguing that funding is allocated according to the number of 
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students enrolled. Other possible barriers include the fact that minors may not live with their parents and 
some schools deny school registration by other family relatives. Other problems include the fact that, though 
access to primary education is free, undocumented families are excluded from economic aid for extra 
expenses such as books, transportation, school meals, etc. Finally, undocumented children tend to have no 
access to education before and after compulsory schooling (Garces-Mascarenas, 2014a).  
 
The institutional arrangements of the education system, as it is, is entirely inadequate in many European 
countries because, not only migrants, but also more generally native disadvantaged people are affected by 
problems such as segregation, poor access to education, and so on. Many research projects illustrate the 
specific structural factors that may explain differences in (migrant) children's performance. These factors 
include features of the education system (such as ability tracking, age of selection, transitions between early, 
primary and secondary education, ethnic majority bias in textbooks and teaching practices); resources 
allocated; legal framework for enrolment (according to legal status, parental choice or residential catchment 
area); integration policies; and national discourses on migration and integration. 
 
The set of rights laid down in EU directives requires proper implementation and monitoring, notably equity 
in treatment. Thus:  
 
 States should remove all legal barriers (at the legislative level) and all practical/administrative  barri-
ers, to ensure effective access to education for migrant children. 
 
 The institutional arrangements of the education system should be revised, in order to: a) tackle 
problems affecting disadvantaged people in general, whether they are migrants or natives (through 
mainstreaming measures), b) be ready to welcome and treat diversity as a positive characteristic of 
society. 
 
 
o Equal access, equal use and equal outcomes 
 
The following experiences are examples of the efforts made in order to ensure equal access, equal use and 
equal outcomes in the education system, by developing pre-school language tuition, compensatory pro-
grammes and access to tertiary education. 
 
In Italy, migrant children with a poor grasp of the Italian language are often kept down one year in primary 
school, and even in the lower levels of secondary school. The impact of this appears to further disadvantage 
the children throughout their school and subsequent careers and to compromise their possibilities for full 
integration. 
 
In Kindergärten (nurseries) German language courses were established: 15,000 children were offered extra 
training in German language every year. For those children who did not succeed, a further year of intensive 
German teaching was offered. More than 1,000 teachers were teaching within this programme, and nearly 
all parents accepted it. The measures were effective: between 2002 and 2012 the percentage of children 
with an immigrant background, who were not ready for school, decreased from 35.7% to 12.4%.  
 
Compensatory programmes have had an impact on closing the attainment gap. These include universal 
nursery provision, (which has been available in many countries for some time), better managed and fair 
admission systems so that some schools do not become effectively educational ghettoes, and specific help 
for those migrant children who arrive with no effective prior experience of education at all. Early years 
programmes such as the UK Sure Start programme have had some impact on improving attainment for 
migrant children but these programmes, as with many other special programmes, have been affected by 
austerity-driven cuts in public expenditure and Sure Start itself was open to the criticism that it was 
structurally quite racist in its overall approach and was not targeted on migrant and minority children (Craig, 
2014).  
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In the Netherlands the example of Turkish migrant young people shows that despite strong pressures to study 
high status subjects such as law and medicine, they are compromised by the structural barriers to accessing 
those sorts of courses. As a result many Turkish young people end up in courses such as business studies in 
professional colleges which satisfy their parents’ aspirations and their own desire to gain qualifications and 
to have a better work-life balance than those of their parents, whilst not meeting their original aspirations. 
 
 Provide additional support to migrant children, in order to ensure that they have equal access, equal 
use and equal outcomes in education. Such measures should also serve the needs of native children. 
Such improvements would in turn result in the increase of the number of migrant children and 
disadvantaged natives accessing tertiary education.  
 
 
o School segregation and dropout 
 
A large number of young migrants are not in education, or employment, or training schemes, which raises 
concerns and underlines the need for further research in this domain. This phenomenon is attributed to 
racism in the education system and the system’s questionable appropriateness. Structural obstacles have 
created a segmentation of education attainments that translates into vocational training and segmentation 
between migrants and nationals at secondary school level and, discrimination and delusion at tertiary edu-
cation level.  
 
Although ethnic minority participation rates in tertiary education exceed those of the native population in 
many countries, this apparent success story does not at present provide adequate data distinguishing 
between different kinds of migrant career within the broader ethnic minority picture. However, it would be 
surprising, given what is known about the way in which institutional racism and discrimination operates 
within education and within higher education in particular, if it were not more difficult for certain kinds of 
migrants to achieve entry to higher status higher education and higher educational institutions.  
 
The case of Barcelona, is relevant. As Garces-Mascareñas (2014b) reports: 
 
“less than half of the schools in Barcelona are public, the rest are private. Children of low-income families are 
mostly concentrated in public schools. Consequently, we see that foreign pupils account for 12% of all pupils 
between 3 and 16 years old, and they represent more than 22% of the pupils in public schools” (Garces-Mas-
careñas, 2014b). 
 
As Craig states:  
 
“If full integration means having the same life choices as host country nationals, then clearly the compromis-
ing by institutional barriers of parental aspirations leading to young migrants ‘realism’ suggests that full inte-
gration through enjoying equivalent higher education choices will not be attained until the issue of racism is 
dealt with” (Craig, 2014).  
 
Significant individual and institutional discrimination leads to lower educational attainments that may in turn 
damage equal opportunities and further increase labour market gaps between migrants (and people with 
immigration background) and natives.  
 
With regard to segregation in education, in Germany, interethnic friendships between minorities and host 
country national in particular neighbourhoods depends critically on the level of education of minorities and 
are less likely in areas with greater degrees of ethnic segregation. There are many examples of local initiatives 
taken to reduce school segregation. The analysis of available evidence shows that very few countries have 
translated local initiatives and ad hoc projects in this area into national policies. One key point which 
facilitates integration in relation to education is improved training of teachers at all levels to ensure they are 
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sensitive and equipped with the skills to work with a range of cultures and ethnic and national origins 
(Wilkens et aI., 2014b). 
 
In Sweden there is an identified and increasing gap in educational achievement between young people with 
and without a Swedish background. An innovative approach was promoted by using systems already in place 
to improve integration outcomes. The aim consists of promoting immigrant youth participation in Swedish 
cultural life; intercultural exchange through writing, storytelling and other art forms between Swedish and 
migrant youth; and to develop the role of libraries in integration processes by developing partnerships and 
networks. These actions identified the importance of an equal gender balance: (project evaluation 
disaggregated findings for male and female participants). In Oslo, Master’s students acted as diversity 
mentors in secondary schools. There was a 30 percent increase in university admissions from these schools, 
compared to an average 7 percent increase in Oslo schools more generally. A mentoring scheme for mature 
students from minority backgrounds helped to lower dropout from university. In 2012, there were 11 percent 
minority students with the target of 15 percent likely to be reached within the next two years. Encouragingly, 
Oslo University turned the project into a permanent diversity office (Humphris, 2014).  
 
Drop-out levels seem to be higher for migrant children overall (Wilkens et aI., 2014b). 
 
There are concerns about the relatively larger number of migrant children not in education, or 
employment or training schemes, although the research base in this area is relatively weak. More data are 
required particularly around the intersection between education, training and employment. In the 
Netherlands and other countries, high rates of early dropout and unemployment amongst young migrant 
people has been attributed largely to their own action (or inaction). In Rotterdam, new types of school have 
been introduced to stem the high dropout rates. A substantial amount of evidence demonstrates the 
continuing impact of racism within the education system, which, despite some contradictory trends within 
certain migrant groups, impedes educational attainment for minority and migrant young people. Additionally 
the appropriateness of education at the top end of secondary school is often questionable. This has led, in 
some countries, to an increased focus on vocational education opportunities. Such evidence seems to 
contradict the recorded motivation and increasing educational attainment of migrant children and points to 
increasing segmentation between different groups. This differentiation is also apparent in established 
minorities where children (and particularly girls) of Indian and Chinese origin tend to do much better than 
most other minority children in terms of educational attainment.  
 
 The education system should: 
 
- train teachers at all levels, to ensure that they are equipped with the special skills needed to be 
sensitive to diversity and to deal with disadvantaged groups; 
 
- organise local school-based bridging programmes and gap filling programmes to help students 
reach the standards they need to succeed alongside their peer group. 
 
 
 
 
o The importance of parental support 
 
Some cultures are strongly pro-learning and schools need to recognise this by affirming the role of 
appropriate parental support. It is clear that migrant children (and their parents in general) are at least as 
keen and frequently more so, to exploit the benefits of education as TCN children and this motivation should 
be recognised and built on. One of the most critical factors in the education domain is fluency in the receiving 
country’s language (acknowledged by virtually every relevant commentator).  
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Children’s language attainment can be held back by a lack of linguistic continuity between school and 
home. A study has shown that when migrant women were more socially mobile, their children had better 
educational attainments. The greater migrants’ aspirations regarding their children’s educational attainment, 
the more their children feel encouraged to study up to tertiary education levels and the more they are socially 
mobile.  
 
A study of parental aspirations in Spain for their migrant children shows how these aspirations can be 
diluted in the context of generally modest expectations of both native and migrant young people; the study 
notes that if government and school were to make effective use of migrant parental ambitions for their 
children, focusing particularly on parents who were amongst the poorest and most disadvantaged, it would 
not only help the integration of migrant children and address racial discrimination but raise educational 
attainment more generally. There is a more general literature showing how discrimination within educational 
systems can shape the aspirations of minority and migrant children (Craig, 2014). 
 
The following recommendations specifically address the local level, schools and civil society: 
 
 Motivate, recognise and build on the pro-learning attitude of immigrant children’s parents. 
 
 Build relationships between schools, the children’s parents and the communities in which the 
school is situated. 
 
 Stress the linguistic continuity between school and home by providing language courses for 
parents at school and within the workplace, involving trade unions.  
 
 
4.2.3  Health care 
 
Health represents the milestone of the migratory experience. Indeed, an individual relies on his or her good 
health for facing all the challenges that migration entails and it is the basic condition of his/her participation 
to the labour market. Migrants’ health outcomes differ from natives. Migrants may have difficulties in ac-
cessing, or making use of their right to health care, for several reasons. Language barriers, communication 
problems, socio-cultural factors, newness or cultural factors may hamper proper medical treatment. What is 
more, migrants also have difficulty in accessing care because of confusion about the system itself and the 
failure of healthcare systems to clear up confusion about its functioning and what people’s entitlements are 
(Craig, 2014). In addition, research shows that newcomers tend to be inhibited when it comes to use 
healthcare services, all the more so when they have not received any introductory course on the system’s 
functioning (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014a).  
 
The issue is of the utmost importance since migrants’ health may deteriorate in the post migration phase 
due to the stress caused by the integration process as well as by the acculturation process. Many migrants, 
especially labour migrants, for the most part arrive in an initial healthy state. It is then that their health con-
dition deteriorates. This is markedly different for asylum seekers that arrive with physical and psychological 
problems due to persecution in their country of origin (Phillimore, 2014). 
 
Amid the causes of deteriorating health, poor housing, low income, working conditions, poor health practices 
and knowledge about entitlements, poor language provision by healthcare services, cultural insensitivity of 
care providers, structural and individual racism, and detention should be acknowledged (Craig, 2014; Bathily, 
2014). 
 
Again, for irregular migrants, the issue is twofold. First, a direct barrier exist in the formal right to access 
healthcare and what kind of care is accessible. Second, indirect barriers exist and may consist of: the exclusion 
of state-funded health schemes for uninsured persons and therefore migrants have to pay the full cost of 
care (which acts as a strong deterrent); and a lack of knowledge as to entitlements. These barriers operate 
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at a national level. At local level, the picture becomes more complex. Healthcare institutions enjoy great 
autonomy which translated into large disparities across municipalities. For instance, some of the nineteen 
municipalities in Brussels have eliminated cumbersome procedures to ease irregular migrants’ access to 
healthcare, whereas Munich implemented a medical contact point for uninsured people (Garcés-Mascare-
ñas, 2014a). 
 
As for regular migrants, they enjoy extensive, but not unlimited, access to healthcare services. In addition, 
difference in health outcomes between migrants and natives are enduring. This is arguably due to disparities 
in the set of healthcare services, in turn due to barriers of different sorts. Despite such differences, only 11 
out of 25 European states (the UK, Ireland, the Netherland, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and Switzerland) have provided specific national health policies for migrants. For some countries, 
these are integrated into broader policies (merged with policies concerned with “race” and “black and mi-
nority ethnic” groups in the UK; falling under the umbrella of “cultural differences” in the Netherlands), for 
some others policies are explicitly addressed to migrants (France, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, inter alia). 
A good deal of these policies aim at tackling what could be called institutional discrimination. They attempt 
to overcome linguistic, cultural and administrative barriers through interpretation and cultural mediation 
services, training staff to diversity, or diversifying the workforce, to name some examples. They may be 
adopted at different levels of policy-making (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014a). 
 
Specific needs also need to be acknowledged. Jobs occupied by migrants tend to be difficult, dirty and dan-
gerous ones. This implies specific attention to ensuing health needs: psychological, physical and psychoso-
matic stress. 
 
Another issue is undocumented workers’ health. Since they have no legal existence, they are invisible in pol-
icy formulation. Remaining in an irregular situation exposes migrants to exploitation and ill-treatment, and 
thus increase the likelihood of substantial health needs. This may be even more critical for children of undoc-
umented parents. Notwithstanding international law provisions in this domain, some countries provide no 
specific protection to children of undocumented parents and, in some countries, irregular migrants using 
healthcare services must be reported to the authorities, which is a huge disincentive. Information about en-
titlements is here critical but often inappropriate (Craig, 2014). 
 
 
o Equal access and equal use of health care 
 
A wide range of problems to accessing health services have been identified. These include: not understand-
ing health systems, language barriers, poor interpretation/translation and over-reliance on family members 
for interpretation, lack of awareness about health prevention and inoculation systems, cultural misunder-
standings by medical practitioners in language and terminology used to describe symptoms, bureaucratic 
barriers to registering for healthcare, high levels of poverty restricting access to fresh or healthy foods, over-
crowding and exploitation in housing or employment leading to increased propensity to communicable dis-
eases, unfamiliarity with culture/climate and/or exploitation increasing stress levels, depression associated 
with lack of social mobility and isolation, poor access to antenatal care associated with higher infant and 
maternal mortality, lack of trust in health services or fear of being charged, exclusion from health services 
for undocumented migrants in some countries (e.g. Sweden), charging for services in others (e.g. UK), racism 
and discrimination by individual professionals, institutional racism and pathologising of ethnicity.  
 
The difficulty migrants have in accessing care are generally thus caused by confusion about the system and 
the failure of healthcare providers to be effective in explaining how health systems are structured and what 
people’s entitlements are. A study of migrants’ experience of healthcare in Ireland suggested that migrants’ 
perceptions were that the system was poor in adapting to the needs of a rapidly diversifying population and 
that, where possible (e.g. for economic migrants), they would prefer either to access healthcare in their own 
countries or at least to confirm diagnoses and medical advice with medical practitioners in their own country. 
These migrants felt that there was a notable lack of sensitivity amongst providers and practitioners to 
74 
cultural aspects of health care including views about conditions, ways of accessing healthcare and negotiating 
care arrangements.  
 
Although some efforts have been made by IOM, on the whole the monitoring of migrant health is poor. The 
lack of appropriate monitoring of outcomes means that in most countries it is not possible to explore health 
outcomes by migration status, while in others, naturalised migrants become invisible in the data. Alterna-
tively health outcome data is based around ethnicity or even a basic minority/majority binary with scant 
consideration of other demographic characteristics that may have more extensive impacts upon migrant/mi-
nority health (i.e. age and gender). 
 
 
 States should be more aware of migrants’ problems in accessing health services and should develop a 
better monitoring system, taking into account variables such as age, gender, immigration status and 
ethnicity.  
 
 Materials should be made accessible to migrants on health promotion and how most effectively to 
access services so that the focus is on prevention. 
 
 The receiving society should be educated about the contribution that migrants make to health 
services. 
 
 Doctors and healthcare personnel should be equipped with the skill sets needed to deal with the 
different needs of a highly diversified population. Cultural mediators should work alongside 
healthcare personnel in hospitals, clinics and health centres.  
 
 Given many budget cuts and constraints in the national funding of healthcare, governments should 
collaborate with civil society organisations to help support appropriate provision within communities. 
 
 
4.2.4 Housing 
 
Housing is another less explored matter on the path towards integration. It is however not devoid of critical 
issues, at the top rank of which we find housing conditions and location of dwellings. It goes without saying 
that it is important to have good quality, affordable, secure (in safety terms and in time) housing. Craig (2014) 
reports the four roles played by housing as identified by Phillimore: “as shelter, status and identity; as a nexus 
for social relationships; providing safety and freedom; and as the site of the integration process” (Phillimore, 
2014). 
 
Migrants with low bargaining power end up at the bottom end of the housing scale. Housing markets are 
usually fairly competitive and resources are limited. Private housing is relatively flexible and compensates 
the unavailability of mortgages for low incomes and more rigid social housing (ineligibility or long waiting 
time). Private housing thus prevails over public housing. In summary, the difficulties migrants face are: first, 
being eligible for social housing since the right to social housing is very limited for most groups of migrants 
and eligibility gives precedence to family over single people; second, accessing accommodation, because 
of a lack of accurate and timely information and inappropriate locations (isolated areas); third, migrants 
can hardly maintain these places due to low income; fourth, they may be obliged to live in housing of poor 
quality, overcrowded and overpriced, and otherwise exploitative (Craig, 2014). 
 
As in the other aspects of structural domains, the difference between legal statuses is distinct. That said, the 
governance structure of housing, in contrast with the other three domains, gives much more leeway to mu-
nicipalities: they do not complement or respond to national policies but they are the primary actors of hous-
ing policies. Irregular migrants for instance are most likely to resort to private housing, less regulated and 
potentially more exploitative. 
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Irregular migrants are excluded from state-subsidized housing and must rely on alternative strategies such 
as the private housing market, their own network (relatives, friends or acquaintances), paying rent to a legal 
resident who acts as the formal tenant, or renting on the unofficial market. Such a situation often results in 
abuses (overcrowded, overpriced apartments), all the more so in countries where landlords can be sanc-
tioned for renting to irregular migrants (the Netherlands, Italy for instance). The issue is often addressed at 
the local level where NGOs may provide temporary accommodation. These initiatives are mostly funded by 
local authorities. Garcés-Mascareñas (2014a) reports that: 
 
in comparison to the national government, local authorities tend to feel a higher need to provide a safety net 
for destitute migrants. This is justified on the basis of three arguments. The first is of a humanitarian nature: 
moral arguments on the inclusion of those residing in the municipality prevail over national regulations aimed 
at exclusion. The second argument is in terms of public health, public order and safety. In this case, imperatives 
to prevent overcrowded housing and urban decay may be of higher priority for local authorities than those 
related to immigration control. The third argument is in response to national policies: feeling burdened with 
the practical implications of the shortcomings of national migration policy, local authorities protest and try to 
persuade the government to reverse certain aspects of its migration policy (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014a). 
 
In Milan, housing has become a key issue. The city’s intervention in immigration matters was first initiated 
by a need to respond to those emergencies that were beyond the scope and capacity of charities. Thus that 
the municipality granted migrants access to public housing in the early 1980s. Access was, however, to be 
limited to municipality-owned public housing until the Region of Lombardy ruled out the restriction in 1983. 
Political tensions arose at that point due to the high costs of renting in the city. Notwithstanding, the data 
provided by the city of Milan over the 2000s show that migrants’ access to public housing has increased. It 
passed from 12.3% of migrants of the total beneficiaries in 2000 to more than 30% of the total number of 
the beneficiaries applying every year (Caponio, 2014b). The municipality also provides temporary accommo-
dation facilities for migrants and especially newcomers which are run by NGOs. Some of these facilities ad-
dress the needs of specific categories of migrants such as disadvantaged families, trafficked women, and 
single women with children. The great majority of public housing however targets the disadvantaged in gen-
eral, not migrants in particular. 
 
As for regular migrants, research finds that discrimination in the housing market is commonplace. With re-
gard to migrants' access to decent and affordable housing, the problem is framed in terms of equality. As 
highlighted in the CLIP final report on housing, ethnic discrimination, as well as discrimination of migrants in 
the housing market, is a widespread phenomenon. Discrimination and racism can be direct, for instance by 
excluding non-nationals from city-owned social housing schemes or reducing migrants' chances of accessing 
particular housing as a result of anti-segregation quotas. Discrimination can also be indirect, mostly resulting 
from unequal treatment and unequal opportunities in the private housing market on the basis of class, eth-
nicity or place of origin or as a consequence of migrants' unequal access to information in a highly intrans-
parent housing market (Penninx et al., 2014a). 
 
Either direct (explicitly providing limitations) or indirect (unequal treatment on the private housing market), 
discrimination have been addressed by local authorities, for example through the setting up of agencies me-
diating between owners and tenants. In most cases, municipalities do not explicitly target migrants but rather 
low or middle income households. Measures may be directed at the demand side, by increasing the renting 
or purchasing capacities of the target households through premiums or subsidies, reductions in mortgage 
payments, free loans or reductions in borrowing costs. Or they may be directed at the supply side by increas-
ing the offer of affordable housing in the city. Policies may also aim at reducing spatial segregation in specific 
neighbourhood through the establishment of quotas and resettlement for instance.  
 
Overall, housing opportunities result in concentration of migrants into specific neighbourhoods, usually de-
prived areas, which do not result from a self-segregating tendency. It is much more a consequence of mi-
grants’ lack of bargaining power, which is in turn a consequence of inter alia low income (Craig, 2014). This 
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is for instance the case in Turku, Finland, where cheap and available housing is concentrated in few areas 
(Penninx, 2014). This has dire impacts on integration as a whole. The combination of spatial, social and ethnic 
segregation has negative consequences on social and cultural integration (improvement of language capacity 
and reliance onto social capital are made harder); and on their structural integration (by risking to be trapped 
within their ethnic communities) (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014a). 
 
 
 
4.3 Integration policy in the cultural-religious dimension 
 
The cultural and religious dimension concerns perceptions and practices of migrants and of the receiving 
society and their reciprocal reaction to differences and diversity. It is especially on the basis of perceptions in 
the cultural and religious domain that prejudices take form and differences are categorized.  
 
This dimension is ambiguous and more difficult to capture because identities and perceptions change over 
time, as do stereotypes and discrimination, depending on historical and broader political changes. For 
instance, while immigrants of Turkish origin in Germany were labelled as “gastarbeiter” in the 70s, nowadays 
they are labelled as “Muslims”. 
 
The debate between different integration models – multiculturalism, assimilationism, and so on – revolves 
around the assumption that migrants have to be incorporated and have to integrate fundamentally from a 
cultural point of view. Moreover, culture and religion have a large impact on public opinion, which is crucial 
for accepting or rejecting different policies. 
 
As said in chapter 2, the burden of integration, and specifically, of cultural integration, has been progressively 
moved from a state to a migrant responsibility. 
 
Notably, in first-generation immigration countries since the mid-1990s, integration started being conceived 
in cultural terms, with cultural and value-based commonalities being thought to be essential for social cohe-
sion. In this view, the cultural dimension of integration is seen as an obligation for immigrants. Acquisition of 
national citizenship was no longer conceived as an instrument that would facilitate structural integration and 
started being increasingly redefined as the end point in a sequential model of integration and process of 
cultural adaptation. This new cultural conception of integration policies went hand in hand with redefining 
the identity of Northwest European countries. The claims and outcomes of such discussions on the ‘identity’ 
of receiving societies (as modern, liberal, democratic, secular, equal, enlightened, etc.) were translated into 
civic integration requirements for immigrants and civic integration courses of an assimilative nature. In this 
sense, cultural integration was made a condition for civic inclusion, rather than an outcome of it (Penninx et 
al., 2014a). 
The fact that migrant integration is conceived pre-eminently in cultural terms is reflected by the analysis 
conducted within the KING research both of European natives’ perceptions of immigration and of migrants’ 
understanding of the very concept of integration. Indeed, on the one hand, European natives demonstrably 
perceive immigration more as a cultural problem than as economic one (Poletti, Regalia, 2014a).  
 
Also analysis of migrants’ perceptions of integration in the UK demonstrated that the integration process is 
framed by migrants in cultural terms.  
 
With regard to the analysis of policies in this domain, a significant part of the KING study was devoted to the 
analysis of local policies, especially city-level ones. Cities’ policies are particularly interesting because the 
mere presence of migrant populations in their neighbourhoods compels cities to develop integration policies, 
and this is all the more the case in the absence of explicit integration policies at the national level. Cities often 
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show a pragmatic approach for dealing with integration-related issues, often contrasting, “mitigating” or re-
shaping national integration policies.  
The cultural – religious dimension of immigrant integration seems to be the most flexible area in which cities’ 
authorities have formulated and implemented their own strategies adapted to specific local needs. When 
contrasted with practices at the national level, cities seem to be skilfully spontaneous, flexible and capable 
to easily targeting the most acute issues in integration policy-making, negotiating in the everyday governance 
practice with the other local stakeholders. This is not to say that local policies do not have ideological ele-
ments: but these refer much more to strategic elements (needed in pragmatic approaches), such as the con-
cept of interculturality and the keywords of diversity and participation, which emerge in local policy docu-
ments rather than national ones (Matusz-Protasiewicz, 2014a; Penninx et al., 2014b). 
 
Cities’ policies in the cultural-religious dimension can be classified into three main categories (Matusz-Prot-
asiewicz, 2014a):  
 
• Cultural integration aiming at economic growth - In local cultural policy documents, diversity may 
be perceived as a source of attractiveness, innovation and competiveness. Cultural integration is 
then developed as a cross-sectorial issue engaging different stakeholders such as public institutions, 
business organizations, media, NGOs, civil society organizations, immigrant organizations, churches 
and trade unions by managing diversity in the most effective way. Literature on urban development 
has connected diversity with the growth of attractiveness for investments and innovations in the 
city. This long-term systematic diversity-oriented approach assumes that culturally diverse commu-
nities may contribute significantly to innovations and economic growth. This way of approaching 
integration shows that the constantly redefined concept of social cohesion and cultural integration 
is interdependent with integration in the economic and political domains.  
 
• Cultural integration aiming at avoiding conflict - Growing ethnic and cultural diversity can aggravate 
difficulties in intergroup relations and hinder communication between immigrant groups and the 
local population. The depiction of specific immigrant groups is easily manipulated, for example by 
presenting Muslims as a threat to societal peace. In such cases cultural integration or diversity man-
agement aims at conflict avoidance and combating negative attitudes towards immigrants, xeno-
phobia and racism. The coexistence of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity might lead to con-
flicts over values and competition for resources. There has been a whole variety of tools developed 
by cities in order to promote intercultural dialogue and intergroup relations within community such 
as educational campaigns, cultural events promoting diversity, information campaigns about equal 
treatment and non-discrimination. All this has been aimed at strengthening a common sense of be-
longing but also combating discrimination in both the hard domains (education, labour market, 
health care) and private life. 
 
• Cultural integration aiming at recognition of diversity - In the case of the cities Wrocław and Lublin 
in Poland, for example, one may witness a set of promotional practices based on an appeal to their 
alleged multicultural and multi-religion heritage in order to attract investors and tourists.  
 
In official documents, the key terms are interculturality and diversity. Both terms do not refer so much to 
cultural diversity as a right, but to the possible use of (certain forms of) cultural diversity for economic devel-
opment and social cohesion of the local society. In the concept of interculturality a selectively used concept 
of diversity (not all cultural diversity is positive) is combined with a strategy that mobilises different stake-
holders such as public institutions, business organizations, media, NGOs, civil society organization, immigrant 
organisations, churches and trade unions in order to manage diversity both for economic purposes and for 
societal cohesion. In such a definition it is a (normative) strategy – rather than a model to describe and ana-
lyse reality. The term inter-cultural policies has replaced multicultural policies as far as that term was used 
before (Penninx et al., 2014b). 
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 Governments at all levels should support policies and strategies which try to impact on relations 
amongst all ethnic, national, religious groups within the city. 
 
 Policies should enhance the role of volunteering in connecting the host population with migrants 
and improving the efficacy of integration projects. 
 
What follows is a compilation of examples of policies concerning the cultural-religious domain classified by 
issue. Most cases are drawn from European cities’ policies, but examples of regional and national policies are 
also included. 
 
 
4.3.1 Language instruction  
 
Migrants define language learning as one of the key challenges for their own integration (Phillimore et al., 
2014). It is widely acknowledged in integration literature that language learning is a necessary step towards 
integration: for children, so they can make the most of their education opportunities; for adults, so they can 
improve their job position and human capital, and do not place too heavy a burden on their children’s shoul-
ders (for example being used as translators) (Craig, 2014). As the case studies on Turku, Finland, shows, de-
spite some observers attributing the employment gap to discrimination and the lack of anti-discrimination 
policies, most policy-makers in Turku see this as a consequence of the lack of relevant skills (including lan-
guage) of foreigners. 
 
Excellent examples of targeted language courses and of vocational top-up training are offered by Swedish 
and Norwegian policies (especially concerning asylum seekers). All migrants in Sweden (aged 20 – 64 and 
also for persons between 18 and 19 who came to Sweden without their parents) receive a personalised ‘in-
tegration plan’ and assistance to help find a job and housing. Swedish for Immigrants (SFI) is a free language 
course which includes mandatory job preparation such as internships, and work experience. The goal is to 
offer 40 hours of full-time activity per week for a maximum of 24 months. 
 
Some cities recognize language as an element in the educational curriculum of primary schools – be it facul-
tative – as was the case in Amsterdam and still is in Turku, or when the home language of an important group 
receives a status of preferred foreign language in secondary education. Another case in point is the project 
carried out by the Turin city administration In Piazza s’impara (You can learn in the square), where voluntary 
teachers and university students of different nationalities offer informal and free Italian language classes 
where many immigrants meet in Porta Palazzo, as well as basic courses of Chinese and Arabic for Italian 
citizens. The project, started in 2008, has been repeated every year (Penninx et al., 2014b). 
 
The Mercator Special Instruction Project in Germany is one example of innovation. Mercator approached 
universities to ask if they would train their students to teach German as a second language. Through a series 
of negotiations with schools and universities, and with improved grades and positive testimonies from 
participants to evidence its success, the teacher training model and curriculum has now officially been 
instituted throughout North Rhine-Westphalia by the state government. A change of law in 2008 now 
requires every university to implement the programme (Humphris, 2014). 
 
Wuppartal, Germany, is a nation-wide leader for language class attendance and provides classes at different 
times, different levels, different locations, with crèche facilities and also in sign language. 
 
Despite the many successful experiences carried out all around Europe, the provision of language teaching is 
still variable in its quality and with regard to the conditions required for accessing courses. In the Netherlands 
and in the UK (for specific target groups), immigrants have to pay for use of such language support. This is 
demonstrably a barrier for those on low income. 
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Civil society organisations are limited and they often provide language training which can result in oversub-
scribed and basic level language programmes (Humphris, 2014). Many successful initiatives have been im-
plemented in partnership with schools such as Frankfurt’s ‘Mama learns German – even Papa’ (Cities of Mi-
gration). While these are positive developments for some situations, such programmes may not help parents 
meet the demands of knowledge- and service-related jobs. 
 
 Migrants’ employability can be enhanced through ensuring access to targeted language courses, 
vocational top-up training and by facilitating access to internships and apprenticeship schemes. 
 
 Vocational top-up training is to be considered as lifelong learning and is available to migrants and 
natives (as a mainstream measure), both for unemployed and employed persons. 
 
 Language and vocational training courses should be flexibly scheduled, to make them accessible to 
all, e.g. persons with different/unsocial working hours, mothers of young children, etc. 
 
 Language acquisition needs to be encouraged through appropriately shaped classes to meet the 
needs of migrants, regardless of age, gender and socio-economic status. 
 
 Innovative approaches to language acquisition should be encouraged, for example the use of 
language mentors or ‘buddying’ systems. 
 
 Language courses and other training should be accessible for those who want to participate. 
 
The city of Barcelona represents an interesting example in their attempt to combine recognition of cultural 
diversity and also uphold the centrality of the Catalan language and culture, on the basis of a so-called “prin-
ciple of interculturality”. Cultural diversity is recognized, “but emphasizing what we have in common and 
fostering ties and positive interaction among citizens on the basis of the cultural heritage of the host society”.  
 
In other words, diversity is acknowledged within a unit which has to be constructed on the basis of interac-
tion. As a result of such theoretical premises, one of the stated goals of the city’s integration policy is the 
promotion of Catalan language learning as the condition for achieving equality of opportunities and as a 
guarantee of social cohesion and maintaining Catalonia’s cultural singularity. For example, the Catalonia’s 
Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració (National Immigration Agreement), signed in 2008 by the Catalan Gov-
ernment, including most political parties and the leading social and economic agents, indicated the need to 
“boost the cohesion dimension offered by the public use of Catalonia’s own language”.  
 
Similarly, the most recent Plan (2014-2016) presents Catalan as a “language of opportunities which should 
foster interrelationship among all the people who live in Catalonia”. If the centrality of the Catalan language 
as a factor of integration and social cohesion has been constant throughout all the different plans and inte-
gration policies, the way in which it is promoted has been gradually changing. From being a right of the im-
migrant and a condition for equality of opportunity, it has come to be a duty of the immigrant and a require-
ment for legal status. In particular, the 2010 Law on Reception of Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia 
conditions the arraigo (social inclusion) reports (required in order to regularise) and also those on integration 
(for renovation of permits) on the “successful completion of cultural, linguistic and work-related courses”.  
 
The 2012-2015 Municipal Integration Plan is even more explicit, in that it states that “Barcelona ought to be 
an aggregate of people who interact with one another against a backdrop of diverse languages, cultures, 
beliefs and ideologies, but within a common frame of reference based on Catalonia's tradition (developed 
over time by embracing new contributions) and in which Catalan, as a lingua franca, must aid cohesion” (Gar-
cés-Mascareñas, 2014b). 
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4.3.2 Civic integration  
 
As a result of the attention paid to cultural integration concurrently with the policy shift that places the re-
sponsibility of integration onto migrants, national integration policies in first and second generation-immi-
gration countries in Europe have introduced “integration agreements”. Migrants also are required to attend 
“civic integration courses” as a condition for stable residence.  
 
Italy introduced the “Integration Agreement”, a sort of contract that migrants have to sign when they obtain 
their permit of staying in Italy. The agreement includes language command requirements (A2 level of the 
Common European Framework of Reference for Languages) and a requirement of the basic knowledge of 
laws and institutions. However, the language tuition system, as it currently stands, does not allow the 
achievement of the established target. Evidence shows that language tuition courses are increasingly 
attended by those who wish to learn Italian to improve personal knowledge or to have a better employment 
position, rather than by those who are supposed to sign the integration agreement.  
 
Compulsory pre-immigration courses, such as those developed in the Netherlands, function as instruments 
that, under the pretext of integration, restrict immigration and select migrants. All actors who have intro-
duced integration requirements abroad should consider that this is not in line with EU law (as evidence from 
court cases demonstrates). The Conclusions of the latest Council and Representative of Governments and 
the Member States on integration of TCN (June 2014) stress the need for "voluntary cooperation between 
receiving countries and countries of origin in a pre-departures phase" which would facilitate reception and 
integration in destination countries. Besides, the reference to “voluntary cooperation” clearly underlines that 
the introduced integration requirement, adopted by some Member States, that could impede family reunifi-
cation is not in line with EU law.  
 
Compared to compulsory courses, the National Integration Plan adopted since 2009 in Luxembourg, seems 
more promising and has shown successful voluntary agreement. A project to improve integration that played 
a lead role was OLAI (Luxembourg Reception and Integration Office). The role of OLAI was to coordinate and 
implement a national integration strategy. The plan involved four key factors (Ministry of Family and Integra-
tion, 2009), firstly, guidance for newcomers; secondly, assistance in social, economic, political and cultural 
integration; thirdly, to fight discrimination; and finally, to study migration. One key element of the integration 
plan was the Welcome and Integration Contract (CAI). The CAI is a two-year agreement aimed at any for-
eigner over the age of 16 year’s old living legally in Luxembourg. The agreement is also seen as holding sym-
bolic value as it is not obligatory. It has therefore been seen as indicative of an individual’s willingness to 
commit to integration and settlement in Luxembourg (Humphris, 2014). 
 
 
 Integration measures, tests and contracts must promote integration and should not be the condi-
tion for accessing rights. 
 
 Social inclusion into society should be incentivized through free and equal access to institutions 
and public goods and services, and not through compulsory frameworks of civic and language 
courses, which have been proved not to be successful. 
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4.3.3 Religion 
 
 
At the national level, following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, many European states feared that the 
growing international tensions would have repercussions at home. They tried to encourage or create Islamic 
institutions on the model of churches, to constitute a dialog partner with whom they would be able to solve 
any problems emerging, hoping to foster a “moderate” Islam. They wanted to integrate Islam, and thus limit 
the appeal and the reach of terrorist and fundamentalist networks. The idea was to “domesticate” Islam, and 
to help a German, French or “European” Islam come into existence, by asking them to create united Islamic 
organizations on the model of the institutions of other religious communities. However, the lack of repre-
sentativeness in migrant communities remains evident almost everywhere around Europe. In particular, 
Muslim associations founded in the last decades cannot compare with churches with respect to tradition, 
public influence, established networks, broad membership and organization (Thränhardt, 2014b). 
 
In Germany, the Federal government decided to give initial funding for Islamic academic centres at universi-
ties. They were established in four places: Frankfurt-Gießen, Münster-Osnabrück, Tübingen and Erlangen. 
Their aim is to institutionalize Islamic theology at German universities, and train Imams and teachers of Is-
lamic religion. The federal ministry expects them to lay the ground for a well-founded denominational reli-
gious instruction and at the same time to create a “chance to introduce historic-critical methods dealing with 
the Quran”. This introduces the classic dilemma between academic freedom of research and teaching on the 
one hand and denominational attachment on the other that has been fruitful and conflict ridden for the 
Protestant and particularly the Catholic Theological Faculties in Germany over more than a century (ibid, 
2014b). 
 
In France, students do not get any faith-based religious instruction in public schools leaving this in the hands 
of religious communities. Schools offer classes on Wednesday afternoon’s and religious bodies are free to 
use school buildings in these open hours to offer religious education on their own. Mosques are active in 
teaching religious education, parallel to the Catholic Church, and Protestant and Jewish communities. Some 
Muslim web sites even speak of “catéchisme musulman”, using a traditional Christian term. The teaching is 
often practised in Mosques, parallel to other activities, and particularly on Wednesdays’ and Saturdays’. In 
contrast to Catholic practice using school premises, Islamic teaching is mainly takes place in Mosques, possi-
bly on practical grounds, due to the smaller numbers of Muslim students in school. Religious education in 
France, for Muslims as for other faiths, is much more a task for parents and civil society, and less state orga-
nized (ibid, 2014b). 
 
At the regional level, in Germany, Länder have prerogatives concerning education. Therefore, each Land can 
decide if and how to introduce Islamic religious instruction in school curricula. As a result, the picture is 
extremely varied, and the following examples testify the vast array of solutions that local German authorities 
have found in order to provide Muslim pupils equal access to religious instruction in public schools.  
 
Bavaria has established a curriculum in cooperation with the Erlangen Islamic religious community, Islamic 
and Protestant theologians, school teachers of religion, professors of religion, Islamic and Arabic studies and 
education and the Bavarian ministry of culture.  
 
The Land of Hamburg opted for “dialogic religious instruction for all”, which is a cooperative solution including 
all religious groups – Protestant, Islamic, Alevi, Jewish, Buddhist – under the coordinating responsibility of the 
Protestant (Lutheran) Church as the traditional church of the city. The intent is to establish religious 
competence in an open and mutually tolerant setting. This practice has been developed over decades, step 
by step, in a consensus between the city government, the traditional Lutheran Church and other religious 
partners, particularly Islamic and Alevi organizations, and is motivated by the wish to create a common 
religious instruction for all children, to further mutual understanding and to have an integrative approach. 
The establishment of an interreligious “Academy of World Religions” in 2010, comprising research and 
teaching of all the related religions, has complemented the comprehensive religious instruction in schools. 
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The concept stresses interrelated theological and didactic research and practice. It includes Professors for 
Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Alevi, Hindi and Buddhist religions.  
 
Other Länder have introduced interim arrangements, consulting Islamic organisations but not conceding the 
definition of doctrines and contents of religious instruction. They want to be less dependent on Islamic 
organizations. North Rhine Westphalia, for instance, has established an advisory council (Beirat) where 
Islamic organizations have a voice but not the power of decision. However, the concept does not meet the 
peculiarities of the German Constitution, and does not position Islamic instruction parallel to Catholic and 
Protestant instruction, giving the state more say in Islamic religious affairs.  
 
Some Länder did not react at all when the German Islam Conference urged them to introduce Islamic religious 
instruction. The new Länder (former East Germany) are not engaged on this issue as they do not have a large 
Islamic population (ibid, 2014b). 
 
For German Länder, one of the main difficulties is the clear identification of interlocutors and partners among 
the Muslim community, due to the very non-hierarchical and non-institutional structure of this religion. This 
represents an obstacle, as religious instruction in public schools can only be offered if there is agreement 
between the public authority and the representatives of the religious community as provided by the German 
Constitution. So, the provision of Islamic religious instruction is considered troublesome because Islam is not 
institutionally organized like the Christian religion and, therefore, as long as Muslims are not able to reach an 
agreement with regard to their representation, Islamic religious education in accordance with the 
Constitution cannot be offered.  
 
Some have argued that the articles of the German Constitution hide a structural discrimination in this regard: 
while de jure Muslims have the same rights to exercise their religion, de facto they cannot not due to the 
structure of their organization. A deeper analysis of the case of the Land of Hessen can provide us with 
interesting insights on how to best ensure the non-discrimination and the equal treatment of religious groups 
with regard to the provision of religious education. After a thorough examination of the issue from the 
juridical point of view, Hessen established ten baseline requirements that need to be fulfilled in order for a 
religious community to become partner of the Land in the implementation of religious education. According 
to these requirements, provided that the religious community has a minimum of institutionally organized 
structure, the community has to set clear rules governing its representation so that authorities can recognize 
the negotiating partner as a legitimated spokesman of the religious community (ibid, 2014b). 
 
However, the State cannot interfere with such rules, as the community has the right to organize itself in 
accordance with the doctrines of the religion. The invocation that Muslim organizations be organized on a 
“democratic basis”, represents an undue interference of the State with religious affairs (additionally, the lack 
of such democratic representation is often used as a pretext in order not to recognize them as legitimate 
partners).  
 
 The practice of diverse culture and religions should be guaranteed in applying the principle of eq-
uity in treatment.  
 
 Specific attention should be given to the issue of equal treatment the implementation of decisions.  
 
A clear example of the application of the principle of equity occurred in the land of Hessen. According to the 
requirements established by the State, a religious community does not have to be organized on a democratic 
basis: the Land just requires that it abide by the law and the Constitution. Furthermore, Hessen acknowledges 
that complete homogeneity of the religious community is not necessary. This allows it to overcome another 
apparent obstacle, i.e. the existence of many different Muslim communities (Sunnis, Shiites, Alevis, 
Ahmadiyya, etc.). Just as the different Christian communities (Protestant, Catholic, Greek Orthodox, 
Adventist, etc.) do not have to agree on common religious education, this also applies to the different Muslim 
communities. Hence, Hessen has followed the traditional state-church relations, concluding a separate treaty 
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with two Muslim organizations (DİTİB Sunni and Ahmadiyya), which fulfilled the above-listed requirements 
for being recognized as a religious community and thus as a partner of the State, giving them responsibility 
for the content of religious instruction, taught by state-trained teachers. This enabled different Islamic 
religious education for different confessions. While the religious contents of religious instruction are decided 
by recognized religious communities, the state is allowed to determine the pedagogical and scientific 
standards for the qualification of teachers, approves the curricula and controls that they are in line with the 
general educational goals and the German Constitution. This is one of the reasons why Islamic religious 
education has to be taught in German (Kindermann, 2014a). 
 
Wisely applying the principle of equity, the Ministry of Hessen gained success in overcoming the hot debate 
on Islamic classes within the public education system.  
 
At the local administration level, cities may engage in having ‘new religions’ taught in the educational curric-
ulum in the same way as `native religions’ are part of such a curriculum. Stuttgart has made some attempt 
to do this. Such policies may have the important practical consequence of bringing immigrants into the edu-
cational system – as teachers. But above all, they have an important symbolic function: the message of recog-
nition of `culture’ as heritage and home language and religion as an important element of immigrants’ iden-
tity. They are, however, not present yet in all cities (Penninx et al., 2014b). 
 
The following series of examples provides a picture of the varied relationships between cities’ administrations 
and religions in domains other than religious instruction. 
 
In the case of the city of Turku, Finland, the Finnish principle of separation of Church and State forbids explicit 
relations between the city’s institutions and religions. At the same time, there was early recognition and 
institutionalisation of Islam by the city that has certainly eased the difficult position that this `new religion’ 
had to face in many other European countries and cities. The result of Finland’s specific legacy and history 
has resulted in a more general acceptance of the religious factor in civil society, but also that the state and 
the city of Turku handle religious aspects by formally keeping at a distance. This is particularly the case, when 
it comes to religious activities in the strict sense, but also when it comes to activities of religious organisations 
in general. Inter-religious dialogue and activities is left to the initiative of civil society and the stakeholders 
themselves. And actually, there are indications that such dialogue exists, be it out of sight of the city itself 
(Penninx, 2014). 
 
Barcelona was the first Catalan (and Spanish) city council to promote a proactive approach to religious mi-
norities, setting up the Oficina d’Afers Religiosos (Office for Religious Affairs) in the 90s. While it always came 
under the auspices of the Regidoria de Drets Civils (Department of Civil Rights) of the Barcelona City Council, 
the management of the Centre was taken over by the Catalan UNESCO Interfaith Association in 2004 and the 
Bayt-al-Thaqafa Foundation in 2013. (2012). The Office is in charge for creating a regularly updated database 
with basic information concerning the main religious groups established in the city, with defending the right 
to religious freedom, acting as a ‘defender’ of religious minority rights, by mediating between communities 
and urban planning specialists, or helping them gain access to municipal facilities for support in festivities 
and special events. Furthermore, in 2009 the Catalan Law on Centres of Religious Worship (16/2009), which 
had the threefold aim of making it easier to practice the right of freedom of worship, to support municipal 
councils in their guaranteeing of this right, and to ensure the proper conditions of security and hygiene in 
places of worship, gave local governments a leading role in the management of religious diversity. For exam-
ple, the law made it obligatory for municipal councils to set aside urban land for uses of a religious nature, 
and also gave them powers to issue municipal licenses for opening and the use of centres of religious worship. 
This led many town and city councils to draft policy for managing religious diversity for the first time (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2014b). 
 
In recent years, Milan’s administration has been positively appreciating and promoting cultural diversity in 
the context of the city’ branding international strategy. However, this does not seem to take religious diver-
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sity into account. More generally, no policies of inter-religious dialogue have been promoted by the munici-
pality. Relations with religious groups, and in particular with the Muslim community, have been not always 
easy. The request of an area on which to build a mosque has remained unanswered for a long time. The 
centre-left majority elected in 2011 abandoned such a hostile attitude, and at the beginning of its mandate 
promised to take the Muslim community request into account. Yet, the mosque issue has been highly politi-
cised by the right-wing opposition parties, and only recently the municipality came to a decision. In the con-
text of the EXPO internationalisation initiatives, three lots of public land are going to be allocated to religious 
communities for the building of their places of worship, and one of these is going to be assigned to the Muslim 
community. The mosque will be built only with private funding. Yet, the Milan mosque is not going to be 
opened in time for the 2015 EXPO (Caponio, 2014b). 
 
In any case, that administrations – at each governance level – should more proficiently engage with the reli-
gious dimension of migrant integration as is demonstrated by the role played by religious networks and as-
sociations in the facilitation of migrants’ settlement. As shown by research carried out within the KING pro-
ject on migrants’ access to integration resources through social networks, religious networks are extremely 
significant in helping new migrants make meaning in their new lives (Phillimore et al., 2014). 
 
 
 The promotion of inter-faith dialogue is crucial in order to prevent the isolation of certain groups 
and to promote mutual understanding between faiths. 
 
 All actors must differentiate better between acceptable cultural norms and those that are not 
within a European framework (for example, wearing a hijab is generally acceptable, but female 
genital mutilation is not). 
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5. INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The final chapter of this report concerns integration strategies implemented in different contexts and/or at 
different levels of governance. In particular, the strategies addressed: i) the implementation of main-
streamed policies which target the entire population and support other policy areas (tenth CBPs) ii) the 
choice to use monitoring as a tool for guiding policies (eleventh Common Basic Principle (CBP)); iii). the 
implementation of policies aimed at supporting non-discrimination behaviours and practices at individual 
and institutional level. The interconnection between migration and integration is a case in point.  
 
 
5.1 Mainstreaming 
 
 
Mainstreaming represents a form of governance that can be a crucial strategy for integration management.  
 
Whereas it did not represent the main focus of the KING project, as attention was reserved for analysis of 
integration governance. Despite this, the project could not but consider the strategic role of mainstreaming. 
For more specific analysis we draw attention to other projects, such as UPSTREAM26, that were specifically 
dedicated to conceptualization and analysis of mainstreaming. 
 
As far as the KING project’s is concerned, there are two noteworthy elements of policy mainstreaming. The 
first,concerns the evident limit of following the silos approach when addressing migration and integration 
issues. In this regard, the negative effect of detention upon arrival on the subsequent integration process is 
a case in point. The second aspect concerns the ongoing dilemma between policies addressed to specific 
targets instead of the entire population.  
 
 
o Limits of the silos approach 
 
The tenth CBP states: 
 
Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and 
public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation. 
 
It is evident that integration and migration are two faces of the same coin. Individuals enter Member States 
through specific migration policies/channels and then require integration policies in order to live within so-
ciety.  
                                                          
26 https://projectupstream.wordpress.com/  
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As said above, integration processes start when migrants arrive, even before in some cases, because they 
need a home, a job, schools for them and their children, medical care and so forth. This reality implicates 
different activities in different fields and involves different levels of governance.  
 
For years, the customary political strategy has been to keep actions divided. Firstly, this choice results in the 
competence division at vertical and horizontal levels, but it also effects the capability to face the challenges 
brought by changes. 
 
The silos approach has produced the existing disconnection between migration and integration policy. 
Hence, designing and implementing an EU policy that combines these two policy fields may be difficult, due 
to competences constraints.  
 
From a legal point of view, the EU has a competence to act in the field of migration which may lead to the 
full transfer of national competence to the EU. Regarding integration, the situation is different since the com-
petence remains the remit of the Member States and EU action is limited to the coordination of national 
rules and practices.  
 
Additionally, the link between immigration and integration only exists with respect to legal migration.  
In this regard, the KING project highlighted the impact of specific migration policies on integration policies 
and processes, notably the effect of detention on integration (Pascouau, 2014a; Bathily, 2014). Indeed, the 
case of detention upon arrivals of migrants and asylum seekers represents quite an extreme example that 
reveals the extent to which immigration and integration policies can be implemented independently one 
from the other. There is a conflict both conceptually and in practical terms between detention of migrants 
and their integration in the receiving society. Undoubtedly, such a disconnection has a financial and social 
price. 
 
The development of detention practices stems from the notion that migrants in an irregular situation should 
not remain on the territory, or be expelled. Therefore, once arrived or discovered in the territory migrants in 
an irregular situation are often27, and sometimes systematically28, subject to detention. This derives from the 
widely shared principle that irregular migrants should be removed and that detention is an efficient practice 
to ensure removal. 
 
This approach propagates a misleading logic as numerous migrants cannot be automatically expelled.  
Many third country nationals, entering the territory without authorisation or apprehended in the territory in 
an irregular situation (because they never had any authorisation or overstayed their residence rights), cannot 
be returned to their country of origin or residence due for instance to their health conditions.  
 
In addition, many third country nationals arriving at the border or in the territory without authorisation claim 
asylum in the EU Member States. Under EU law, asylum seekers must be admitted and allowed to reside in 
the State until the final decision on their asylum application is taken29.  
 
In such cases, the legal status of these persons may turn from irregular to regular. However, this regulariza-
tion process may take a variable amount of time – hours, days, weeks, months – and this is sometimes spent 
                                                          
27 The number of detention centres has increased over time in the EU, see for instance work undertaken by several NGO’s in this 
regard like Migreurop http://en.closethecamps.org/2014/03/03/europe-of-camps-deploys-its-web/ and the Atlas http://www.mi-
greurop.org/IMG/pdf/Carte_Atlas_Migreurop_19122012_Version_francaise_version_web.pdf  
28 “Invisible Suffering. Prolonged and systematic detention of migrants and asylum seekers in substandard conditions in Greece”, 
Médecins sans Frontières, 2014, Report available at the following address: http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/invisible_suffe-
ring.pdf  
29 Article 3, par. 1, of Directive 2003/9/EC states “This Directive shall apply to all third country nationals and stateless persons who 
make an application for asylum at the border or in the territory of a Member State as long as they are allowed to remain on the 
territory as asylum seekers, as well as to family members, if they are covered by such application for asylum according to the national 
law”. 
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in detention. This is increasingly the case at EU’s external borders, where detention is used, often in a sys-
tematic fashion, for a considerable number of asylum seekers.  
 
In these circumstances, the existing link between detention practices and the fact that detained people may 
receive a legal status and fall therefore within the scope of integration policies is completely neglected. In 
other words, the use of detention – at the border or later in the process– has never been questioned and its 
effects on the capacity a person deprived of his/her freedom in pursuing successful integration has never 
been comprehensively explored. The absence of this linkage or connection, in designing policies is particularly 
worrying where detention is systematically applied to asylum seekers arriving at EU’s external borders with 
the reasonable prospect, due to their nationality or country of origin30, to receive protection. 
 
Assessing the cost of detention is a difficult task, since it includes not only detention itself, but also detention 
places and human resources. In addition, , the cost is not only financial, but it is also medical and social. 
Third country nationals may easily suffer from diseases and even post-traumatic disorders linked or created 
by detention conditions. Detention may also have a broader impact on individuals, conditioning their atti-
tude towards the receiving State and the receiving society. The way nationals perceive detained people 
should also be taken into account.  
All in all, the detention aspect of immigration policy may have a very high price not only in financial terms 
but more broadly in terms of social integration (Bathily, 2014).  
 
Taking into account the aftereffects of detention on social inclusion should lead either to reconsideration of 
the use of such a practice or a review of the design and implementation integration policies bearing these 
effects in mind. The sixth Common Basic Principle which recalls the prohibition of non-discrimination and 
calls for public institutions to be open to immigrants may not be applied to migrants who have been detained 
and restrict them from making full use of support and policies provided.  
The relationship between immigration and integration is in the end all but easy. Friends when it comes to 
legal migration, foes when it comes to irregular migration and in particular detention.  
 
With that in mind, we think that at every level of governance. 
 
- Adopting and implementing immigration rules having an integration focus/perspective should be 
seen as a possible solution.  
 
- Migration and integration policies should be implemented by taking into account the impact each 
has on the other.  
 
As said about governance (see chapter 3), the power distribution between the European, the national and 
the local levels is different as far as integration policy implementation is concerned. This distinction occurs in 
a vertical and horizontal way.  
 
On the one side, institutions at European level are not competent to act in several fields related to integration 
- such as labour market, education, health, culture, etc. – because those are governed by the national level 
with spin-offs at the local level.  
 
On the other side, each institution at each level of governance tends to frame the topic by looking exclusively 
at what is contained within its own field of interest. Interconnections and collaboration to reach a common 
objective are often missing.  
 
                                                          
30 Eurostat pointed out for instance that 90% of asylum applicants from Syria received a positive first instance decision in 2013 in the 
EU28: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-QA-14-003/EN/KS-QA-14-003-EN.PDF.  
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The European Union started to move toward mainstreamed policies years ago firstly by supporting Member 
States, cities, civil society in sharing policies, practices, and experiences. This process has been guided 
through the main tool at EU’s disposal: the funds. 
 
The now concluded European Integration Fund (EIF 2007-2013) financed many projects aimed to support 
the idea that migration and integration should be faced in a shared manner, particularly during the latter 
stages of its implementation. Hence, the new fund Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF 2014-
2020) stressed this strategy by bringing two different categories of migrants, Third Country National and 
refugees, under the same umbrella. The change in the Fund’s name provides an indication of the possible 
future direction towards mainstreaming already taken at the European level. 
 
Other important considerations concern the changes proposed in November 2014, when during Dimitri Av-
ramopoulos’ audit to the Parliament, he referred to the opportunity of European Delegations in order to deal 
with migration. Again, another sign came in February 2015 from the statement of the High Representa-
tive/Vice-President Federica Mogherini who highlights: 
 
 “We cannot allow other tragedies at sea in the coming weeks and months; we need to be able to give a strong 
political and operational response. As I have announced today during the College in Strasbourg, I will convene an 
extraordinary meeting of the Commissioners' Group on External Action in the coming days in order to discuss 
with the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, a review of our pol-
icies. I've also decided to put a discussion on migration on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council soon. The 
fight against smuggling and trafficking, the rescue of migrants at sea, the protection of asylum seekers are shared 
challenges; they require a stronger exercise of shared responsibility31”. 
 
Therefore,  
 
 More Directorate-Generals (DGs) should be involved in the design of integration policies, with DG 
Immigration, Home Affairs and Citizenship acting as coordinator 
 Eventual development of coordination between the DG Immigration, Home Affairs and Citizenship of 
the Commission and the European External Action Service could be of help in tackling with the 
Mediterranean tragedies. 
 
At national level, the Land of Hessen in Germany is a case in point. The Hessen Government founded an 
integration unit at the Ministry for Social Affairs, declared integration to be a cross-cutting issue, developed 
a catalogue of integration measures for all State Ministries and passed an integration concept which covered 
all areas of society by the beginning of the year 2000. An Integrationsbeirat (advisory council on integration) 
which consisted of representatives of various civil society groups was appointed. The meetings were led by 
the Minister or the State Secretary. In 2001, a state wide public relations campaign (“Hessen grenzen-los”, 
alias “Hessen without borders”) was started. The goal was to inform the public about the importance of 
integration.  
 
In Hessen each Ministry was obliged to fulfil the integration policy tasks that fell within its general responsi-
bilities. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was in charge of the labour market programs, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs for early language tuition and measures in the health and care sector. The Ministry of Education was 
responsible for integration measures in schools, the Ministry of Science and Art for integration projects at 
Hessian universities. The State Chancellery had to act in media policy issues and the Ministry of the Interior 
was in charge of sports, prevention and safety.  
                                                          
31 http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150210_03_en.htm 
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Then, a second step was implemented which included actions aimed at increasing the awareness for inte-
gration in all cities and municipalities. Therefore, Hessen`s program Modellregionen Integration (Model 
Regions, 2009 to 2013) was established. In the cities and municipalities the active participants developed a 
grass root movement on integration and found support through a fully responsible leadership. From 2014, 
all Hessian counties have benefited from these experiences. Through a new program called WIR (“WE”), 
with an annual budget of EUR 3.1 million in 2014, the State of Hessen aims to further facilitate intercultural 
awareness. The 33 cities and municipalities in Hessen can employ full-time coordinators to implement strat-
egies. Furthermore, the programme emphasizes these six main focus areas of integration policy: the estab-
lishment of a welcoming and open culture; intercultural awareness and acceptance in administrations, 
associations, and organisations; active integration partnerships in the regions; reliable and accessible lan-
guage assistance; training and implementation of integration volunteers and innovative projects. The 
State of Hessen organises platforms for sharing local experiences on current issues. These platforms show-
case good ideas and promote successful integration policies. 
 
In addition, another level of integration mainstreaming affected the private economy and particularly the 
non-profit sector: Intercultural awareness in sport clubs, the voluntary fire brigades, the many non-profit 
organisations and big charities had to be facilitated. In modern society and particularly in Central Europe 
personal and organized volunteer work plays an important role not only for the realization of citizens` inter-
ests but also to fulfil tasks public budgets cannot afford any more. The argument is that non-profit organisa-
tions need to be more accessible to migrants who are not used to the structure and culture of the German 
non-profit sector – to engage them in the organisations or/and in to benefit from their activities (Kindermann, 
Wilkens, 2014a). 
 
 Integration should be considered as a cross-cutting issue. 
 Sustainable integration would need long-term commitment from all government levels, in order to 
ensure coordination. 
 Mainstreaming should affect all levels of policy: the government (national and regional), the cities and 
municipalities, private and economic sectors. 
 The most effective and innovative projects and policies should not be based specifically around 
integration but more generally on wider issues 
 
 
o The dilemma between targeted policies and mainstreaming 
 
The other aspect of mainstreaming concerns the targets of integration policies. In particular the dilemma 
regards the following two questions. Should policies exclusively address and act on the common interests of 
individual, natives and immigrants, and thus treat them all the same within the given institutional structures? 
Or should they cater for the specific interests and needs of immigrants and devise specific policies in order 
to attain equality for everybody?  
 
In other words, the choice is between direct or indirect integration policies.  
 
As established through the analysis of policy targets (§ 2.2), migrant integration policies that formulate 
specific groups of immigrants as target groups are different from policies that focus on all immigrants. And 
these are different from policies that target all individuals regardless of their origin. Policies may also target 
collectives (organisations, civil society) rather than individuals. They may even target general institutions of 
society: political rights can be granted to immigrants as individuals, for instance by granting voting rights, or 
as members of a group, which often means the creation of representative bodies; policies promote equal 
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opportunities for all citizens by guaranteeing equal access to housing, education, health care and the labour 
market, or equal share in their actual access to these goods and services; finally, cultural diversity can be 
promoted as an individual or as a group right. The latter often implying the state support to immigrants' 
organisations and own institutions (Penninx et al., 2014b). 
Evidence is numerous throughout Europe, specifically if we consider local level practices.  
 
The EU institutions have promoted a set of clear indications aimed at supporting specific interests and needs 
of migrants, notably, of those legally residing in the EU territory as already mentioned. The frame the Euro-
pean plan follows is the “us & them” logic.  
 
However, this logic gives room to another crucial question: who is “us” and who are “them”? 
Societies (“us”) are currently super-diverse. They are formed by autochthones, people with a migrant back-
ground and migrants having already started their integration process. But societies are also different in terms 
of structural characteristics.  
 
Migrants (“them”) are super-diverse too. Demographic variables (age, gender, nationality, etc.) but also fac-
tors that pushed migrants to leave their countries (asking for protection or simply trying to have a better life) 
and the objective linked to migration (aspiring and feeling like temporary migrants or being aware that they 
would like to permanently settle in the receiving society). 
 
Finally, there are those who cannot be considered as a target of integration policies because of their legal 
status: irregular migrants on one side and EU-citizens on the opposite side.  
Both these groups are in need of integration support but are in, different ways, excluded by policies. Irregular 
migrants don't belong neither to the "us" category nor to the "them". However, as we highlighted in different 
parts of this report, cities are called to face the challenges brought by their presence. In fact, cities cannot 
pretend they do not exist, but at the same time, municipalities have to deal with the needs of this group 
whilst also avoiding negative attitudes of others.  
 
EU-migrants enter into the categories of “us” because their status opens (or should open) the full range of 
opportunities and services on an equal footing with natives. However, it is the fact that the presence of these 
newcomers cannot always be incorporated immediately by institutions, collectives and individuals of the 
receiving city and newcomers have to acquire the knowledge and skills to find their position. However, cities 
cannot use some of the European funds, and often also not national funds, to finance basic integration 
support for these EU internal immigrants (Penninx et al., 2014b).  
 
Evidence show that often cities make different choices. The case of Amsterdam is a case in point. The recent 
Amsterdam policy discourse rejects the concept of integration, because that term would allude to the gap 
between natives and immigrants and would reinforce that gap. Obviously, integration has become a 
“spoiled” term in the politicised policy discourse, similarly to the terms guest workers (gastarbeiders), ethnic 
minorities (etnische minderheden) and multiculturalism in the Netherlands. Key words in the new Amster-
dam policy discourse are diversity and participation (ibid., 2014b). 
 
In the KING project two different positions emerged both recalling advantages and disadvantages. On the 
one side public administrators promote the mainstreaming of integration policy which can thus be more 
effective, inclusive and prospective. On the other side, experts in law highlight mainstreaming should be 
tackled with wariness, recalling the unavoidable necessity of laws promoting rights, and the enjoyment of 
them, for third country nationals and other specific groups. 
 
Mainstreaming seems to be the most favourable strategy. However, both choices have advantages and dis-
advantages which should be evaluated.  
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A clear advantage of mainstreaming policies is that political opposition by anti-immigration parties and right-
wing movements could be stemmed (Martinelli, 2014b). On the opposite, a disadvantage is the so called 
“shadow effect” where migrants disappear in reference to the entire population. 
 
With regard to targeted policies, an advantage is that migrants’ needs can be highlighted and directly ad-
dressed, while a disadvantage is that this approach makes the development of policies more problematic 
due to the creation of policy silos.  
 
To sum up, both positions can be considered as valid. Perhaps a mix of both perspectives would be the most 
favourable approach.  
 
 It should be considered that mainstreaming of integration policy is a luxury that can only be afforded when 
the local level is pivotal in providing the conditions for successful integration, as in the case of the land of 
Hessen or the City of Amsterdam. But mainstreaming can also be used for the opposite aim, to promote the 
absence of integration policies as in the case of Lombardy when specific political parties were in charge.  
 
 
 
 5.2 Monitoring 
 
 
Monitoring is a cross-cutting aspect of policy evaluation that should run alongside and support the policy-
making process at all times and at all levels. It is a tool that fuels both the effectiveness of multilevel govern-
ance and the mainstreaming of integration.  
 
As in CBP 11, 
 
Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress 
on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective. 
 
 
A complete European harmonisation of integration monitors is difficult, as each country has its own 
specificities and peculiarities (i.e. particular demographic circumstances, different integration policies, 
different migration histories, etc.). Great variation also persists in the ways countries monitor integration. 
Thus, comparison and evaluation of policies across the EU can still be extremely difficult.  
 
One of the most controversial aspects is the target group chosen by each national monitor, as some countries 
differentiate between “nationals” and “non-nationals” or “non-EU citizens”, whilst others also include 
“persons with a migrant background”. Solely using the categories “non-nationals” and “non-EU citizens” as 
monitoring categories can be only partially justified in recent immigration countries (e.g. East European 
countries). 
 
However, this criterion is also problematic as: 
- even recent immigration countries will experience migrants' settlement;  
- many integration issues concern second and third generation (i.e. education) but these issues are 
not detected by a monitor that only uses the categories of “national” and “non-national”;  
- recording only “non-EU citizens” hides the difficulties experienced by migrants coming from 
countries that have acceded to the EU only recently (i.e. Romania, Bulgaria or Croatia). 
 
In general, key indicators point to large, aggregate differences in monitoring procedures, categories and 
numbers (Wilkens et al., 2014). Nevertheless, more accurate analysis requires more specific data to enable 
measurement of demographic characteristics and their changes over time.  
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Therefore, monitoring provides policy-makers with an understanding of integration processes and their 
variety, according to different profiles (e.g. gender, age, education). It renders possible the mapping of 
migrants’ needs so that appropriate political responses are brought about, whether through integration 
policies or through more general social and economic policies.  
On the other hand, monitoring allows policy-makers to watch over changes in the target groups’ situation 
and to adjust policies accordingly, provided of course that monitoring is conducted regularly and comprises 
a set of relatively consistent and stable indicators.  
 
UK integration policy, for instance, has been a more or less total failure because it neglects in many policy 
documents to identify migrants at all or identify specific indicators for migrants, and places emphasis (ever 
more emphatically) on managing immigration (although this, in the UK context, seems simply to be about 
controlling numbers arbitrarily in response to populist pressure and right-wing groups) rather than 
settlement, and leaves serious data gaps regarding a range of possible measures such as use of services, 
attitudes of nationals, and the impact of service use on inclusion. 
 
Another clear example comes from the healthcare sector where a lack of appropriate data or analysis 
impedes the development of appropriate interventions. In this field more effort should be done not only in 
tracing the right origin of the persons, in terms of migrant background, but also in linking demographic 
characteristic with social data in order to provide a clear frame of disadvantages and inequalities that strongly 
affect health outcomes.  
 
A further example is France where official statistics do not consider the “race” element, as evident in the UK, 
within their databases and this makes targeted interventions difficult. 
 
Finally, monitoring is the fundamental tool for highlighting changes in context and characteristics of migra-
tion and integration32. 
 
Nowadays, migration can be understood as superdiverse because new migrants are diverse across a wide 
range of variables including ethnicity, immigration status, rights and entitlements, labour market experi-
ences, gender and age profiles, and patterns of spatial distribution. Whilst there are clear signs that we have 
entered an era of superdiversity, policy, practice and academia have largely failed adequately to adapt. Policy 
and practice activities and monitoring, as said above, continue to focus narrowly on ethnicity or on particular 
immigration statuses and give scant consideration to the wider range of variables that may combine to im-
pact upon outcomes and integration (Phillimore, 2014a). 
 
In general, different groups of migrants have different trajectories and outcomes, whether it be voting 
behaviours, settlement patterns or types of employment; thus measures of integration need to be sensitive 
to these differences both between and within distinct ethnic groups and across genders as well as across 
time. For instance, in the UK Somalis tend to have high unemployment rates, Iranians relatively high self-
employment rates, but African-Caribbean men lower employment rates than co-ethnic women (Humphris, 
2014). 
 
To sum up, it is of the outmost importance to highlight again that the type of monitoring instrument needed 
varies depending on whether non-nationals or people with a migration background are included as target 
groups. In the former case, second and third generations are de facto excluded from the scope of the moni-
toring whilst in the latter case, needs may be better mapped and policies better designed if appropriate 
instruments are devised. Needs can also be pinpointed through the use of regional and local monitoring, 
using tools that focus down onto specific situations in specific locations.  
 
                                                          
32 At this regard, the ISMU Foundation had carried out a project in order to analyse integration practices and their contexts of refer-
ence. The EMILL project (acronym of European Modules and Integration at Local Level) permits to highlight the role of the context 
(in terms of administrative and legal dimensions) in supporting or hampering the integration practices implementation. For more 
information regarding the project we remind you at the project website: www.emill.ismu.org  
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 Research and evaluation studies should identify a set of indicators useful for shedding light on 
the qualitative aspects of integration processes, and not just on quantitative aspects. 
 
 Monitoring should be the stepping stone to political responses that, in turn, should be monitored 
so as to evaluate the extent to which those responses actually address identified needs. Where 
this virtuous circle between monitoring and policy is in place, policies can significantly move 
forward in terms of results achieved. 
 
 Integration needs to be monitored in its entirety; i.e. it should be longitudinal as integration is a 
long process, it should mirror the reality of migrants’ lives, and should encompass many different 
dimensions, instead of focusing on economic one. 
 
 Monitoring should report also racism and discrimination, as it is fundamental to their eradication. 
 
 The agreement of national integration monitors to the standards set by EU Core Indicators would 
be extremely important. In particular, identifying up to 30-40 basic indicators and an agreed 
selection of “key indicators” seems sensible. 
 
 The quantity, the quality and the periodicity of the data gathered should be improved, especially 
in some countries, in order to make it possible to compare across countries on a regular basis. 
 
 Monitors' target groups must include second generation migrants, not just “non-nationals” or 
“non-EU citizens” (by using an agreed definition of the target group that refers to “people with a 
migrant background”). 
 
 Incisive analysis of immigrant integration needs to disaggregate migrants according to factors 
which may influence their integration outcomes – in particular their country of origin, length of 
residency and skill level. 
 
 Monitors should also differentiate between different target groups (by age, sex, level of education, 
and immigration status etc.) as they might have different integration needs. Multivariate analysis 
may thus be necessary. 
 
 Regional and local monitoring could uncover particular issues linked to a specific local setting and 
provide a more precise “snapshot” of the situation. 
 
 Monitoring should be embedded in a wider policy context. This would increase politicians' liability, 
especially if monitoring is used to conduct ex-post policy evaluations and ex-ante impact 
assessments. 
 
 Monitoring bodies’ activity should be funded by States, as this would ensure the appropriate 
periodicity of data gathering and analysis, provided that the independence of the monitoring body 
from government is guaranteed.  
 
The above recommendations are directed to all levels of governance. Indeed, it is important to underline 
that responsibilities should be shared across the multiple hierarchical governmental and administrative lev-
els. 
 
o Establishment of local observatories on migration and integration 
 
Five observatories on migration have been identified as emblematic examples. Four of them - The Hessens’s 
Observatory, The Migration Observatory (United Kingdom), The Immigration Observatory (Portugal), and The 
Permanent Migration Observatory of Andalusia (Spain) – provide analysis on available statistical data. The 
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Regional Observatory for the Integration and the Multiethnicity of Lombardy ORIM (Italy) has carried out 
since 2001 an ad hoc yearly survey of about 9.000 units where the sample is composed both by regular and 
irregular migrants (Di Cesare, 2014). 
 
The finer geographical level seems to be the best target for implementing policies aimed at migrant 
integration and consequently the best unit for identifying accountability mechanisms. In 2010, the Hessian 
Monitoring Report on Integration (Integrationsmonitoring) was published for the first time. A second edition 
was released in 2013, showing integration trends since 2005. The Hessen Government publishes studies on 
integration topics which go into more detail, e.g. on school education of migrant students, early childhood 
education, labour market participation of foreigners, migrant organisations or religious beliefs in Hessen. If 
possible, the Ministry conducts public opinion polls. Thus, the Hessen population was surveyed on 
immigration twice. To serve local policy actors, a study on the state of integration policies in cities and 
municipalities has been conducted where most municipalities have been involved (Wilkens et Al., 2014). 
 
 Foster the establishment of Observatories on migration and integration; and strengthen the 
interaction between the observatories, the national statistics agencies, parliament, and national-
regional governments in general to translate the work of monitoring into real actions and policies.  
 
 The Observatories should also analyse and understand public opinion on immigration. This is 
essential for the implementation of more efficient and effective policies. 
 
 Guarantee independence to both local Observatories and national entities, to ensure unbiased, 
objective, and neutral evidence. 
 
 
o Mutual learning exchange of good practices and policy transfer 
 
Exchange of good practices has long since been one of the main issues of the European integration 
programme. However, it has been widely used at various levels and many examples are now available. Given 
the focus the KING project had on the Land of Hessen, it is worthwhile to mention the bundle of measures 
the Hessen government has used for fostering integration, ranging from large scale programmes to symbolic 
acts. Yet, the underlying principles of Hessian Integration Policy are information, building networks and 
providing incentives for local authorities.  
All the measures mentioned are, however, not specially tailored for a German Land. In every region across 
Europe every single tool could be used. Moreover, measures can be picked out to be used in combination. 
The Hessen government also continually works to improve the tools. In order not to reinvent the wheel and 
to make integration policies more effective and efficient, it continuously monitors how other Bundesländer 
and other countries organize their integration policies (Kindermann, Wilkens, 2014).  
 
 
 A systematic and centralised method (including a website) for sharing the outcomes of the 
evaluations of projects across the EU should be created, in order to disseminate good practice. 
 
 All parties should encourage mutual learning and exchange of information between municipalities, 
regions and civil society organisations. 
 
 Even if a one-size-fits-all policy cannot exist, it is important to identify the key lessons learnt from 
successful policies across Europe. 
 
 
Matching emerging initiatives to longstanding ones is an effective way of building capacity. It may make 
sense to look at pairing approaches connecting organisations or even municipalities so they can learn from 
each other in an organisational version of mentoring initiatives. In the past, there has been much duplication 
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of effort as a result of the failure to disseminate good practice or knowledge about how to overcome chal-
lenges and problems. Whilst websites like Cities of Migration do an effective job highlighting practice, there 
is currently no systematic method for sharing the outcomes of evaluations and research studies (Phillimore, 
2014a). This is key: wide-ranging reviews of evidence show that there is a wealth of evidence and few gaps 
in knowledge but that this is very poorly disseminated and shared except through narrow networks (such as 
academics, NGOs etc.) (Craig, 2014). 
 
Starting from practices that tend to be regarded as good practices, it is advisable to look at their degree of 
innovativeness; for example, to look at the extent to which migrants are placed at the centre of the pol-
icy/practice design. Since the range of involved actors varies from one place to another as much as challenges 
do, there is no straightforward manner to transfer policies/practices: each form of policy transfer has to be 
specific to the two contexts involved. 
 
Policy transfer in a ‘smart policy process’ means selecting the sample of practices that seem to work better 
according to precise criteria, identifying ‘what works’ in the source case, comparing the similarities between 
the source case and the target case, and assessing the potential for replication in different contexts and for 
different target groups, so to transfer key innovative elements rather than fully-fledged policies (Pasini, 
Poletti, 2014a).  
 
 In particular, actor-centred policies (putting end-users, that is, migrants at the centre of the 
policy design) should be taken as sources of inspiration. 
 
A number of networks have already been established focusing on transferability of good integration prac-
tices. The LeCim project developed evaluation grids with a specific set of local indicators to consider the pos-
sibility of a successful transfer of integration practice. The results concluded successful transfer did not nec-
essarily rely on close comparability of two places (in terms of economy, social situation, education and train-
ing policies, organisational or informal structures) but more on matching the concept (and basic values) of 
the programme and on the willingness to adapt new models by those responsible in the target institution to 
their own context. In addition, certain processes behind successful integration policies may be transferable 
from case studies in different locations. 
 
Attention should also be paid to significant and more frequent types of conflict that may arise in the 
implementation of a given policy, as well as participants’ perception of who benefits and who loses. In this 
respect, a repertoire of worst policies/practices and of policy failures could be constructed, in order to apply 
a trial and error method. 
 
 Emerging initiatives could be matched to long-standing, experienced ones in order to build 
capacity. 
 
 Key innovative elements are often easier to transfer than fully-fledged policies. 
 
 ‘Worst practices’ and policy failures should also be studied, in order to avoid repeating mistakes. 
 
 
The Swedish Inheritance Fund Commission has been identified as unique as it requires its funded projects to 
test out new ideas, or to develop innovative methods and come up with solutions to social issues. It 
recognises that innovation may be accompanied by failure but considers this as part of a learning process.  
Evaluations often happen at the end of projects rather than being formative i.e. undertaken throughout the 
life of a project, and thereby helping to shape project development through a process of feedback. Guidance 
around the evaluation of integration funds might be changed so that they are encouraged to be more 
formative. 
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 Goals should be set by funders and project managers on the basis of learning as well as outcomes, 
because when funding is dependent on good outcomes this can also act as a strong disincentive to 
admitting failures. 
 
 Evaluation of integration initiatives should be set in order to serve as a guide for the 
implementation of the initiatives themselves. 
 
 
 
5.3 Non-discrimination 
 
 
Within virtually every EU Member State, there appears to be a growing and almost inexorable tendency 
towards racism and discrimination at institutional (policy) and individual levels. This is manifest in the 
increasing numbers of incidents of racist violence and abuse and by growing disregard by institutions to the 
differing cultural and religious needs of migrants and minorities more generally.  
This tendency undermines the process of integration. 
 
Discrimination is a powerful device generally used to regulate the distribution of resources and opportu-
nities and to limit the erosion of the satisfaction related to consumption of goods and services. It exists in 
facts and in discourses and operates both at a concrete and a symbolic level. Discrimination is a tool for 
holding the reins of the structure of power in term of resources and opportunities. Given its role and its 
function it is conceivable that it will endure in the future.  
 
Direct forms of discrimination are, for instance, the exclusion of non-nationals from city-owned social hous-
ing schemes or the reduction of migrants' chances to access particular housing as a result of anti-segregation 
quotas. Discrimination can also be indirect. A clear example comes from the housing sector. Indeed, discrim-
inative behaviours mostly result from unequal treatment and unequal opportunities, in the private housing 
market on the basis of class, ethnicity or place of origin or as a consequence of migrants' unequal access to 
information in a highly opaque housing market.  
 
Discrimination can be easily traced at three levels. The first level is the institutional level, where the law 
defines who is entitled to enjoy rights and who is not. Indeed, institutional social exclusion is, through 
legislation, regulations and conventions the most powerful mechanism of social discrimination.  
 
In the political and legal sense, distinctions between who is entitled and who is not cannot be called 
discriminatory (i.e. legally unjustified), since they are embedded in the nation state’s legislation. However, 
this is a clear form of social exclusion, and it has severe consequences for the position of migrants, particularly 
in the long term.  
 
The alleviation of this legalized political exclusion should be at the core of European integration policies, 
through provisions like partial voting rights in local elections, diminished distinctions between inhabitants 
based on national citizenship, and the facilitation and promotion of naturalization.  
 
Evidence shows that when certain openness occurs, significant results are achieved without an explicit policy 
addressing them. 
 
 Institutional social exclusion should be diminished by facilitating access to rights.  
 
Secondly, discrimination is present at a collective level in many different vicious forms. In this domain, there 
are norms aimed at fighting against discrimination and institutions are more attentive and active. As 
mentioned in the analysis of the socio-economic dimension, discrimination prevents access to education and 
work opportunities.  
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Thirdly, discrimination can be recognised at individual level where it represents a serious obstacle to social 
trust and well-being. Acts of racism and harassment targeting migrants and people belonging to minorities 
demonstrably reduce social confidence, affecting the whole process of integration.  
 
When discrimination occurs at individual levels, laws and norms, if properly applied, can act in defence of 
those who are discriminated. Thereby, the lack of visibility of individual discrimination is one of the most 
crucial aspects. 
 
To sum up, if contact between individuals are coloured by prejudice, this may be uncomfortable, but also 
have a limited impact. If organisations, for example work organisations, base their recruitment of workers on 
stereotyped or prejudiced perceptions and procedures, the consequences for individual immigrants may be 
quite disastrous. The workings of institutions (and policies) may also be influenced systematically by catego-
risations - inadvertently or on purpose – possibly with systemic consequences for migrants (indirect and di-
rect institutional discrimination in terms of anti-discrimination policies).  
Structural discrimination can be found in each dimension of integration, in all areas of society. Some laws or 
regulations privilege particular groups, others disadvantage certain groups. Some barriers are set up 
deliberately, some emerged and developed unintentionally (Kindermann, 2014a). 
Usually, there is unity concerning the design of approaches to immigrant integration which include the 
principle of equal rights. However, many factors contribute to the fact that access to public facilities and 
services is sometimes very limited for immigrants, e.g. because of detailed regulations governing the use of 
public services (Kindermann, 2014a). 
Figure 6 - Cartoon 
 
 
 
 
Source: found on the internet without any indication of copyright, (Kindermann, 2014a). 
 
 
Non-discrimination is the strategy aimed at fighting direct and explicit as well as unintended or indirect 
discrimination and racism at institutional, collective and individual level. Almost every CBP refers in some way 
to discrimination, given its role in preventing integration, and also undermining social cohesion. In particular, 
CBP 2 - stating that Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union - implicitly refers to 
non-discrimination, which is one of the European basic values (The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, art. 22). 
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The principle of equality is here advocated and apparently, no clear or manifest tensions arise in these policy 
fields: every person recognised as member of the community should enjoy the same rights and therefore 
services and provisions. Obviously, there is a difference between having formal access to a right and being 
able to realise it in practice, and it is in this regard that anti-discrimination policies have their responsibility. 
The starting point is reducing and overcoming the practical barriers, linked either to immigrants' linguistic 
and cultural difference or to their more disadvantaged socio-economic position. These policies often repre-
sent the ways in which cities focus on very specific problems, contrasting non-pragmatic or feeble national 
policies, or opposing policies that have been defined at higher administrative levels without an effective ap-
preciation of the situation on the ground. Frequently restrictive policies are unfavourable to social cohesion 
as they are moved from different and more “political interest”. 
 
Finally, the concept of equity completes the principle of equality; in fact, while equality is based on results, 
equity applies to procedures. In other words, equity is to be used in a context where differences are per-
ceived as large and it is difficult to reach equality. One salient example to illustrate this concept is building 
a Mosque. The principle of equality would simply say “yes” (in a multiculturalist vein) or “no” (in an assimila-
tionist vein), inevitably leaving one party discontented. On the contrary, following rules and procedures on 
the basis of equity, avoids focusing on results, and builds a consensus on the fairness of the processes rather 
than on equality of the results. 
 
Using the principle of equity is a procedural way to overcome discrimination and to find an alternative to the 
“us vs them” logic. Eventually, the point is that the principles of equity and equality should be considered at 
the same time making them useful in reducing discrimination.  
 
Moreover, and according to the economic-oriented political vision of migration, because discrimination is 
clearly limiting the potential of competitiveness in the global arena, efforts should be made to implement 
the principle of equity. It could be challenging but it is concrete and useful, and, overall, feasible.  
 
Hessen is a case in point where the equal treatment of religious groups became reality through Islamic reli-
gious education teaching in public school through the application of the principle of equity (see paragraph 
4.3.3).  
 
Another concrete example comes from the city of Barcelona, which has been widely studied among the KING 
project analysis. From the late 1990s, the city of Barcelona has implemented plans for interculturality. Since 
2008, the principle of equity has gained importance and become central to the city’s approach of intercul-
turality, with the insistence on the need to advance towards equality of rights and duties in the formal sense 
but also with attention to the practical ability to exercise them. In other words, it is necessary to guarantee 
both formal rights and duties, and equality of opportunity in having access to them. This entails inter alia 
combatting discrimination, promoting upward social mobility, and an education system that provides oppor-
tunities for all. 
 
In order to favour equal opportunities and equity, the city developed a range of policies (full details are avail-
able in Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014b). 
 
Labour market policies give central importance to training so that migrants can join the workforce similarly 
to any other citizen. They aim at bettering migrants’ employability, for newcomers as much as for longer-
term migrants, for women that came under family reunion programmes, for youngsters that dropped out 
from school, for migrants that lost their jobs, etc. In this regard, the service provides information about how 
to access the labour market, legal help for recognition of qualifications and short training courses. 
 
As for access to healthcare, the system is rather complex, intertwining national provisions and regional man-
agement. Pursuing its goal of equity, the city of Barcelona provides information on how to access healthcare 
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and especially about the legal intricacies of the system. This seems to be the most salient need for users: 
healthcare information. 
 
Regarding education, the city of Barcelona deploys efforts to recognise foreign qualifications. The city trains 
young migrants with good school results in their country of origin so that they may pass University entry 
exams. More than specific actions, it seems the most salient aspect of Barcelona’s approach is the munici-
palities’ activism. As Garcés-Mascareñas states,  
 
“there are innumerable initiatives, ranging from training and employability programmes in some neighbour-
hoods, to projects promoting intercultural interaction through sport, to educational endeavours on cultural 
diversity, or projects aiming to foster knowledge of the languages of the immigrants’ countries of origin” 
(2014b). 
 
In its ‘Conclusions on integration of third country nationals legally residing in the EU’, adopted in June 2014, 
the JHA Council of the European Union and the representatives of the Governments of the Members States 
agreed on the need to further non-discrimination policies (9905/14). An enhancement of non-discrimination 
measures, specifically concerning discrimination in the workplace is called for, through close cooperation 
with social partners and civil society. 
 
Following this, some issues seem to be extremely important in the fight against discrimination: 
 
 The immigration debate should de-politicized through the acknowledgement that Europe is 
innately and irreversibly diverse. 
 
 Anti-racist strategies should be based in part on knowledge of the psychological dimensions and 
mechanisms that underlie racist and anti-immigration attitudes.  
 
 Anti-racist campaigns should be properly resourced in order to be long-lasting, multi-level and 
tailored to concrete contexts, involving different actors in civil society.  
 
 Since processes of perception and attitude formation are complex and multi-level, campaigns to 
influence perceptions, attitudes and ideas should also be multi-level, tailored to concrete contexts, 
and longer in duration. 
 
 The respect for equal treatment as provided for by EU law requires the implementation of active 
anti-discrimination and anti-racism policies.  
 
 Racism and discrimination should be systematically addressed through different actions, for 
instance pro-diversity measures aimed at facilitating inter group relations and inter-ethnic contact. 
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Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Migrant integration policies are implemented in contexts shaped by demographic, economic, social and 
cultural elements.  
 
As shown in chapter 1, the demographic situation in Europe is hardly sustainable. The causes of this challenge 
are manifold: declining fertility, advances in old-age care, and the legacy of the baby-boom generation. This 
situation will have a very serious impact on European societies and, even if migration may help to mitigate 
these challenges, it cannot be seen as a definitive solution. 
 
With regard to economic concerns, one first element is that the structure of labour market is more powerful 
than any integration policy. The different structures of the labour markets in Europe have varying impacts 
on the way in which integration process take place. Since cultural barriers exist between European nations, a 
number of obstacles prevent the labour mobility which had been hoped for Eurozone supporters. While the 
Schengen area allows free movement of European citizens between European countries, migrants are still 
blocked by some national borders. Obstacles to free movement around Europe is a limit to European 
economic growth, because it de facto impedes the effective match between labour shortages and migrant 
workers.  
 
In addition, considering the cultural context in which migrants are received, the effect of misconceptions and 
xenophobia has been heightened. As previously seen throughout history, economic difficulties often lead to 
political radicalism. Among the most troubling concerns on the European horizon is the rise of Eurosceptic 
extremist parties. Stagnation and insecurity breed resentment. When hard times hit, public opinion looks for 
someone to blame. Foreigners are often the first scapegoat and this is one of the many issues that extremist 
parties have seized upon to attempt to lend themselves legitimacy within their own countries. The spread of 
these ideas may help to explain why European citizens perceive immigration more of a cultural rather than 
an economic threat. In any case, the results that emerged from an analysis of Eurobarometer data deserves 
more and continuous attention in order to find an answer to the open question: Why in a period of economic 
difficulties people perceive immigration as a cultural threat instead of an economic one? 
 
The framing of migrants’ integration policy, analysed in chapter 2, has been deeply influenced by how 
migration policy has been perceived by policy makers: namely as a security issue.  
At the European level, migration and integration policies, embedded in this particular area of EU competences 
– under the DG Immigration, Home Affairs and Citizenship portfolio – are, and will be, driven by this initial 
security aim. At national and, consequently, at local level, the inclusion of migrants has been subordinated to 
the will of establishing who could be considered worthy to enter the territory. In this regard, the 
interconnection between migration and integration policies and their consequences are crucial elements that 
require deeper analysis.  
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Although laws defining who has the right over what are justified and inalienable, the situation of migrants 
not legally residing in European countries deserves more attention and realistic solutions. The presence of 
people without rights potentially fosters poverty and social exclusion thus damaging the entire society. Some 
cities’ good examples have been mentioned, but solutions cannot be left entirely in the hand of the local 
governance.  
 
Since 2007 there has been a policy shift towards migrants taking responsibility for integration. This trend is 
increasing despite the different meanings and justifications. Specific attention should be paid to those 
changes occurring mainly at national level. In particular this report has highlighted the pre-departure 
requirements that have turned integration agreements into measures to control migration. Born out of the 
aim to foster integration by providing migrants with basic knowledge, these courses have been translated in 
assimilative, mandatory courses, with an underlying security rather than integration aim, despite differences 
across contexts.  
 
Additionally, despite the constant claim to attract the best and the brightest migrants to foster economic 
growth, the report asserts that there is a high level of brain wasting mainly due to discrimination and a 
persistent need of low skilled. Through historical document analysis it can be seen this situation had been 
identified and expressed since the ‘80s. To this day, migrants are still far from enjoying rights comparable to 
those of European citizens. While integration is conceived as a two way process, migrants still live it as one 
way process and evidence seems to confirm this situation. 
 
Chapter 3 relates to integration policies. They involve an impressive number of actors and, due to the 
multidimensional aspect of integration process, they are also related to a large variety of policy fields. This 
makes integration governance a complex issue to define. In Europe, there is a deluge of examples and 
solutions involving different levels of governance (European, national, and local).  
 
As in the TFEU, European institutions have shared competences in the field of migration and supporting 
competencies on integration. Despite constant claims towards a holistic approach, there is a structural 
imbalance of competence that developed de facto separating migration and integration policies. The EU is 
not responsible for integration, but it supports national and local integration policies with policy coordination, 
funding and fostering exchanges of knowledge, ideas and experiences. In this regard, evidence shows that 
efforts should be made in order to let Europe become a more welcoming place for everyone. 
 
The differences in States’ organizations among Member States imply significant dissimilarities in the way 
integration is fostered and enhanced at the national level and, then, at the local level, an even bigger plurality 
of solutions emerges. Systematic comparison of local policies reveals a significant variation in the framing of 
policies and in the meaning of integration.  
 
The tensions between the different levels of governance become explicit specifically between the national 
and the local level. Even if decisions are taken at the national level it is at the local level that processes of 
becoming an accepted part of the society, are developed.  
 
The intricate mix of actions put in place at the European level have attempted to harmonize national rules set 
against an erratic organization of migration and integration governance at the national level. Then, the 
strategy adopted by cities is not to implement the national policies as a final rule, but use them as a 
delineating framework that can be further modified, accommodated or renegotiated in everyday governance 
practices with the other local stakeholders. 
 
Eventually, the role of the civil society is of crucial importance in filling the gaps left by institutions at every 
level of governance. At the same time, their mobilisation may produce a “crowding out” effect wherein 
native associations mobilising on behalf of immigrants actually become the main recipients of municipal 
funding and partners in policymaking, thus preventing immigrants from forming their own organizations. 
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In this regard, migrants’ networks need proper supporting measures as well as the correct understanding 
of their functioning and structures. Indeed, as networks act at different levels, particular attention should be 
given to the transnational networks that scarcely are considered in the policy making process, but strongly 
impact migrants’ life both in terms of integration opportunities and in shaping feelings of belonging.  
 
Opportunities should be created for migrants to mix with a wide range of individuals, in particular, members 
of the receiving societies. This might include measures which encourage religious organizations to work 
together or might connect colleges, workplaces and other integrative agencies with migrant organizations. 
 
The three integration dimensions considered in chapter 4 - the legal-political, socio-economic, and cultural-
religious - have been used to analyse what has been done at different levels of governance to integrate 
migrants into the receiving society. Each dimension is different as far as their direct objectives are concerned, 
but they are interconnected and should always be considered as such. As a matter of fact, evidence sheds 
light on the negative, even if inadvertent, impacts of one dimension on the others due to misguided policies 
or attitudes. On the other hand, evidence also highlights that good practices, in promoting efficient migration 
and integration policies, can produce good results in more than one dimension at the same time. The socio-
economic dimension of integration may be strongly influenced by the legal-political one, particularly if access 
to rights in these critical fields are limited or even denied.  
 
Potentially, the outcomes of immigrant integration in the socio-economic dimension may also be influenced 
by the ethnic/cultural/religious one, for example, where negative perceptions relating to certain groups of 
migrants lead to prejudice and discrimination by individuals, organisations or institutions of the receiving 
society. This results in – even if access is legally guaranteed – fewer opportunities and lower scores for 
immigrants in the so-called hard domains of employment, education, housing and health care.  
 
In general, there is little acknowledgement that integration is a process, even an ongoing negotiating 
between cultures, that can move forward in the right conditions, may not proceed in poor conditions or 
can be reversed if conditions or opportunities deteriorate. 
 
As regard the legal-political dimension, there are several forms of migrant participation in the democratic 
process, such as voting, activism in a political party, participation in consultative bodies etc. Notably, direct 
political inclusion of migrant groups and ethnic minorities takes place through access to voting rights. When 
voting rights are granted migrants represent a potentially relevant political electorate able to influence 
politicians in their choices. With regard to difficulties concerning the representativeness of migrants or ethnic 
groups, some localities show a wise vision in training migrants in order to have good and credible actors to 
deal with in the near future.  
 
In the socio-economic dimension European countries are far from ensuring equal access and equal outcomes 
to migrants and natives. There is still a significant gap between the two groups and, despite the numerous 
interesting initiatives carried out across Europe, migrants demonstrably face more difficulties than natives in 
enjoying rights and accessing opportunities. The European experience illustrates how labour migration 
policies and selection of migrants lack long term planning and are disjoined form the real needs of the market.  
We are far from the full inclusion of pupils with a migrant background in the education system ensuring equal 
access, equal use and equal outcomes, compared to native pupils. In Many European countries, the 
institutional arrangements are still inadequate as not only migrants, but also more generally native 
disadvantaged people are affected by problems. 
 
The cultural and religious domain pertains to perceptions and practices that regard both migrants and 
natives, but that do not affect the two groups in the same way. As indicated by Kindermann, both tasks – 
European integration and immigrant integration – need to be done simultaneously. Since they are closely 
related, they form two sides of the same coin, they are not separable. Success in one task furthers success in 
the other. 
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We posit that cultural diversity should be viewed as a key asset when formulating policies aimed at the 
economic growth, and for policies aimed at avoiding conflicts or those that make diversity a special brand for 
city promotion. In any case, it seems that at local level diversity is increasingly perceived as a positive element 
in society, pivotal to economic growth but also to the progression towards a globalised world. 
 
 
 
o Which Europe in 2030? 
 
As proposed by Kindermann (2014b), there are several characteristics that shape a good policy. Firstly, it 
should be evidence based. Secondly, it should set ambitious goals that are also realistic. And thirdly, it should 
use instruments and measures that ensure that these goals can be achieved. These instruments have to be 
checked for suitability and, when necessary, they have to be adapted. Besides, policy makers should put 
migrants at the centre of the action, engaging as many levels of governance and as many stakeholders 
possible. 
 
Most European countries show interest in highly-skilled migrants, even if this is not always a reasonable 
economic need. Nevertheless, due to the existing immigration laws no real migrant selection can take place. 
As a consequence western European countries still attract many migrants who cannot keep up with demands 
of modern knowledge society. This has also resulting in the unavoidable consequence that the majority of 
integration policies are concentrated on engaging migrants in the labour market. 
 
Therefore, within Europe, integration policy governance not only has to focus on diversity but also has to set 
targets at breaking the following circulus vitiosus: poverty, exclusion, poor language skills and therefore lower 
educational attainment complicates access to the labour market which leads to lower employment rates and 
increased poverty.  
 
Kindermann found an analogy between states and clubs in professional football. Clubs such as Real Madrid 
are able to attract the world’s best players. But clubs with fewer financial resources only have a chance to be 
successful in the competitive world of football if they support the young generation. This is the current 
situation in EU Member States. To harness the special potentials migrants have to offer, considerable 
investments are necessary particularly in developing human capital through education and combating 
against discrimination. These investments could be profitable within twenty to thirty years.  
 
Moreover, for attaining integration, the entire population of the EU Member States has to develop a positive 
attitude towards immigration and remain favourably disposed to diversity. So far, wise and broad policies 
have been planned and implemented, involving individuals, groups, and institutions. 
 
Since the adoption of the CBPs for Immigrant Integration Policy in 2004, migration and integration have 
changed significantly.  
 
Today we face a wide and increased variety of immigrants in terms of demographic characteristics, expertise, 
legal statuses, etc. Therefore, the “two way process” has become more complex. As immigration has been a 
fact in Europe for a long time, it is no more a two way process involving migrants and natives. People who 
immigrated in the ‘70s, ‘80s and in the ‘90s have become part of today’s receiving society. Their ideas, values 
and customs have blended with those of the native-born population. Thus policy makers have to consider a 
more complex situation than the so called two way process. 
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Figure 7 - Relationship Between Receiving Society and Newcomers 
 
 
Source: Kindermann (2014b) 
 
 
The mutual accommodation process proposed that people with different characteristics meet each other 
along the way to integration. The main question here is: Who meets whom? We can simply answer that new 
migrants are one of the two parts quoted in CBP 1. The second one is represented by the receiving societies 
that are made by autochthonous individuals as well as by individuals with a migration background (see fig. 
7).  
 
This frame needs also to take into account other individual variables when discussing the accommodation 
process. Firstly, those linked to the legal status: we can have regular and/or irregular migrants, EU-citizens, 
Third Country Nationals with a temporary rather than a long permission to stay, asylum seekers, beneficiaries 
of international protection, etc. Secondly, there are demographic characteristics that play a crucial role, 
because needs are different along different axes of difference. Hence, variables such as age, gender, 
education, marital status etc. relate to both autochthonous and migrants but have a strong impact in the way 
the integration process can be shaped or perceived. This could lead to add new typologies of migrants, as for 
instance elderly migrants (Stuckenberg, Fuhr-Becker, 2014), to those already considered (women, minors, 
new comers, etc.). 
 
 
o Integration strategies 
 
Given the complexity of the phenomenon and the number of spheres of action involved at several levels, it is 
crucial to focus on some shared strategies that can be implemented in different contexts. These strategies 
have been individuated by considering the evidence collected through the desk research phase of the KING 
project and the analysis of the CBPs. Indeed, evidence has highlighted a common denominator linked to each 
dimensions of integration: discriminatory behaviours. As a matter of fact, discrimination is the main threat to 
a successful integration processes 
Besides, mainstreaming and monitoring, the other two strategies analysed, consider policy implementation. 
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In our analysis, mainstreaming concerns firstly the way to face integration by overcoming the two-silos 
(migration vs integration) approach, and secondly the choice to address a specific target (migrants) rather 
than needs (entire population).  
Monitoring has been regarded as the fundamental tool for guiding policies since it allows focus on both the 
characteristics of the target group and its needs. At the same time, monitoring can shed light on the context’s 
characteristics. 
 
Mainstreaming integration and migration policies, specifically at European levels, should be considered as 
the crucial site of cross-cutting the two silos approach. In this regard, the KING project outlined the negative 
impact of specific migration policies - such as implementing detention upon arrival - on the forthcoming 
integration processes. These kinds of political choices, based on the idea of protecting and safeguarding the 
receiving societies’ benefits, finally result in not only being ineffective, but also harmful. For instance, 
referring to such political visions, evidence highlights that being imprisoned upon arrival has a huge impact 
on the health conditions of migrants and the integration chances leading to future expenses for the receiving 
country.  
 
Mainstreaming also concerns the dilemma between direct and indirect integration policies. This remains an 
open debate even within the KING project where scholars and representatives of public administrations hold 
contrasting opinions. What emerged was a caveat between two choices. The risk of following the 
mainstreaming strategy is that measures address the entire population (without distinguishing between 
migrants and autochthonous) places migrants in the shadows. Indeed, these kinds of practices could 
jeopardise the possibility for migrants to enjoy rights.  
On the opposite side, foreseeing targeted policies could keep migrants in a sort of limbo and even worse shift 
negative attitudes onto those who do not fall into the target. 
 
Monitoring represents a cross-cutting strategy that should run alongside and support the policy-making 
process at all time and at all levels. It is a tool that fuels both the effectiveness of multilevel governance and 
the mainstreaming of integration. On the one hand, monitoring allows policy-makers to understand 
integration processes and their variety, according to different profiles (gender, age, education, etc.). It 
renders possible the mapping of migrants’ needs so that appropriate political responses are brought about, 
whether through integration policies or more general social and economic ones. On the other hand, 
monitoring allows policy-makers to watch over changes in the target groups’ situation and to adjust policies 
accordingly, provided that monitoring is conducted regularly and comprises a set of relatively consistent and 
stable indicators. Finally, monitoring can be used also for highlighting the contexts’ characteristics and 
changes
33
.  
 
If monitoring is to be a tool serving better integration policies, the definition of the target population is of the 
utmost importance. The type of monitoring instrument needed will vary depending on whether non-nationals 
or people with a migration background are included as target groups. In the former case, second and third 
generations are de facto excluded from the scope of the monitoring whilst in the latter case, needs may be 
better mapped and policies better designed if appropriate instruments are devised. Needs can also be 
pinpointed through the use of regional and local monitoring, using tools that focus on specific situations in 
specific locations. Integration needs also to be monitored in its entirety; i.e. it should be longitudinal as 
                                                          
33
 At this regard, Ismu Foundation had carried out a project in order to analyse integration practices and their contexts of reference. 
The EMILL project (acronym of European Modules and Integration at Local Level) permits to highlight the role of the context (in terms 
of administrative and legal dimensions) in supporting or hampering the integration practices implementation. For more info regarding 
the project we remind you at the project website: www.ismu.org/emill 
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integration is a long process, it should mirror reality of migrants’ lives, and should encompass all the different 
dimensions, and not just the economic one. Monitoring should be the stepping stone to political responses 
that, in turn, should be monitored so as to evaluate the extent to which those responses actually address 
identified needs.  
 
Non-discrimination is the third cross-cutting strategy analysed and is aimed at fighting direct and explicit as 
well as unintended or indirect discrimination and racism at institutional, collective and individual level. As 
mentioned above, evidence shows that institutional social exclusion is, through legislation, regulations and 
conventions the most powerful mechanism of social discrimination. In fact, given that legislation is the highest 
form of regulation of inclusion and exclusion, it determines legal discrimination. In this sense, anti-
discriminatory policies, following the rules that establish who belongs to the community and who does not, 
can only declare discriminatory acts against such rules. There are domains, on the contrary, where norms are 
settled to fight discrimination and where institutions are more attentive and active. This is the case in 
education, health, housing and, to a less extent, employment (where it is easier to skip from institutional 
controls). 
 
To a wider extent, in the context of changing societies due to the growing presence of migrants, Europe has 
to face a choice between two available options.  
 
It may continue considering migration as an exogenous phenomenon and looking at the changes occurring 
in the shape of its constituent societies as a problematic cultural threat. It also may favour the community 
of nationals to the detriment of migrants, discriminating the latter through sophisticated institutional 
devices.  
 
In this case, and under this wanted or unwanted choice, the risks Europe runs are high. Indeed,  
 
- Europe may go down the road of an ageing continent with fewer workers and therefore fewer tax 
payers or economic contributors, or, in a nutshell, fewer active citizens.  
 
- Europe may fill some of its labour market gaps with low-skilled workers, but it may consequently 
deprive itself of sources of innovation and human capital, in an ever-more competitive world, by 
opting for a suboptimal position.  
 
- Relationships between natives and ‘foreigners’ does not improve and young migrants, skilled or 
otherwise, are deterred from remaining.  
 
- For those migrants who do remain, the climate of distrust between the receiving society and 
‘foreigners’ will steadily undermine future generations’ trust in each other. Intended or unintended 
discrimination against ‘foreigners’ may disenchant first generations and subsequently generate 
negative perceptions amongst second and third generations towards the receiving society, fostering 
potential social conflict.  
 
Alternatively, Europe may change its current vision on integration and support the idea of societies made by 
both natives and migrants. Thus, not “us” and “them”, but “we”.  
 
This attitude would help to combat discrimination, to give open access to resources, to facilitate migrants’ 
empowerment and enable their full economic, social and political contribution to building societies across 
Europe. The challenge is burdensome but the long-term benefits are immensurable. Indeed, 
 
- Europe would reverse its current demographic trend of decline, ensuring at least in the short term, 
the sustainability of its economy and welfare state models. This could provide time for doing the 
structural changes that the new demographic trends indicate are required in the long term. 
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- Europe would increase the likelihood that migrants can realize their full potential, facilitating 
horizontal and vertical mobility and increasing its competitiveness. That will also act to attract highly 
skilled people 
 
- It would provide a climate of mutual understanding for newcomers that could be integrated into 
settled societies developing a true sense of belonging.  
 
- European societies would then produce fully-fledged citizens, committed to the development of their 
own societies.  
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